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Modern societies increasingly depend on the reliable functioning of urban infrastructure 
systems in the aftermath of natural disasters such as hurricane and earthquake events. 
Apart from a sizable capital for maintenance and expansion, the reliable performance of 
infrastructure systems under extreme hazards also requires strategic planning and 
effective resource assignment. Hence, efficient system reliability and risk assessment 
methods are needed to provide insights to system stakeholders to understand 
infrastructure performance under different hazard scenarios and accordingly make 
informed decisions in response to them. Moreover, efficient assignment of limited 
financial and human resources for maintenance and retrofit actions requires new methods 
to identify critical system components under extreme events. 
Infrastructure systems such as highway bridge networks are spatially distributed 
systems with many linked components. Therefore, network models describing them as 
mathematical graphs with nodes and links naturally apply to study their performance. 
Owing to their complex topology, general system reliability methods are ineffective to 
evaluate the reliability of large infrastructure systems. This research develops 
computationally efficient methods such as a modified Markov Chain Monte Carlo 
  
simulations algorithm for network reliability, and proposes a network reliability 
framework (BRAN: Bridge Reliability Assessment in Networks) that is applicable to 
large and complex highway bridge systems. Since the response of system components to 
hazard scenario events are often correlated, the BRAN framework enables accounting for 
correlated component failure probabilities stemming from different correlation sources. 
Failure correlations from non-hazard sources are particularly emphasized, as they 
potentially have a significant impact on network reliability estimates, and yet they have 
often been ignored or only partially considered in the literature of infrastructure system 
reliability. 
The developed network reliability framework is also used for probabilistic risk 
assessment, where network reliability is assigned as the network performance metric. 
Risk analysis studies may require prohibitively large number of simulations for large and 
complex infrastructure systems, as they involve evaluating the network reliability for 
multiple hazard scenarios. This thesis addresses this challenge by developing network 
surrogate models by statistical learning tools such as random forests. The surrogate 
models can replace network reliability simulations in a risk analysis framework, and 
significantly reduce computation times. Therefore, the proposed approach provides an 
alternative to the established methods to enhance the computational efficiency of risk 
assessments, by developing a surrogate model of the complex system at hand rather than 
reducing the number of analyzed hazard scenarios by either hazard consistent scenario 
generation or importance sampling. Nevertheless, the application of surrogate models can 
be combined with scenario reduction methods to improve even further the analysis 
efficiency. 
  
To address the problem of prioritizing system components for maintenance and 
retrofit actions, two advanced metrics are developed in this research to rank the criticality 
of system components. Both developed metrics combine system component fragilities 
with the topological characteristics of the network, and provide rankings which are either 
conditioned on specific hazard scenarios or probabilistic, based on the preference of 
infrastructure system stakeholders. Nevertheless, they both offer enhanced efficiency and 
practical applicability compared to the existing methods. 
The developed frameworks for network reliability evaluation, risk assessment, 
and component prioritization are intended to address important gaps in the state-of-the-art 
management and planning for infrastructure systems under natural hazards. Their 
application can enhance public safety by informing the decision making process for 
expansion, maintenance, and retrofit actions for infrastructure systems. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Urban societies heavily rely on functional and dependable infrastructure systems 
for their well-being. With the urban population throughout the world on a sharp 
and steady rise, maintaining minimum standards for the satisfactory functioning 
of infrastructure systems is gaining more attention, as evidenced by some of the 
short and long term policies in cities around the globe (NIST, 2009). However, 
the amount of attention and funding allocated to maintain minimum levels of 
reliability for critical infrastructure systems such as the power grid, water 
distribution networks, and highway bridge systems is not proportional to their 
critical importance, even in developed countries (Amin, 2003; NIST, 2009; 
ASCE, 2009). In the United States, professional communities have continuously 
tried to raise concern over the condition of infrastructure networks in recent years. 
For example, the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) report card on 
infrastructure systems gave an overall grade point average of D to the condition of 
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infrastructure in 2009, and estimated 2.2 trillion US Dollars must be invested 
during the next five years on all systems (ASCE 2009). A new report card 
published recently in 2013 shows only marginal improvements, and gives an 
overall average of D+ to the current state of infrastructure systems (ASCE 2013). 
The 2009 report, for example, labeled more than 26% of bridges in the highway 
transportation system as structurally deficient or functionally obsolete. The 
expansion of the power grid, on the other hand, is not proportional to growing 
demand, which may result in similar scenarios to the 2003 North America 
blackout (Andersson et al. 2005). The same situation is echoed in other parts of 
the world; for example, see EU Commission (2006) for a green paper on 
European Union’s state of energy systems. 
Estimating the reliability of infrastructure systems against natural or man-
made hazards is also of interest to system stakeholders and policy makers alike 
for the insights it provides for maintenance and expansion planning while 
ensuring public safety. Infrastructure systems are expected to maintain adequate 
functionality during normal operational conditions throughout their design 
lifetime; nonetheless, they must also provide the service required in the aftermath 
of extreme events, such as earthquakes and hurricanes (Chen et al.,  2002). 
Accordingly, system reliability in the context of this thesis is defined as the 
probability that the system satisfactorily fulfills its performance objective(s) given 
a specific hazard scenario. Equation 1.1 formulates the concept of reliability by 
defining its complement, the system failure probability: 
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where 
fP  is the failure probability of the system, h stands for a given hazard 
scenario event, x is the vector of variables influencing system reliability, ( ) fX x
denotes the joint probability density function of the input variables, and   0g x  
represents the limit state function, a hyper surface which separates regions of 
system failure and survival in the space identified by x. Equation 1.1 can be used 
to evaluate the reliability of a single structure such as a bridge, or a portfolio of 
structures as in highway bridge networks. The system performance metrics which 
are used to define the limit state function are specific to the type of system under 
study. For instance, an appropriate performance metric for electrical power 
transmission networks may be the number of customers who remain connected or 
the amount of available megawatts after a seismic or hurricane event. 
Furthermore, the system failure may be associated with a variety of scenarios, 
from the structural failure of a few key components, such as bridges of road 
transportation networks, to cascading failures triggered by a chain of events, as 
possible for power transmission systems. For most reliability problems, the limit 
state function   0g x  is not available in explicit form. Therefore, computing 
the system failure probability in Equation 1.1 often requires point estimations or a 
surrogate model to replace  g x  for numerical integration. Evaluating the system 
failure probability for complex systems is the first major objective of this 
research. Specifically, this thesis develops efficient methods to evaluate the 
system reliability for complex systems comprised of numerous components where 
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the limit state function is too contrived or unavailable in closed form. Application 
of the developed methods is demonstrated for three types of urban infrastructure 
systems: highway bridge networks, water distribution networks, and the power 
transmission grid. Most of the developed methods are focused towards highway 
bridge systems; however, they are applicable to other networked infrastructure 
systems as well with appropriate reliability objectives. 
System reliability evaluations can be integrated into a probabilistic risk 
analysis framework to estimate the exceedance rate of system failure 
probabilities. Evaluating the system failure probability by Equation 1.1 is 
contingent upon a given hazard scenario, which informs the joint probability 
density function ( )fX x . As the result, the estimated system failure probability is 
conditioned on a specific hazard scenario. In this regard, the risk analysis 
framework provides an opportunity to evaluate the unconditional probability of 
exceeding system failure probabilities, which is achieved by estimating the 
system reliability for multiple hazard scenarios, and account for the hazard 
scenarios’ annual rate of exceedance. The resulting risk curves can inform 
appropriate site-specific decision making for system stakeholders once the 
consequences of events in monetary or social terms are quantified. However, 
probabilistic risk assessment poses a computational challenge for infrastructure 
systems since system reliability evaluations must be performed multiple times. 
This challenge leads to the second major objective of this thesis: developing an 
efficient framework for probabilistic risk assessment of large, complex 
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infrastructure systems. Accordingly, achieving the first stated objective is a pre-
requisite of the second research objective. 
With limited resources at their disposal, the owners of infrastructure 
systems often need to prioritize the system components for maintenance and 
retrofit actions against natural hazards in order to achieve the targeted risk and 
reliability goals. For example, in a highway transportation system, the 
stakeholders must give priority to bridges which are located on the most critical 
routes and are most vulnerable to the concerned hazard. Devising a prioritization 
scheme gives rise to an optimization problem which can be very complicated to 
solve without simplifying assumptions. As the third and final major research 
objective, this thesis develops methodologies which rank the system components 
based on different criteria, both for a given hazard scenario and in a probabilistic 
framework. The developed methods do not require solving the contrived 
optimization problem, and instead rely on importance measures to rank 
component criticalities. 
1.1. Scope of Research 
This study focuses on the reliability and risk assessment of spatially 
distributed infrastructure systems against natural hazards such as seismic and 
hurricane loads, and develops computationally efficient methods to make such 
studies feasible for large and complex networks. Although essential for urban 
planning and public safety, evaluating infrastructure system performance and 
subsequent reliability estimation often requires large-scale and complicated 
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computations which may be prohibitive in practice (Chen et al. 2002; Dueñas-
Osorio and Rojo 2011; Frangopol and Bocchini 2012). However, reliability and 
risk assessments are critical for future infrastructure operation, maintenance, and 
renewal, thus highlighting the need for methods that can efficiently apply to 
networked systems without over simplification. Moreover, system level 
assessments need to consider correlated component failures and interdependence 
with other systems, which add to the problem complexity. 
Most infrastructure systems are spatially distributed over large areas with 
many components that interact to fulfill the objectives of the system. Network 
theory offers appropriate tools to model the behavior of infrastructure systems and 
study their reliability against a range of natural or man-made hazards. In their 
simplest forms, networks are modeled as a collection of nodes (vertices) 
connected together by links (edges). Networks are represented by either directed 
or undirected graphs denoted as G(N, L), where N denotes the set of  nodes in the 
network and of L is the set of links (Newman 2010). As an example, the set of 
nodes in the power grid may contain power generation plants, substations, and 
final consumption nodes such as residential homes, while the power lines 
connecting those nodes at the transmission and distribution level constitute the set 
of links. This research also adopts network models to study the performance of 
infrastructure systems at the component and system levels, and applies pertinent 
methods that balance efficiency and accuracy for system reliability and risk 
assessment of critical systems, including highway bridge networks, water 
distribution systems, and the power transmission grid. However, the application 
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of the developed methods is not limited to the three mentioned networks, as they 
may be generally employed for networked systems. 
The choice of performance metrics and reliability objectives are often 
specific to the type of the infrastructure system under study, but they can also be 
similar across different systems. Maintaining connectivity between source and 
consumption nodes, for example, is a relevant reliability objective among many 
infrastructure systems. This research considers a range of relevant performance 
metrics and reliability objectives for the different systems under study. Both 
structural failure of system components and the functional loss in the network 
performance as the result of component failures are emphasized. For instance, a 
highway transportation system may fail if critical destinations are inaccessible 
because the connecting brides are closed, or if the remaining path after the closure 
of some bridges is longer than an acceptable threshold (Chen et al. 2002; Liu et al. 
2006; Stergiou and Kiremidjian 2010; Bocchini and Frangopol 2011a). As 
another example, even if pipes and pump station structures in water distribution 
networks are likely to survive a hurricane event, the system may fail to provide 
the necessary water pressure for the consumption nodes due to blackouts which 
leave the pumps without power. This example highlights the significance of 
considering interdependent infrastructure systems for reliability and risk analysis, 
as the reliability of one system may depend on other systems (Dueñas-Osorio et 
al. 2007; Dueñas-Osorio et al. 2007; Hernandez-Fajardo and Dueñas-Osorio 
2011a; Hernandez-Fajardo and Dueñas-Osorio 2011b; Poljanšek et al. 2012; Hall 
et al. 2012). 
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The response of components of infrastructure systems to natural hazards is 
often correlated in a probabilistic risk analysis framework for a variety of reasons. 
For seismic hazard, many researchers have demonstrated that the intensity of 
excitations a portfolio of structures experience is correlated due to the 
geographical proximity of their locations (Wesson and Perkins 2001; Bocchini 
and Frangopol 2011b; Bommer and Crowley 2006; Jayaram and Baker 2009; Lee 
and Kiremidjian 2007). Neglecting these correlations can lead to underestimation 
of the system’s failure probability, as the mentioned studies have shown. In 
addition to the hazard-induced correlations, there are other factors which also 
influence the correlated response of components by affecting the resistance 
capacity of structures. Such factors include similar structural detailing and similar 
environmental conditions among other sources, and have been the subject of only 
a few studies (e.g. Lee and Kiremidjian 2007). Specifically, they can impose a 
correlation structure on the failure probabilities of system components, which can 
subsequently impact the system reliability. This research also proposes a 
methodology to quantify the correlations from non-hazard sources, and integrates 
them into a framework along with hazard-induced correlations for efficient 
reliability and risk assessment of large infrastructure systems. The resulting 
framework is called Bridge Reliability Assessment in Networks (BRAN), and 
enables exploring the impact of different correlation levels on the reliability of 
networks with varying topological characteristics. Such an exploration enables 
communicating the importance of considering common cause effects in 
infrastructure reliability studies more effectively. 
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Even with efficient network reliability methods, probabilistic risk 
assessments often become a computational challenge for large networks since 
many hazard scenarios need to be considered. In structural reliability problems, 
surrogate models developed by methods in statistical learning have made 
reliability and sensitivity analysis of large structures accessible with manageable 
errors (Dai et al. 2012; Dubourg et al. 2011; Echard et al. 2011; Hurtado 2004, 
2011). However, surrogate models, even in simple forms, have not been applied 
to network reliability and risk evaluations. This research employs advanced 
surrogate models to significantly relax the computational expense of seismic risk 
evaluations of networked systems, not by reducing the number of hazard 
scenarios, but by replacing costly simulations for each scenario to evaluate the 
network performance by a predictive model. The surrogate models in this work 
are developed by random forests (Breiman 2001), which are shown to be well 
suited for network reliability applications, and exemplified through synthetic and 
real systems. Establishing the surrogate models requires simulations on only a 
subset of hazard scenarios, and their application to large highway bridge networks 
is shown to produce results which are close to benchmark Monte Carlo 
simulations. Moreover, surrogate models produce even more accurate predictions 
if used along with hazard scenario reduction methods such as importance 
sampling (Jayaram and Baker 2010). Besides developing surrogate models by 
random forests, this research employs Fisher’s Discriminant Analysis, a linear 
model, in order to visualize the limit state function of high dimensional network 
reliability problems in two dimensions. The proposed methods to develop 
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surrogate models and visualization in networks make seismic risk evaluations 
accessible for large highway bridge systems, and can help network stakeholders 
concerned with efficient resource allocation. 
Finally, efficient ranking methods are pursued to prioritize system 
components for maintenance and retrofit actions. Prioritization is a relevant 
problem in practice for developing effective policies to ultimately mitigate risks 
from natural hazards (Fussell 1975; Ramirez-Marquez and Coit 2005; Lee et al. 
2011). Comprehensive ranking approaches need to consider the system reliability 
objectives along with the component vulnerabilities, and must measure the 
importance of components in fulfilling system-level objectives. This thesis 
reviews the existing approaches to address the problem of efficient resource 
assignment, and develops new importance measures to enhance upon the current 
state-of-the-practice, e.g. Buckle et al. (2006) for highway bridge networks, which 
often ignores system-level performance of components and solely focuses on 
component replacement costs in case of their failure. 
1.2. Summary and Research Objectives 
Reliability and risk assessment of urban networked infrastructure systems 
enables system stakeholders to make informed decisions regarding system 
maintenance and future expansions in order to protect public safety and optimize 
available resources. However, those assessments are often computationally 
expensive, which makes them impractical to implement for large and complex 
networks. On the other hand, the existing methods for reliability and risk 
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assessment of networked systems do not consider all correlation sources that 
influence the response of system components during natural hazards such as 
earthquakes, which can potentially lead to either over or underestimating the 
system reliability and thus, waste resources or put the public safety in danger. The 
research proposed in this thesis addresses those concerns by developing efficient 
frameworks for reliability and risk analysis of networked systems, and proposing 
novel prioritization methods to optimize resource allocation. The developed 
frameworks are applied to case study networks of existing infrastructure systems, 
and the results are compared against state-of-the-art methods to highlight their 
efficiency. 
Based on the discussions presented in this chapter, the objectives of this 
thesis may be summarized as follows: 
1. Develop efficient network reliability methods which are applicable to large, 
complex infrastructure systems. Such methods must be able to 
accommodate correlated component failure probabilities from various 
sources of correlations. 
2. Develop a framework for probabilistic risk assessments by fitting a 
surrogate model to the limit state function of networked systems. The 
surrogate model is instrumental to evaluate the annual exceedance rate of 
network reliability levels based on multiple hazard scenarios that enable 
risk quantification. 
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3. Develop efficient methods to prioritize network components under natural 
hazards by considering their vulnerabilities as well as role within the 
system. 
Based on the stated research objectives, the thesis is organized as follows. 
Chapter 2 reviews the existing literature on the reliability and risk assessment of 
networked systems. Chapter 3 presents the relevant and established methods in 
complex network reliability assessment, re-states the gaps in the literature, and 
introduces the BRAN methodology, which enables integrating correlations into 
the network reliability framework. Chapter 4 describes forming surrogate models 
for network reliability assessments, which can be used for probabilistic risk 
evaluations. Chapter 5 introduces the developed importance measures to prioritize 
system components, and describes the specific applications of each metric. The 
developed methodologies are all exemplified through case study networks in 
Chapter 6, which also offers discussions on the insights from those practical 
applications. Finally, Chapter 7 provides the concluding remarks, and lists the 
future research needs in the field. 
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Chapter 2 
Review of the Existing Literature on the 
Reliability and Risk Assessment of 
Infrastructure Systems 
This chapter reviews the advances in the reliability and risk evaluation of urban 
infrastructure systems, and summarizes the existing state-of-the-art methods for 
network reliability assessments and importance measures. Since infrastructure 
systems are modeled as networks, a brief introduction to network theory and its 
application to technological networks is presented first. The literature review 
consists of three subsections; each describing the advances for one of the 
infrastructure systems under study. Studying these systems (highway bridge 
networks, water distribution systems, and power transmission grid) requires 
system-specific performance metrics and reliability objectives, which are 
elaborated in their respective subsections. However, the reviews on the existing 
reliability and risk evaluation methods mainly focus on highway bridge networks 
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because advanced bridge fragility models exist in the literature which are 
developed based on the results of dynamic analysis of structures. Fragility models 
are presented as functions relating the probability of a structure being in a 
particular state to the intensity of hazards, and are used to estimate the bridge 
failure probabilities given a hazard scenario. In contrast, fragility models for the 
components of the other two systems have not received the same amount of 
attention in the literature.  
2.1. Network Models of Infrastructure Systems 
Mathematical networks or graphs are widely used in the natural and social 
sciences to model the interaction of systems with many components (Albert and 
Barabasi 2002). The new applications by researchers over many fields of science 
(physics, mathematics, engineering, biology, social sciences, etc.) continue 
promoting new ideas and methods to model and analyze the behavior of 
networked systems (Newman 2010). Accordingly, network models of 
infrastructure systems have appeared in numerous recent studies (e.g. Albert et al. 
2004; Cardillo et al. 2006; Dueñas-Osorio and Vemuru 2009; Hines et al. 2010; 
Yazdani and Jeffrey 2010). 
For network modeling, each system is represented by a directed (e.g. 
highway bridge network) or undirected (e.g. water distribution system, power 
transmission grid) graph G(N, L), with N and L denoting the sets of nodes and 
links, respectively. The adjacency matrix (A) is one way of describing the 
connections between nodes in the network, besides other representations such as 
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the edge list or the adjacency list (Newman, 2003). The adjacency matrix is a 
square matrix of size equal to the number of nodes in the network, where each 
entry Aij is equal to 1 if there is a direct link connecting node j to node i, and 0 
otherwise. The size of set N which is the number of nodes in the network is called 
the network order (n), while the number of links denotes the network size (l). 
Infrastructure systems are typically spatially distributed networks for transporting 
goods (data, commodities, humans, cars, etc.) across different nodes. Therefore, 
they often have special nodes as origin and destination (or source and sink) 
among which the transport takes place. Figure 2.1 represents a network of order 
six and size seven with two end nodes along with its adjacency matrix. Since this 
thesis is mainly concerned with the number of nodes in infrastructure systems, the 
term size is interchangeably used to refer to the network order (i.e. number of 
nodes). 
 
 
0 1 0 0 1 0
1 0 1 0 0 1
0 1 0 1 0 0
 
0 0 1 0 0 1
1 0 0 0 0 1
0 1 0 1 1 0
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
A  
Figure 2.1. Schematic six node network. O and D identify the origin and destination 
nodes, respectively. 
Since infrastructure systems are designed to transport goods between 
origin and destination nodes, those nodes must remain connected in order for the 
network to function satisfactorily. Therefore, the performance metric in many 
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network reliability studies against extreme hazards is connectivity, which 
examines for the existence of a path from the origin to the destination node(s). 
Connectivity is the minimum necessary condition for the network to function, 
preceding more sophisticated measures such as travel time or flow capacity. In the 
depicted example network of Figure 2.1, the network connectivity may be lost by 
removing Nodes 2 and 5, 3 and 4, or 3, 5, and 6, for instance, among other 
combinations. Examining connectivity is straightforward for small networks; 
however, efficient path finding algorithms are required for larger systems. 
Dijkstra (1959) presented one such algorithm, which finds the shortest path 
between two nodes in  O( log )l n n  operations, where O( )  denotes the 
asymptotic worst case computational complexity. 
From the system reliability point of view, networks with simple topology 
(i.e. simple networks) can be reduced to sets of series and parallel sub-systems 
which provide paths from the origin to the destination nodes. The reliability of 
those series and parallel subgraphs can be readily identified given their 
components’ failure probabilities before combining for the system reliability 
evaluation. Accordingly, the reliability of simple networks can be evaluated by 
established methods such as network reduction or event-tree analysis (Billinton 
and Allan 1992; Todinov 2007). Complex networks are not reducible to series and 
parallel sub-systems (e.g. Figure 2.1); however, regular decomposition algorithms 
can be used for small networks to extract simple network structures (Todinov 
2007). Nonetheless, such methods are infeasible to apply to large networks since 
the number of computations quickly increases with the size of the network under 
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study. Therefore, specific methods exist for complex networked systems (Section 
2.2) which may be categorized in two main classes of closed-form and 
approximate methods.  
Network reliability evaluations required component failure probabilities. 
The network components are typically assumed to have binary states (survival or 
failure), although problems with multiple component states can also be addressed 
with a few adjustments. The probability of a component being at either state is 
assessed by the component’s response to the subjecting hazard, and is determined 
from the component’s fragility model. For example, the failure probability of a 
bridge inside a bridge network under a seismic scenario may be the probability of 
exceeding a certain threshold displacement in its columns. Regardless of the 
method of choice, the network reliability is a function of component fragilities 
(probability of failure), topology of the network, and correlations among 
component responses to the hazard. In terms of Equation 1.1, the component 
fragilities and the correlation structure define the joint probability distribution 
( )fX x , and the network topology affects the limit state function   0g x . The 
developed Bridge Reliability Assessment in Networks (BRAN) methodology which 
is elaborated on in Chapter 3 provides more details on solving the complex 
network reliability problem with correlated component failures. 
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2.2. Review of Methods in Network Reliability Evaluations 
Since complex infrastructure networks are not reducible to subsets of 
series and parallel systems, specific closed-form and simulation-based methods 
have emerged in the literature to evaluate their reliability. The reliability of 
networks depends on component failure probabilities and correlations among 
them, as well as the network topology. In highway bridge networks, for instance, 
the location of origin and destination nodes, the number of paths connecting them, 
the reliability of bridges on those paths, and the correlations among bridge failure 
probabilities determine the network-level reliability. A brief review of the most 
recognized methods in complex network reliability assessment follows. 
2.2.1. Shortest Paths, Minimum Cut-Set Methods 
This class of methods is concerned with finding the minimum cut-sets and 
shortest paths from the origin to destination nodes to solve the connectivity 
reliability problem in networks. For unweighted graphs that are commonly used in 
network reliability studies, the shortest path is a path that goes over the minimum 
number of links between the origin and destination nodes, which is also the path 
with the minimum weight. A cut-set is a set of several nodes or links in a network 
whose removal separates the origin and destination nodes into two disjoint sub-
graphs. The minimum cut-set contains the minimum number of components to 
disconnect origin and destination nodes. Finding all disjoint shortest paths and 
cut-sets in a network determines the network reliability and probability of failure, 
respectively; resulting in an exact solution to the network reliability problem. 
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However, the number of paths and cut-sets grows exponentially with the number 
of components in a network, causing long computation times even for not very 
large networks (Billinton and Allan 1992; Todinov 2007). The Recursive 
decomposition algorithm or RDA (Li and He 2002; Liu and Li 2009; Liu and Li 
2012) is an attempt to address this concern by recursively identifying and 
removing exclusive paths until the remaining network is not complex anymore. 
The same strategy is also applicable by finding and removing exclusive cut-sets. 
Since the number of paths and cut-sets are very large in a system with hundreds or 
thousands of nodes, RDA approximates the network reliability by decomposing 
the network up to a desired level, leaving out the rest of paths and cut-sets for 
computational efficiency. Recently, Lim and Song (2012) further improved the 
method into a Selective Recursive Decomposition Algorithm where the most 
reliable path is sought after at each stage of the decomposition. This method has 
performed satisfactorily for small to medium size test networks; although its 
efficiency has not been examined for large infrastructure networks yet. Originally, 
methods based on recursive decomposition were applicable to a single pair of 
origin and destination nodes. Recently, Kim and Kang (2013) developed a 
framework to extend the recursive decomposition algorithm to multiple origin and 
destinations; however, their application may become intractable for larger 
networks. 
In summary, a major practical shortcoming of shortest path, minimum cut-
set class of methods emerges in their decreased efficiency in application to large 
networks over multiple origin-destination (O, D) pairs. However, they are more 
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computationally efficient when applied to small networks compared to simulation 
based methods, particularly for extremely high or very small network reliability 
levels. 
2.2.2. Matrix-Based System Reliability (MSR) Method 
Matrix-based system reliability (MSR) is an improvement upon original 
work on bounds on system reliability by Song and Der Kiureghian (2003), and 
provides a closed form solution to the network connectivity reliability problem. 
MSR establishes the power set of events (i.e. the complete set of are mutually 
exclusive and collectively exhaustive (MECE) events), and examines the 
connectivity among origin and destination nodes for each event. If a system 
comprises n components, 2nm   is the number of events in the power set. As for 
the MECE events, the system failure probability can be computed as: 
 P 'sysE  c p  2.1 
Where Esys is the event of system failure, cm×1 is a column vector of 0 and 1 
associated with MECE events leading to system survival and failure, respectively, 
and pm×1 represents the probabilities associated to each component of each event 
associated to 'c . Song and Kang (2009) present methods to efficiently produce 
vectors c and p, and apply MSR to evaluate the seismic reliability of multi-
member bridge structures where safety factors of the structural members are 
dependent due to respective correlations in their associated seismic demands. 
They also propose a method to analyze the sensitivity of system reliability 
estimates. MSR has also been applied to reliability assessment of bridge networks 
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with simplified layouts (e.g. Kang et al., 2008). The major challenge for MSR lies 
in its computation complexity for large networks, where the number of events in 
the power set grows exponentially with the number of components in the network 
and become intractable. Similar to the recursive decomposition algorithm, bounds 
on system reliability may be established to relax the computations; however, the 
most probable events may not be identified (Der Kiureghian and Song 2008). 
MSR has also been used in a bridge seismic network reliability analysis with a 
simple flow-based reliability objective (Lee et al., 2011). 
2.2.3. System Reliability Method for Radial Topologies 
Special network topologies can enable increased computational efficiency 
in reliability assessment studies. Accordingly, a new combinatorial method was 
recently proposed that provides closed form solutions when applied to networks 
with radial topology. Since power distribution systems have tractable radial 
layouts, they are well-suited for the application of this method (Dueñas-Osorio 
and Rojo 2011). For power networks application, the method examines the 
connectivity of the source node to all other nodes (one to all). The methodology 
used in this approach reduces the number of computations for a system with n 
components from O(2
n
) to O(n
3
) by relying on recursion principles. While the 
combinatorial closed-form method could account for correlated component 
failures by O(2
n-1
) computations, the complexity can still be reduced to O(n
2
) if 
correlations are ignored (Rojo and Duenas-Osorio 2011). 
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To apply the closed-form recursive reliability assessment methodology to 
risk assessment problems, Dueñas-Osorio and Rojo (2011) used the number of the 
served consumers as the network performance metric, and provided the 
probability mass function (PMF) of the served consumers based on service nodes 
connected to the source. Further improvements upon the uncorrelated version 
have provided approximate methods to compute the PMF of more general 
systems very efficiently, making it desirable relative to Monte Carlo based 
simulations for this application while providing component and event importance 
measures. 
2.2.4. Simulation Based Methods 
Monte Carlo based methods are widely used for reliability assessment of 
large networks, due to their general applicability (e.g. transportation networks: 
Kiremidjian et al. 2007 and Jayaram and Baker 2010; power networks: Allan and 
Billinton 2000). Since network reliability evaluations by Monte Carlo simulations 
do not require enumerating paths and cut-sets or decomposing the system into 
MECE events, they are relatively simple to implement. However, simulation 
based methods face two challenges: 1) their computational complexity may limit 
the size of the network that can be analyzed (although less limiting than most 
closed form solutions), and 2) they are computationally inefficient in evaluating 
low system failure probabilities. Nevertheless, algorithms based on Monte Carlo 
simulation coupled with other stochastic and heuristic techniques may efficiently 
solve the network reliability problem with thousands of nodes, and help overcome 
some of the noted limitations within reasonable accuracy. Moreover, Monte Carlo 
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based methods can seamlessly integrate correlated component failures for 
network reliability assessment, and, therefore, they are the method of choice in 
this thesis. Since crude Monte Carlo simulations are often computationally 
inefficient, particularly to evaluate extreme probabilities, variance reduction 
techniques are used throughout this thesis to increase their efficiency. 
Accordingly, quasi Monte Carlo sampling (Korobov 1957; Halton 1960; 
Niederreiter 1992; Lemieux 2009) and importance sampling are discussed in 
Chapters 3 and 4, respectively, for reliability and risk assessment. Furthermore, 
simulation based network reliability assessment allows for parallelization 
algorithms, which enables using cluster computing to significantly reduce the 
computation time. The case studies (Chapter 6) also highlight the efficiency 
gained by reducing the number of simulations. The literature offers other methods 
to increase the efficiency of the simulations as well, most notably the subset 
simulations (Au and Beck 2001). 
As the most basic form of simulation based methods, Naïve Monte Carlo 
simulations can be applied to evaluate the reliability of networked systems, with 
any number of origin and destination pairs. Component failures are realized based 
on their reliability in each Monte Carlo simulation, and the reliability of the 
remainder of the network is evaluated by the performance metric of choice (which 
is connectivity here). Table 2.1 presents the steps to evaluate the connectivity 
reliability in a network with n components. 
Generating the n-dimensional uniform random variable u by quasi-random 
sequences such as the Sobol sequence or Latin Hypercube sampling can greatly 
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enhance the efficiency of the Naïve Monte Carlo method. Although the Naïve 
Monte Carlo method provides a simple implementation, its efficiency decreases 
when several (O, D) pairs are considered and the reliabilities in b are high. The 
BRAN methodology employs a different simulation based method, the Markov 
Chain Monte Carlo simulations, which is more efficient for multiple origin and 
destinations, as discussed in Chapter 3. 
Table 2.1. Pseudo-algorithm of naïve Monte Carlo method for network connectivity 
reliability 
1 START 
2 INPUT 
3 
Component reliabilities [0,1 ]nb ; NMC: number of Monte Carlo 
simulations; origin and destination nodes (O, D) 
4 0r   
5 for k = 1:NMC 
6 Simulate [0,1 ]nu  
7 Set  t u b  
8 For all i where ( ) 0t i   : remove component i from the network 
9 
Run an algorithm such as Dijkstra (1959) to examine (O, D) 
connectivity 
10 If the connectivity is lost, set 1r r   
11 end 
12 f
MC
rP
N

 
13 END 
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2.2.5. Summary and Research Gaps 
Monte Carlo based methods for system reliability, particularly by variance 
reduction techniques, can be applied to estimate the network reliability of large 
infrastructure systems with correlated component failures. However, the 
computational efficiency of the Naïve Monte Carlo method for network reliability 
assessment decreases over multiple (O, D) pairs, particularly to estimate extreme 
failure probabilities. When computationally intensive tasks such as sensitivity 
analysis for network reliability assessment is intended, such constraints may 
become limiting in application to large networks. Similarly, probabilistic risk 
assessment requires many network reliability evaluations, which suggests more 
computationally efficient methods are required for such applications. Among 
closed form solutions for general network topology, recursive decomposition 
algorithms have shown promising results over small networks. However, their 
application to large networks with correlated component failures and multiple (O, 
D) pairs becomes intractable. Therefore, the BRAN methodology focuses on 
simulation based methods, and employs variance reduction techniques and more 
efficient algorithms to relax the computational complexity. 
2.3. Advances in Reliability Evaluations of Critical 
Infrastructure Systems 
This section reviews the existing literature on reliability evaluations of the 
three critical infrastructure systems studied in this thesis along with their 
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applicable performance metrics and reliability objectives. Literature review on the 
highway bridge networks also includes probabilistic risk assessment and 
importance measures. The reviews identifie gaps in the existing research and 
areas in need of improvement. 
2.3.1. Highway Bridge Networks 
Bridge structures are vulnerable against natural hazards such as 
earthquakes and hurricanes. The fragility of bridges against natural hazards 
depends on many factors such as bridge type, material, proximity to deteriorating 
agents and environments, soil-structure interaction, and fatigue loading from 
crossing traffic, among others (Weyers et al. 1994; Nielson and DesRoches 2007; 
Choe et al. 2008; Ghosh and Padgett 2010). Advanced bridge fragility assessment 
frameworks (e.g. Ghosh et al. 2013; Rokneddin et al. 2013) consider most of 
these factors to evaluate the vulnerability of aging highway bridges under extreme 
hazards such as earthquakes, and provide bridge specific models to estimate their 
failure probability for spectral accelerations or displacements induced by a given 
hazard scenario. Moreover, these models can take advantage of data from bridge 
instrumentation of a select number of bridges to update the expected value of the 
deterioration parameters throughout the network and enhance the fragility 
estimates (Ghosh et al. 2013). The developed BRAN methodology employs time-
dependent fragility models by Ghosh et al. (2013) to estimate the present-day 
reliability of bridges in the network. 
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At the network level, highway networks must maintain connectivity 
among critical nodes in the network as a minimum objective in the aftermath of a 
seismic or hurricane event (Chen et al. 2002; Rokneddin et al. 2012). The 
necessary connectivity condition is satisfied if the path between the critical origin 
and destination nodes remains connected after an extreme event, during which a 
number of bridges are expected to reach a damage state requiring short or long 
term closure to repair or replace. Reaching the extensive damage state is 
considered failure in this thesis, resulting in the unavailability of the bridge in the 
aftermath of natural disasters. To maintain an acceptable level of service, the 
remainder of the highway network must have enough paths and redundant traffic 
capacity to keep the average travel time below an acceptable threshold. 
Accordingly, most highway system reliability studies consider either connectivity 
or traffic flow metrics under seismic hazards (e.g. Liu et al. 2006; Lee and 
Kiremidjian 2007; Kang et al. 2008; Stergiou and Kiremidjian 2010; Bocchini and 
Frangopol 2011a; b; Chang et al. 2012; Rokneddin et al. 2012, 2013). The same 
reliability objectives and performance metrics are applicable for hurricane-
induced loads as well; however, most of the existing literature of bridge network 
reliability evaluations focuses on the seismic hazard, as bridge fragility models 
under hurricane loads have only emerged very recently (e.g. Padgett et al. 2012; 
Ataei and Padgett 2013). 
This thesis elects network connectivity as the reliability objective for 
highway bridge networks, similar to Lim and Song (2012) and Liu and Li (2012), 
as connectivity satisfies the minimum necessary condition for network 
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functioning in the event of an extreme hazard. The network reliability methods 
reviewed in Section 2.2 are also consistent with this reliability objective. 
Accordingly, the computational complexity posed by the size of the network 
(highway bridge networks may contain hundreds or thousands of bridges) 
emphasizes the need for computationally efficient methods. 
Until recently, the prevalent practice in seismic reliability studies of bridge 
networks assumed independent bridge failures for reliability and risk evaluations 
(e.g. Liu et al., 2006). The independence assumption can simplify the 
computations, but recent research has revealed that it can lead to unrealistic 
reliability or seismic loss estimates (e.g. Lee and Kiremidjian 2007; Jayaram and 
Baker 2010; Bocchini and Frangopol 2011b; Lim and Song 2012). However, the 
majority of the existing literature highlights the significance of correlated bridge 
responses to seismic intensities in a probabilistic risk assessment, and little has 
been done in formulating correlated responses due to other factors (Kiremidjian et 
al. 2007). Seismic intensity correlations are triggered by factors such as the 
geographical proximity of the bridges in a transportation network, which result in 
correlated structural response and subsequently correlated bridge failure 
probabilities which affect the network reliability evaluations. Intensity 
correlations in spatially distributed networks arise from inter- and intra-event 
dependencies carried by ground motions and included in attenuation models 
(Wesson and Perkins 2001; Crowley and Bommer 2006; Jayaram and Baker 
2009). Equation 2.2 presents the general form of ground motion models with the 
two error terms combined that capture the observed dependence: 
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ln( )ln( ) ( ) imim f  arg  2.2 
where im is the intensity measure at the location of network bridges, arg is a 
vector representing the arguments of the attenuation relationship (such as the 
earthquake magnitude, distance to the seismogenic rupture area, and subsurface 
conditions), and ln(im) is the combined error term, which is normally distributed 
with mean zero. To conduct a probabilistic risk assessment, the performance of 
the network must be evaluated for multiple hazard scenarios, each specifying the 
intensity level at the location of all bridges. The proximity of bridge locations 
imposes correlations among the intensity they experience, which defines the 
normal distribution of the error term. The hazard intensity scenarios which are 
generated by simulating the intra- and inter-event error terms are called network-
consistent in this thesis, and used for probabilistic risk assessment, as described in 
Crowley and Bommer (2006). However, if the network reliability evaluation is 
desired for one scenario only, the error term in Equation 2.2 can be set to zero, 
i.e., its mean value (Wesson et al. 2009). 
Unlike intensity correlations, the impact of bridge failure correlations 
originating from correlated bridge structural capacities and network location has 
not received much attention. The structural vulnerabilities of bridges may be 
correlated due to factors such as the structural conditions of the bridges, similar 
construction detailing, traffic flows through the network, fatigue, and proximity to 
deteriorating environments, amongst others (Kiremidjian et al. 2007). The impact 
of such sources on correlated seismic response of structures is not always known, 
nor have all potential sources of correlations been identified. The BRAN 
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methodology introduced in Chapter 3 quantifies the impact of correlations that 
stem from known factors different from hazards, while the case study application 
presented in Chapter 6 highlights the significance of accounting for the resulting 
correlations among bridge failure probabilities. 
2.3.1.1. Probabilistic Seismic Risk Assessment 
Some of the existing literature on the risk assessment of highway bridge 
networks is not concerned with network models. Those studies consider the 
bridge system as a spatially distributed portfolio of bridge structures, and are only 
concerned with the direct repair and replacement cost of bridge structures and no 
regard for the indirect costs from delayed or lost travels (e.g. Lee and Kiremidjian 
2007). However, many studies suggest that the cost of delayed traffic and lost 
travels in the aftermath of a seismic event surpasses the direct loss due to 
structural repair and replacement of bridges (e.g. Luna et al. 2008; Enke et al. 
2008). Accordingly, the majority of recent risk assessment studies consider the 
role of transportation system components in networks. Those studies, 
consequently, evaluate the systemic risk using metrics such as travel time or 
connectivity, either in addition to the structural repair cost or in solitary (e.g. 
Stergiou and Kiremidjian 2010; Jayaram and Baker 2010; Bocchini and 
Frangopol 2011; Lim and Song 2012). 
Chapter 5 offers a probabilistic risk assessment framework, in which the 
network performance metric is the network failure probability, which is related to 
indirect costs from lost travels. Since risk analysis corresponds to evaluating the 
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probability of exceeding different system performance levels, performing a 
probabilistic risk assessment requires estimating 
0P[ ]f fP P  for multiple values 
of
0 [0,1 ]fP  . Therefore, risk assessment requires multiple network reliability 
evaluations for different hazard scenarios, which is computationally intensive for 
large and complex networks. The use of advanced surrogate models, such as those 
formed by methods in statistical learning, relaxes the computational complexity 
by developing a predictive model of ( )g x  to replace network reliability 
evaluations by Monte Carlo analysis. The surrogate models are formed by fitting 
a model to a subset of the hazard scenarios to be analyzed. As the result, network 
reliability evaluations can be performed using the predictive model (i.e. direct 
evaluation) instead of Monte Carlo simulations for the seismic scenarios not 
included in the model developing subset. 
The seismic risk assessment literature for transportation networks offers 
other techniques to reduce the number of scenario analyses as well. For example, 
importance sampling may be employed to perform the network reliability 
assessments on a select number of scenarios (Jayaram and Baker 2010). Hazard-
consistent probabilistic scenarios have also been proposed for this application 
(Chang et al. 2000; Vaziri et al. 2012). The surrogate model approach proposed 
by this thesis provides an alternative to enhance the computational efficiency, not 
by reducing the number of hazard-induced events, but by developing a surrogate 
model of the complex system at hand. Nevertheless, the proposed method can be 
also applied in conjunction with the existing methods to further enhance the 
computational efficiency. The application of surrogate models for network 
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reliability evaluations is exemplified through several synthetic networks in 
Chapter 5 as well as by the case study bridge network in South Carolina, US 
(Chapter 6). While the synthetic networks show the applicability of the proposed 
method, its application to the existing highway bridge network in South Carolina 
highlights the improved efficiency which can be achieved by adopting a surrogate 
model and further enhanced with employing hazard scenarios generated by 
importance sampling. 
2.3.1.2. Importance Measures for Bridge Retrofit Prioritization 
Due to its significance, seismic retrofit prioritization has been the subject 
of many studies in highway bridge networks. Prioritization studies have either 
focused on optimizing the retrofit and replacement costs in bridge networks, or 
developing importance measures that can rank the criticality of bridges without 
solving a full combinatorial optimization problem. Stergiou and Kiremidjian 
(2010) proposed a two stage stochastic programming methodology to find the 
optimal set of bridges and minimize system damage given a set available budget. 
Although many simplifications are made, their presented method may be overly 
complex in practical applications due to the size of the problem. Moreover, since 
bridges are grouped into classes based on the type and cost of replacement, the 
results only identify clusters of bridges rather than individual ones with maximum 
impact. One reason for this shortcoming is that their study is mainly concerned 
with minimizing the overall retrofit cost rather than prioritizing the bridges, and a 
more detailed prioritization scheme would add to the complexity of the problem. 
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Methods evolving from importance measures are generally preferred in 
large highway bridge networks for their computational advantages. A review of 
the existing importance measure methods is presented by Song and Der 
Kiureghian (2005) and Rokneddin et al. (2012). Chapter 5 also presents the most 
widely used metrics to rank the seismic criticality of bridges in highway bridge 
networks. In practice, the Seismic Retrofit Manual for Highway Structures 
(Buckle et al. 2006) provides empirical methods to identify the most critical 
bridges in a network. These methods consider individual bridge vulnerabilities 
and the replacement cost of bridge structures; however, they fall short of taking 
the topology and system-level reliability of networks into consideration. On the 
other hand, the network theory literature also offers purely topological metrics 
which can be considered a first order proxy to flow in networks (i.e. traffic in 
highway networks). The Betweenness Centrality (BC) (Freeman 1977) is a prime 
example of the topological metrics used to rank component criticalities. However, 
topological measures do not consider bridge fragilities and are not conditional on 
the extreme events either. To address these concerns, conditional importance 
measures (CIM) are introduced in the literature to incorporate individual 
component fragilities with their role in fulfilling the network objectives (Ramirez-
Marquez and Coit 2005; Song and Kang 2009; Rokneddin et al. 2012). CIM 
rankings are more comprehensive than empirical methods in practice or 
topological metrics, but they are more computationally intensive as they require 
solving the non-reducible network reliability problem for complex networks. 
Their dependence on network reliability also implies that CIM rankings are 
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sensitive to the choice of origin and destination nodes, which makes them highly 
adapted to specific reliability objectives. Moreover, the rankings provided by CIM 
only apply to the hazard scenario considered for network reliability. 
Rokneddin et al. (2012) developed Bridge Rank (BR), an importance 
measure which combines component fragilities with their topological significance 
in the network. Bridge Rank produces a ranking which does not depend on the 
choice of origin and destination nodes, and therefore, virtually considers all 
existing path in the network (i.e. an all to all ranking). However, and similar to 
CIM, BR rankings also applies only to the hazard scenario considered to estimate 
component fragilities. For a probabilistic ranking, another method is developed in 
this thesis which ranks bridge criticalities based on the impact of their failure on 
network reliability objectives in probabilistic risk assessments. This importance 
measure is developed using surrogate models for the network’s limit state 
function by statistical learning methods, and is explained along with the other 
discussed methods in Chapter 5. 
2.3.2. Water Distribution Networks 
Components of water distribution networks (e.g. pump stations, water 
tanks, pipes and junctions) are directly vulnerable against seismic loading and 
aging; however, direct damage from other phenomena, such as wind-induced 
loads and flooding, is relatively negligible since most of the infrastructure in 
buried underground. Nevertheless, interdependency with the power transmission 
network results in indirect loss of performance, as hurricane-induced outages in 
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the power system is followed by subsequent failure of source nodes in the water 
systems (i.e. pump stations). Evidence of interdependence-induced vulnerability 
against recent hurricane events such as Katrina in 2005 and Ike  in 2008 is well 
documented in the literature (e.g. Comfort 2006; Miller et al. 2011). 
The performance of water distribution networks under different hazards 
may be studied by different metrics, such as maintaining connectivity from source 
to consumption nodes, or providing a minimum water pressure for system 
customers. Regardless of the metric of choice, the impact of interdependencies 
between water distribution networks and electrical power systems must be 
included in the analysis, as it may have a significant impact on water network 
reliability estimates (Rinaldi et al. 2001; Lee et al. 2007; Adachi and Ellingwood 
2008; Hernandez-Fajardo and Dueñas-Osorio 2011; Poljanšek et al. 2012). 
Traditionally, the performance of water distribution networks is studied by 
deterministic hydraulic models such as EPANET (U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency (USEPA) 2000) with defined topology, geometry, demand levels, and 
water sources (e.g. Fujiwara and Jun Li 1998; Li and Lence 2007; Raad et al. 
2010). Where probabilistic approaches are considered for reliability analysis, the 
majority of the existing literature adopts connectivity-based metrics to estimate 
the network reliability, and often ignore the interdependence effects for simplicity 
and computational efficiency. On the other hand, studies that consider hydraulic 
analysis are not generally concerned with high consequence and low probability 
extreme events such as earthquakes and hurricanes, and focus on normal 
operational conditions (Wagner et al. 1988; Bao 1990; Wu et al. 1993). 
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To address the inadequacy of performance metrics in the literature of 
reliability assessment in water distribution networks, a new methodology is 
presented in Chapter 6 for the reliability analysis of a case study water 
distribution network under hurricane hazard with a hydraulic-based reliability 
objective. This study also highlights the impact of considering interdependencies 
between power and water systems on water network reliability. To simplify the 
procedure, the damage propagations in water and power systems are addressed 
separately; resulting in a two stage framework that is elaborated later. 
2.3.3. Power Transmission Networks 
The power transmission grid is arguably the most critical urban 
infrastructure system with high interdependencies with many other systems such 
as water distribution, telecommunications, the Internet, transportation networks, 
etc. (Rinaldi et al., 2001; Lee et al., 2007). Despite their critical importance, 
power transmission networks have expanded at a rate much slower than the 
increase in electricity demand during the past couple of decades which has left 
them more vulnerable to disruptions from natural hazards and targeted attacks 
(EU Commission 2006). Furthermore, even though the power grid in the United 
States is estimated to function with around 99.9% reliability, the blackouts and 
power cuts still cost the economy tens of billions of dollars annually when 
aggregated from its distribution level (Pipattanasomporn et al. 2005; Thornton 
and Monroy 2011). 
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 Power transmission systems are comprised of power generation stations, 
voltage transforming substations, and power lines carried by transmission towers. 
Both nodes and links in power transmission networks are vulnerable against a 
wide range of natural (seismic, hurricane, tornado) and man-made (terrorism, 
vandalism, cyber attack) hazards, which complicates reliability studies in real 
systems. Moreover, and similar to other infrastructure networks, the topology of 
power transmission systems makes them complex. 
The performance of power transmission systems under hazards has been 
studied by network topological indices (Albert et al. 2004) as well as various 
power flow metrics such as the Direct Current (DC) power flow model (Dobson 
et al. 2007) with different modeling complexities. Cascading failures in power 
transmission networks, which account for the fact that a few component failures 
in power distribution networks may lead to disproportional failure propagation in 
the system and result in large scale failures, is a critical consideration in power 
network reliability (Wang and Rong 2009). Furthermore, interdependence with 
other infrastructure systems makes reliability analysis of power transmission 
networks a challenging study (Ouyang and Dueñas-Osorio 2011a). 
A major obstacle in evaluating the reliability of power transmission 
systems is that the reliability of system components is not always known. 
Furthermore, although the literature offers many reliability indices to evaluate the 
performance of power transmission systems, they are becoming less adequate in 
the environment created by deregulation of the power grid in recent years (Kropp 
2006; Allan and Billinton 2000). Deregulation has introduced new challenges by 
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causing deviation from centrally planned and operated power systems which 
resulted in separate entities being responsible for power generators, transmission, 
and distribution (Allan and Billinton 2000). Additionally, the increasing 
availability of renewable energy and the emergence of the smart grid are changing 
the old power grid models. Therefore, reliability estimates may be poor due to 
insufficient data or assumptions that are not accurate in the new environment (e.g. 
neglecting cyber attacks). Moreover, unforeseen events may happen as surprises 
for which the system was not analyzed for (Aven 2008). 
A different approach to study the performance of the system against 
undesirable events is to systematically evaluate system weaknesses against all 
possible contingencies, known or unknown. This approach is known as 
vulnerability analysis, and has been applied to study the performance of both 
synthetic networks (Crucitti et al. 2004; Grubesic et al. 2008) and real power 
systems (Solé et al. 2008) in the recent past. A vulnerability analysis is 
particularly suited for power transmission systems since it does not require 
knowledge on the nature of hazards. Instead, it provides estimates of the negative 
consequences associated with all possible states the system can be subject to, due 
to any possible hazard. Moreover, reliability studies mostly focus on 
contingencies involving the failure of power lines; however, the performance of 
power transmission systems is also affected by the failure of power generation 
plants and substations. Albeit rare compared to transmission lines failure, their 
loss can cause considerable direct risks and cost to users, as well as indirect 
failures in interdependent systems (US–Canada Power System Outage Task Force 
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2004). A simple form of vulnerability analysis, the N – 1 criterion, is widely used 
in reliability studies of power networks. N – 1 criterion states that the system must 
provide enough redundancies to be able to function satisfactorily in case any 
single component of the system fails. The vulnerability analysis expands that 
concept to N – 2, N – 3, and further combinations. 
Although network reliability methods reviewed in this chapter are also 
applicable to estimate the reliability of power transmission systems under natural 
hazards, the application shown in Chapter 6 adopts a vulnerability approach. 
Rather than direct reliability evaluation against a specific hazard scenario, 
topologically-informed bounds are established on system performance against all 
possible failure scenarios in a vulnerability analysis. Such bounds can provide an 
approximate solution to network reliability for all types of hazards, and therefore, 
can complement the reliability analysis as a screening tool for rapid assessments. 
2.4. Summary 
The review of the literature on infrastructure reliability and risk evaluation 
against extreme hazards highlights the significance of the three research 
objectives enlisted in Chapter 1 of this thesis, which are: 1) Developing a 
computationally efficient network reliability framework applicable to large and 
complex networked systems, 2) Developing an efficient risk assessment 
framework to combine network reliability evaluations with probabilistic hazard 
analysis, and 3) Developing new importance measures which account for both 
component vulnerabilities and the function of components within the network. 
40 
 
The existing network reliability methods are not efficient to apply to large 
complex infrastructure systems, especially with correlated component failures. 
Moreover, the existing literature is focused on correlations induced by hazard 
intensity levels, and does not provide a framework to consider other factors 
affecting the structural capacity of system components against natural hazards. 
Furthermore, probabilistic risk assessment requires multiple network reliability 
evaluations, a task which may become intractable with the existing methods. 
However, network surrogate models developed by statistical learning methods can 
significantly enhance the analysis. Finally, more advanced importance measures 
are required to prioritize system components for retrofit and maintenance actions 
against natural hazards. Such importance measures must account for component 
fragilities and their significance in fulfilling the network reliability objective. At 
the same time, they must provide a balance between the computational 
complexity required for ranking and applicability in practice. 
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Chapter 3 
BRAN Methodology: Bridge Reliability 
Assessment in Networks 
The Bridge Reliability Assessment in Networks (BRAN) is developed as a general 
framework for reliability evaluations of large bridge networks with complex topology 
and correlated bridge failure probabilities (Ghosh et al. 2013; Rokneddin et al. 2013). 
This framework improves upon the state-of-the-art in two ways: 1) by evaluating seismic 
fragilities for aging highway bridges in a network after Bayesian updating of spatially 
interpolated/measured deterioration parameters; and 2) by estimating the network 
reliability of large systems considering correlated bridge failures. This integrated 
methodology is summarized in Table 3.1, and is explained throughout this chapter. The 
application of the BRAN methodology is also exemplified in Chapter 6 on a case study 
highway bridge network in South Carolina, US. 
The BRAN methodology focuses on quantifying the impact of correlations that 
stem from bridge structural capacities under joint seismic and aging threats. While the 
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previous chapter reviewed the literature of seismic intensity induced correlations, little 
has been done to assess the impact of factors correlating the bridge structural capacities, 
and hence, their failure probability. Some of factors affecting the structural vulnerability 
of bridges (such as the effects of the corrosive agents) are directly modeled in bridge 
fragility models (Stage 1 of Table 3.1). This study, therefore, is concerned with the 
significant contributing factors which are not integrated into bridge fragility models. The 
resulting correlations among bridge failure probabilities are referred to as “extra 
correlations” in this thesis. 
Table 3.1. The BRAN methodology to assess bridge network reliability 
1 Determine the bridge failure probabilities from their respective seismic fragility model 
2 
Evaluate correlations among bridge failure probabilities and set up the correlation 
structure 
3 
Simulate bridge failure scenarios according to their joint probability distributions by the 
Dichotomized Gaussian Method 
4 
Estimate network reliability by the modified Markov Chain Monte Carlo simulations 
method 
 
Individual bridge failure probabilities are determined in Stage 1 by a 
parameterized fragility formulation approach which updates the statistical distributions of 
the deterioration parameters using available data from bridge instrumentations (Ghosh et 
al. 2013). While BRAN provides a general framework for network reliability evaluations, 
Stage 2 proposes methods to determine the correlation values when direct estimates are 
not available. Finally, Stages 3 and 4 estimate the bridge network reliability by simulated 
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bridge failure scenarios drawn from their joint probability distribution, which is 
consistent with bridge failure probabilities and the correlation matrix. 
Generating realizations of correlated bridge failures is equivalent to simulating 
samples from an n-dimensional (n being the number of bridges in the network) binary 
random variable as the state of each bridge is a binary random variable with values equal 
to 0 for survival and 1 for failure. The expected value of the n-dimensional binary 
random variable, therefore, is also the vector of marginal probabilities (bridge failure 
probabilities from Stage 1), while its covariance matrix can be established from the 
correlation matrix (R) across failure probabilities. The process of forming the correlation 
matrix and simulating samples from the n-dimensional binary random variable are 
explained in detail throughout this chapter; after the next section clarifies how the 
network reliability is affected by accounting for correlated bridge failure probabilities. 
3.1. Impact of Extra Correlations on Network Reliability 
Assessments 
The connectivity reliability of bridge networks depends on the bridge failure 
probabilities, the correlation structure among failures, and the topology of the network 
which defines the paths from the origin to the destination. To illustrate the correlation 
effects, first consider a network consisting of merely two nodes where both nodes must 
survive for the network to remain functional. The network probability of failure may be 
written as: 
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      1 2 1 2 1 2P F F P F F P(F F )fP P     3.1 
where Fi denotes the failure event of node i. A positive correlation between the two 
failure events has a favorable effect on network reliability as it increases
1 2P(F F ) , and 
therefore, reduces the network failure probability (Pf). A negative correlation, on the 
other hand, increases the vulnerability of the network. Before expanding the problem, 
consider the following two equalities on two given events A and B: 
    A B A BP P 1 P(A B)    3.2 
    A B A BP P 1 P(A B)    3.3 
Equations 3.2 and 3.3 state De Morgan’s law, and can also be visually derived 
using a Venn diagram. It is readily inferred that a positive correlation among events A 
and B increases the probability of their joint union event which in turn induces an 
increase in the left hand side (L.H.S) of Equation 3.2 and a decrease in the L.H.S. of 
Equation 3.3 by the same amount. Consider now the network presented in Figure 3.1. The 
network failure probability may be expressed by mutually exclusive collectively 
exhaustive events as in Equation 3.4: 
      1 1 4 24 3P F F P F F P F FfP    3.4 
Equation 3.4 may be derived by a recursive decomposition algorithm, similar to 
that presented in Liu and Li (2012). Based on Equations 3.2 and 3.3, the network 
reliability in Figure 3.1 is favorably affected by a positive correlation between events F1 
and F4, and a negative correlation between F2 and F3. The first term in the right hand side 
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(R.H.S.) of Equation 3.4 decreases and the increase in  1 4P F F  is weighted by 
 2 3P F F  (which decreases itself); inducing an overall reduction in Pf. Accordingly, the 
worst correlation scenario for the example network happens when events  F1 and F4 are 
negatively correlated while F2 and F3 are positively correlated at the same time. 
 
Figure 3.1. Example of a reducible network topology 
These arguments may be expanded to more complicated networks. The network 
connectivity reliability is favorably affected by negative correlations among nodes on a 
cut-set (e.g. Nodes 2 and 3 in Figure 3.1) as well as positive correlations among nodes on 
a chain which include the origin and destination nodes. In small networks where full 
network decomposition can be carried out to identify all cut-sets and shortest paths in the 
network, the impact of correlations on the network reliability may be qualitatively 
assessed by examining correlations among nodes on cut-sets or chains. In actual bridge 
networks with hundreds or thousands of nodes, a full decomposition may not be practical, 
but simulations-based methods can quantify the impact of correlations, as presented in 
the case study in Chapter 6. 
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3.2. Estimating the Extra Correlations (Stage 2) 
Stage 2 of the BRAN methodology forms correlation matrix R, which along with 
the bridge failure probabilities (Stage 1) define the joint probability distribution of bridge 
failures, which is in turn used at Stage 3 to simulates bridge failure scenarios for Monte 
Carlo analysis. The extra correlations must ideally be estimated from sufficient number 
of detailed post-earthquake reconnaissance reports that offer correlations among bridge 
failures based on similarities in factors such as maintenance and retrofit schedule, 
construction methods, and traffic loads. However, unlike correlations among seismic 
intensities for probabilistic seismic hazard analysis, extra correlations are often 
overlooked in the literature of transportation network reliability, and data-driven 
estimates are not currently available due to lack of sufficient reliable data. Therefore, 
forming the correlation matrix must depend on network owners’ discretion and the 
availability of auxiliary data sets in lack of explicit correlation estimates (Rokneddin et 
al. 2013). Accordingly, the estimated correlations may not accurately represent the actual 
correlation values, and therefore, a sensitivity analysis with various levels of correlations 
among bridge failure probabilities is conducted in this research to investigate the impact 
of extra correlations on network reliability estimates. 
This thesis evaluates the parameters contributing to extra correlations from 
available data on bridge structural conditions and network characteristics. In particular, 
the correlation matrix is set up from three sources: the current condition ratings of bridges 
from inspection records, the Functional Road Class (FRC) of the route the bridges are 
carrying, and the topological characteristics of the bridge network. This section describes 
the procedure of constructing the correlation matrix (R) from these three sources (the 
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original estimate) as well as deriving correlation matrices with different values for 
sensitivity analysis. 
The condition ratings of bridge structures are qualitative scores (from 0 at worst 
to 10 at best) assigned to bridges based on their structural condition by bridge inspectors 
(Federal Highway Administration 2013). The FRC refers to the classification of the roads 
carried on bridges, and is adopted from TELEATLAS (TELEATLAS 2010) highway 
maps. Table 3.2 lists the road classes considered for this research. Finally, the topological 
characteristics of the highway network refer to the indices that characterize its topology 
as a graph. Network theory offers metrics to evaluate the level of topological similarities 
between pairs of nodes in a network, among which a degree-based similarity metric, the 
degree assortativity, is used in this thesis since it directly provides a correlation ratio. The 
degree assortativity establishes pair-wise bridge correlations based on the node degree 
(i.e. the number of highway segments directly connected to a bridge), and the similarity 
of their immediate neighboring bridges. The evaluated similarity between two nodes 
within the network is compared to that in a random network where connections are 
arbitrary. 
The effects of corrosion and environmental agents, bridge types, and common 
structural detailing on bridge failure probabilities are considered in bridge fragility 
models, and therefore, the evaluated bridge failure probabilities (Stage 1) are 
conditionally independent of them. Hence, the three mentioned proxy data sources can 
represent the majority of the unaccounted factors in extra correlations among bridge 
failures. For instance, the effects of construction methods and maintenance are reflected 
in the condition ratings of bridges; and a combination of bridge condition ratings and the 
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FRC may represent the impacts of traffic loading. The correlations among bridges 
stemming from the network topology (such as the degree assortativity) may indicate 
patterns for long term maintenance and retrofit prioritization. Specifically, the topological 
metric is a better predictor of the level of correlations than the geo-location of the bridges 
for factors such as live traffic loading, allocation of maintenance segments to contractors, 
etc. since topology concerns with connectivity of bridges while close by bridges may not 
be directly connected or even accessible from one another. In addition, the topological 
metrics may capture sources of correlation not yet modeled or even unknown to analysts 
as topology influences network functionality. 
Table 3.2. Functional Road Classes (FRCs) as per TELEATLAS classification. Local roads 
and collectors (below Class 5) are not considered in the transportation nework. 
FRC Description 
0 Motorway, freeway, or other major road 
1 
A Major road less important than a 
motorway 
2 Other major road 
3 Secondary road 
4 Local connecting road 
5 Local road of high importance 
 
Stage 2 of the BRAN methodology forms separate correlation matrices from 
bridge condition ratings (R1), the FRC data (R2), and the degree assortativity (R3) before 
combining them to establish the overall correlation matrix (R). Forming R3 is 
straightforward, while establishing R1 and R2 requires additional steps. The degree 
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assortativity is equivalent to the Pearson correlation coefficient among node degrees, as 
described by Equation 3.5: 
2 2
( )( )
( ) ( )
ik i jk j
k
ij
ik i jk j
k k
A A A A
r
A A A A
 

 

 
 3.5 
where rij is the similarity metric’s value between nodes i and j, and iA  denotes the mean 
of values on the i
th
 row of the adjacency matrix. The value of r varies in [-1, 1], 
presenting a correlation ratio that is readily applicable to form the topological correlation 
matrix. 
Correlation ratios in R1 and R2 are informed by the National Bridge Inventory and 
TELEATLAS databases, respectively, and require a function to transform the perceived 
similarities between two bridges into a correlation ratio. To be consistent with the 
existing research, which generally prefers an exponentially decaying function to capture 
correlations among bridge locations as a function of distance (e.g. Bocchini and 
Frangopol 2011b), this thesis elects a function in the form of Equation 3.6, reflecting user 
discretion rather than real data analysis: 
2
,( )
,       1,2 and , 1,...,
q ijb
q ijR ae c q i j n

     3.6 
where Rq,ij is the correlation ratio between bridges i and j in constituent matrix Rq; q, ij is 
the difference in values associated with those bridges (in condition rating or the FRC); 
and a, b, and c are model parameters to be estimated. Equation 3.6 maps the difference 
between bridges’ condition ratings or FRCs into the [-1, 1] range. Parameters a, b, and c 
are evaluated by the following procedure: First, initial values of Rq,ij (in [-1, 1]) are 
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assumed for different ij’s based on user’s discretion on the level of correlations between 
bridges with various levels of similarities. Then, a function in the form of Equation 3.6 is 
fitted to the initial values by the Least Square Error method. Figure 3.2 demonstrates the 
initial values assumed in this study and the fitted curves to evaluate the entries of R1 and 
R2. For instance, Figure 3.2(b) associates the maximum and minimum differences in the 
FRC levels with correlation ratios of -0.4 and 1, respectively. The fitted function reduces 
correlation levels at the limits to -0.33 and 0.83. 
  
(a) (b) 
Figure 3.2. Estimated correlation ratios between bridges i and j for a) the difference in 
condition ratings, and b) the difference in the Functional Road Class. The differences 
between the condition ratings in the NBI database vary from 0 to 8, while the FRCs differ by 
0 to 5 levels (Table 3.2). The fitted function is derived by Equation 3.6 fitted to the initial 
estimates. 
Finally, the three constituent matrices combine to form the correlation matrix. The 
user has the flexibility of choosing the form of combination as well as assigning weights 
in order to establish the correlation matrix. In the absence of further information on the 
relative importance of the three sources on correlation levels, the correlation matrix is 
formed by averaging the correlation values from the constituent matrices. The established 
matrix, which averages the originally estimated correlation values from the three sources, 
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is not yet ready for simulating bridge failures, as it might not be compatible with the 
failure probabilities of bridges. The roots of compatibility conditions and the procedure 
of examining for compatibility are discussed in the next section. 
3.3. Adjusting the Correlation Matrix for Compatibility Conditions 
Since the estimates used to form the correlation matrix R do not emerge from 
actual post-earthquake reconnaissance data analysis, the correlation values may be 
incompatible with the marginal probabilities (i.e. bridge failure probabilities). The 
compatibility conditions arise from basic rules of probabilities and limit the range of 
admissible values for the correlation ratio between pairs of marginal probabilities. 
Equations 3.7and 3.8 state the necessary compatibility conditions among probabilities of 
failure: 
   max 0, 1 min , , i j ij i jP P P P P i j      3.7 
1, i j k ij ik jkP P P P P P i j k         3.8 
where Pi is bridge i’s probability of failure, and Pij is the joint probability of failure 
between bridges i and j. In order to check for compatibility conditions, the probability 
matrix n nP  may be established from the marginal probabilities and correlation matrix R 
in which the diagonal entries are the marginal probabilities and off-diagonal entries are 
the joint probabilities computed from Equation 3.9: 
  1  (1 )ij i j ij i i j jP PP R P P P P     3.9 
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where Rij is the correlation ratio between the failure probabilities of bridges i and j. 
Equation 3.9 is derived from the definition of the correlation ratio between two binary 
random variables where the expected values are Pi and Pj and the variances are (1 )i iP P  
and (1 )j jP P , respectively. 
If the joint probabilities in the probability matrix do not satisfy the necessary 
compatibility conditions (Equations 3.7 and 3.8), they need to be modified accordingly to 
be within the admissible range, which is a range of values that comply with the 
compatibility conditions. Equation 3.9 may then be used to back calculate the admissible 
ranges for the correlation ratios when solved for Rij. The incompatibility of estimated 
correlation values with the admissible range has been reported in the literature, for 
example in Bocchini and Frangopol (2011), for other types of correlations. However, the 
literature does not offer a settled solution to address the incompatibilities, especially for 
large systems. The proposed approach in this thesis, therefore, offers a systematic 
solution to this problem which can be used for related problems as well. 
The compatibility modification is performed by mapping the elements of the 
correlation matrix into their respective admissible range. Two auxiliary matrices, Rmin 
and Rmax, store the minimum and maximum allowable correlation ratios, respectively, for 
every element of the correlation matrix. The modification, therefore, involves linearly 
mapping the correlation ratios Rij from their original range to    min max[ , , , ]R i j R i j . The 
modified correlation matrix '
0R  is constructed by Equation 3.10 and is compatible with 
the marginal probabilities, and therefore, ready to be used in simulating samples from the 
multi-dimensional binary random variable: 
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   
 max min0 min
' ( min . )
max min

  

R R
R R R R
R R
1  3.10 
where min(R) and max(R) are the overall minimum and maximum correlation ratios in 
the correlation matrix, respectively, and 
n n1  denotes a matrix of ones. The zero subscript 
in '
0R  indicates that the modified correlation matrix is mapped from the originally 
estimated correlation matrix.  
To investigate the sensitivity of network reliability estimates to the correlation 
values, the elements of the original correlation matrix are shifted towards either min(R) 
or max(R), resulting in more negative or positive correlation levels, respectively. Since 
Equation 3.11 represents a linear mapping, any shift towards the boundaries in the 
original correlation ratio range results in a proportional shift in the modified correlation 
matrix towards Rmin or Rmax, as: 
   
   
' '
0 max 0
'
' '
0 0 min
       0,1 
    1, 0

 
 
   
 
   
R R R
R
R R R
 3.11 
where 'R is the shifted modified correlation matrix and  is the level of overall deviations 
from the original correlation estimates. 
Although modifying the correlation matrix to satisfy the compatibility conditions 
is necessary for its applicability, such modifications may result in considerable deviations 
from the originally estimated values. The difference in correlation matrix 2-norm before 
and after the compatibility adjustments offers a metric to quantify the level of 
modifications. Equation 3.12 introduces the error metric based on matrix 2-norm: 
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min maxmax( , ) 
E


 
R R
R R R R
 3.12 
where E denotes the normalized change in the 2-norm of the correlation matrix, and 'R  is 
the modified correlation matrix, either from the original correlation estimates or the 
shifted values (Equation 3.11or 3.12, respectively). 
The admissible range for Pij (and consequently Rij) can be very tight for extreme 
probabilities of failure. In particular, the difference between Pij and Pi.Pj becomes 
negligible in extreme cases and therefore, the binary random variables representing 
bridges i and j can be treated as independent random variables. Appendix A provides a 
proof for the rationality of this independent treatment when the failure probabilities are 
either very large or very small. Accordingly, failure probabilities larger than 0.95 or 
smaller than 0.05 are assumed to be statistically independent. 
3.4. Generating Realizations of Correlated Bridge Failures (Stage 3) 
With a correlation matrix compatible with the marginal probabilities, samples of 
the n-dimensional binary random variable can be simulated. Among the different 
established methods in the literature to simulate samples from binary random variables 
(e.g. the use of Copulas (Nelsen 1999); Emrich and Piedmonte 1991; Park et al. 1996; 
Lunn and Davies 1998), this thesis adopts an algorithm based on the general 
Dichotomized Gaussian Method (DGM). The DGM is preferred over the other methods 
for its general applicability, especially when negative correlations exist. The DGM 
procedure forms an associated n-dimensional normal random variable from the binary 
random variable. The covariance matrix (S) of the associated normal random variable is 
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derived from the marginal probabilities and the correlation matrix for the binary random 
variable (R). To generate samples from the original binary random variable, simulated 
samples from the normal random variable are dichotomized based on their signs. The 
details of DGM may be found in Emrich and Piedmonte (1991) and Bocchini and 
Frangopol (2011b). 
The independent treatment of extreme failure probabilities reduces the 
dimensionality of the binary random variable (which is originally n) since the correlated 
samples only need to be generated for correlated bridge failures. In addition to enhancing 
the computational efficiency, the reduction of dimensionality prevents the numerical 
errors produced by the narrow admissible ranges in establishing matrix S in DGM. In real 
bridge networks with large number of bridges, such size reduction may vastly improve 
the applicability of DGM by polynomially reducing the computation time. Finally, matrix 
S must be checked for positive-definiteness before it can be used in DGM to simulate 
correlated bridge failures. In high dimensional problems such as networks with many 
components, evaluating matrix S often incurs numerical errors (e.g. from numerical 
integration of the multivariate normal density). Moreover, and since satisfying the 
compatibility conditions does not guarantee the modified correlation matrix to be strictly 
positive-definite, the computed matrix S may have a few small negative eigenvalues. A 
straightforward routine to solve this problem is setting the erroneously produced negative 
eigenvalues of S equal to zero in its eigenvalue decomposition. 
Table 3.3 illustrates the pseudo-algorithm to simulate correlated bridge failures. 
The open source statistical package Bindata (Leisch et al. 1998) in statistical analysis 
software R (R Core Team 2012) is used to simulate samples of correlated binary failures 
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after forming matrix S. The result is NMC records of realized failures (0 for survival, 1 for 
failure) for n bridges in the network (a data-frame of NMC rows and n columns) which are 
directly applicable for Monte Carlo simulations. 
Table 3.3. Pseudo-algorith to generate realizations of correlated bridge failures for Monte 
Carlo simulations 
1 START 
2 Input 
3 Bridge failure probabilities (Pi, i = 1, 2, …, n) from Stage 1 
4 The originally estimated correlation matrix R 
5 If  ,   0.05    ( 0.95)i ii P or P     Treat bridge i as independent 
6 
Compute the admissible range for the elements of 
d dP  from Equations 3.7 and 
3.8, where d is the number of correlated bridges 
7 
Determine the admissible range for the elements of the correlation matrix from 
Equation 3.9 
8 
Modify the elements of correlation matrix for compatibility with the admissible 
range 
9 
Establish the modified correlation matrix from Step 8 ( R ), and compute the 
normalized change in the 2-norm from Equation 3.12 
10 
Set up S, the covariance matrix for the associated d-dimensional normal random 
variable, from R and the bridge failure probabilities (using Bindata package), 
and check for its positive-definiteness 
11 
Simulate NMC samples from the d-dimensional binary random variable by DGM 
(Bindata package) 
12 
Independently simulate NMC binary samples for (n – d) independent bridges. Put 
the records in a dataframe together with the records of Step 11 
13 END 
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3.5. Network Reliability Assessment by Markov Chain Monte Carlo 
Simulations (Stage 4) 
The dataframe of correlated bridge failure samples from Stage 3 are used to 
evaluate the network reliability by Monte Carlo simulations. This study evaluates the 
connectivity reliability of the aging bridge network subjected to seismic loading by the 
Markov Chain Monte Carlo simulations approach (MCMC). The MCMC system 
reliability method is described in detail in Ching and Hsu (2007) and Rokneddin et al. 
(2012), although for independent failures. For each Monte Carlo simulation, MCMC 
simulates the state of the network by a Markov Chain whose transition probability matrix 
T is given by Equation 3.13. Each entry Tij in the transition probability matrix is the 
probability that a random walker can move from node i to node j in one step ( i j ). 
1
max 0,1 - ,            
0,                                   ,  0
j
ij i j
i
w
nodes i and j aredirectly connected
T k b
i and j not directly connected or k
   
          


 3.13 
In Equation 3.13, ki is the out-degree of node i, bj is the reliability of node j (i.e. 1 
– Pj), and wj denotes a simulated sample from a uniform distribution in [0, 1]. Moreover, 
1ii ij
j i
T T

   since the sum of probabilities on each row of T must be one. For each 
Monte Carlo simulation, the connectivity is retained if the random walker starting from 
the origin node has non-zero probability to reach the destination. The network 
connectivity reliability is then computed by dividing the number of simulations in which 
the network remains connected over the total number of simulations. 
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The original MCMC algorithm requires modification in order to accommodate 
correlated binary samples simulated by the DGM. The modified algorithm is summarized 
in Table 3.4. In particular, simulating wj in Equation 3.13 is modified to comply with the 
correlated failures: 
[ ,1],  bridge  fails
[0, ],  bridge  survives
j j
j
j j
u b j
w
u b j

 

 3.14 
where uj is a uniform random variable. This modification ensures Tij = 0 if bridge j fails 
according to the correlated binary samples generated by DGM. 
Compared to the naïve Monte Carlo method for network reliability with the 
computational complexity of  2 2O( log )l n n , MCMC offers a superior efficiency with 
the complexity of 3( )O ln . Furthermore, and in its application to highway bridge 
networks, the computational complexity of MCMC is even less than 3( )O ln  for the 
general case. The reason is that the state transition matrix T is very sparse, and therefore, 
computing VOD and VDD (Step 7 of Table 3.4) only requires a select number of entries in 
V, and often does not involve a full conversion (as in Step 6 of Table 3.4). 
The network probability of failure (Pf in Table 3.4) represents the outcome of 
applying the BRAN methodology and helps the stakeholders of the transportation system 
to assess risks to the functionality of the network in the event of a strong ground motion. 
The network reliability method with correlated failures also enables ranking the criticality 
of bridges with conditional importance measures, as elaborated on in Section 5.4. 
Assessing such criticalities enables owners to make more informed decisions in 
allocating funds for necessary maintenance and seismic retrofitting actions. 
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Table 3.4. Pseudo-algorithm of MCMC network reliability method with correlated bridge 
failures 
1 START 
2 Generate NMC correlated bridge failures by DGM 
3 0r   
4 for k = 1:NMC 
5 Set up the transition matrix T from Equations 3.13 and 3.14 
6 Create matrix V = (I – T)-1 
7 Compute 
OD OD
OD
DD
V
f
V

  
8 If 0 1ODf r r     
9 End 
10 f
MC
rP
N
  
11 END 
I stands for the identity matrix, O and D are the origin and destination nodes in the network reliability 
objective, and ij denotes the Kronecker Delta function assuming the value of 1 if i = j and zero otherwise. 
VOD and VDD in Line 7 are elements of matrix V (Line 6). 
3.6. Summary 
The BRAN methodology offers a comprehensive framework for reliability 
assessment of large and complex infrastructure systems which accounts for correlated 
bridge failures from different sources. The extra correlations, having not been formulated 
and quantified before, are considered in this methodology along with a general 
Dichotomized Gaussian Method (DGM) procedure to simulate samples of correlated 
bridge failures from a multi-dimensional binary random variable. Moreover, the BRAN 
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methodology uses an advanced simulation based network reliability method in Markov 
Chain Monte Carlo simulations to achieve the efficiency required to analyze large and 
complex highway bridge networks. 
Factors such as the structural conditions of bridges, type of the roads they carry, 
traffic, and topological implications of bridge networks impose extra correlations among 
the failure probabilities that are often impractical to include in the analytical bridge 
modeling, particularly on a structure-by-structure basis. Nevertheless, the impact of extra 
correlations on network reliability estimates may be significant, depending on specific 
correlation ratio signs and the topology of the network. Using a decomposition algorithm, 
it is shown that neglecting correlations may over- or underestimate network reliability 
assessments based on the correlation values and the topology of the network. The 
correlations shape the joint probability density function, while the network topology 
determines the limit state function. The decomposition method presented in Section 3.1 
enables the user to qualitatively evaluate the impact of extra correlations on network 
reliability, even prior to performing a network reliability evaluation. 
The BRAN methodology offers a practical approach to quantify the extra 
correlations and use them to simulate correlated bridge failures in large systems based on 
the DGM. Realizations of correlated bridge failures become the input for the modified 
Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) reliability method to assess network-level 
performance. Regardless of the approach to evaluate pair-wise correlations among bridge 
failure probabilities, the established correlation matrix, which is formed upon three 
auxiliary sources in this thesis, needs modifications to comply with the necessary 
conditions which impose an admissible range for the correlation ratios based on bridge 
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failure probabilities. Accordingly, the elements of the correlation matrix are modified to 
comply with their respective admissible ranges. BRAN offers an error metric to measure 
the level of changes made to the estimated correlation values when modified for 
compatibility. This metric can be used to measure the quality of the original correlation 
estimates. 
BRAN improves upon the existing methodologies in terms of efficiency and 
practical applicability. Its systematic modification of estimated correlation values is also 
applicable to other networks and types of correlations (e.g. hazard-induced correlations). 
The application of the BRAN methodology to large highway bridge networks is 
exemplified in Chapter 6. Although BRAN offers a method efficient enough for 
infrastructure reliability studies, probabilistic risk assessment still poses a computational 
challenge since reliability evaluations must be implemented multiple times. Therefore, 
the next chapter introduces the surrogate models for reliability evaluations. The surrogate 
models are developed by fitting a predictive model on network reliability evaluations by 
BRAN, and enable efficient risk assessment implementation. 
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Chapter 4 
Network Surrogate Models for Probabilistic 
Risk Assessment of Bridge Networks 
In network reliability problems, the random variables that populate x in Equation 1.1 
represent the failure probability of system components. For instance, the reliability of a 
highway bridge network in a given seismic scenario depends on the failure probability of 
bridges given the intensity of seismic excitation at bridge locations. If the limit state 
function   0g x  is known in explicit form, the reliability problem may be solved by 
classical approximations such as first and second order reliability methods (Cornell 1967; 
Hasofer and Lind 1974; Ditlevsen 1979; Hohenbichler and Rackwitz 1983; Shinozuka 
1983; Tvedt 1990; Ditlevsen and Madsen 1996; Melchers 1999). As previously 
discussed, however, explicit functional forms are often not available, and the limit state 
function must be numerically approximated to find the system failure probability by 
Monte Carlo simulations. Traditional structural reliability studies apply polynomial 
functions for this approximation, resulting in polynomial response surface methods 
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(Faravelli 1989; Bucher and Bourgund 1990; Rajashekhar and Ellingwood 1993; Kim 
and Na 1997; Guan and Melchers 2001). Although simple and transparent, the limitations 
of response surface methods in application to complex domains or problems with many 
components have been well documented by researchers in the field. For example, the 
number of point estimates of the limit state function and the location of these points have 
been shown to influence the outcome of the numerical integration (Guan and Melchers 
2001). Moreover, the number of required analyses to estimate the failure probability 
significantly increases with the number of random variables in the problem (Hosni 
Elhewy et al. 2006). Therefore, other functional forms of the limit state function have 
been proposed, such as those based on artificial neural networks for implicit 
approximations (Adeli 2002; Papadrakakis and Lagaros 2002; Cardoso et al. 2008). More 
recently, advanced statistical learning techniques such as Support Vector Machines 
(SVM) and Kriging have been successfully applied to structural reliability problems (e.g. 
Dai et al. 2012; Dubourg et al. 2011; Echard et al. 2011; Hurtado 2004, 2011). In spite of 
such successful applications to set up surrogate models instructural reliability, statistical 
learning application to network reliability has not been explored to date. 
The review of the literature on probabilistic risk assessment of bridge networks 
revealed that such studies may require prohibitively large number of simulations for real 
infrastructure systems, as they involve evaluating the network reliability for multiple 
hazard scenarios. However, if the implicit function ( )g x  in the system reliability 
formulation is replaced by an explicit, surrogate model, network reliability evaluations 
can be performed in closed form, which can save computation time. Such surrogate 
models developed in this chapter by non-parametric data fitting using statistical learning 
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methods. In order to form the surrogate models, network reliability evaluations are 
performed (for example, using the BRAN methodology) on a subset of the total required 
hazard scenarios for risk assessment. Once a model is fitted to the data generated by those 
reliability simulations, network reliability evaluations can be performed using this 
surrogate model (which is direct evaluation rather than Monte Carlo simulations) for the 
seismic scenarios not included in the model developing subset. Therefore, the proposed 
approach provides an alternative to enhance the computational efficiency of risk 
assessments: rather than reducing the number of hazard scenarios to analyze by hazard 
consistent scenario generation (e.g. Vaziri et al. 2012) or importance sampling for hazard 
scenario selection (e.g. Jayaram and Baker 2010) as mainly pursued today, it develops a 
surrogate model of the complex system at hand. 
This thesis employs random forests to develop the surrogate models for network 
reliability evaluations. While the application of other statistical learning methods such as 
SVM to structural reliability has steadily risen in recent years, random forests (Breiman 
2001) have not been explored in this field. Nonetheless, random forests have been 
extensively used in other engineering fields from image recognition to bioengineering 
(e.g. Mao and Kelly 2007; Homenda and Lesinski 2011; Zhao et al. 2011; Latifi and 
Koch 2012; Vibrans et al. 2013), and have emerged as one of the most powerful data 
mining tools for their robustness to outlier data (Hastie et al. 2009). Additionally, random 
forests are able to detect significant random variables amongst a mixture of irrelevant 
input variables or features to build a predictive model. This characteristic is especially 
desirable for application to network reliability, where the state of the system is primarily 
governed by a small subset out of many constituent components. Application of statistical 
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learning methods to reliability problems are sometimes presented as classification instead 
of regression (Hurtado 2004). Rather than fitting a surrogate model to   0g x , which is 
a regression approach, the classification approach finds whether 
0( 0)g x or 0( 0)g x  
given an input vector 
0x . This thesis pursues both approaches for network reliability 
assessment. 
Seismic reliability and risk assessment of bridge networks can also benefit from 
visualizing the failure surface, in which the limit state function is visually placed either in 
the original or transformed feature space defined by the vector of random variables x, and 
separates the failed and safe samples in the classification problem. The benefits of failure 
surface visualization include easy determination of the seismic scenarios leading to 
systemic failure (which can be used to compute the integral in Equation 1.1), and 
identification of the worst case scenarios in seismic risk assessment (Hlavácek et al. 
2004; Takewaki 2007; Hurtado 2011). In order to visualize the failure surface in network 
reliability problems, a separate statistical learning method, Fisher’s Discriminant 
Analysis (FDA), is also applied to two example networks. Although FDA approximates 
the failure surface by a linear function and hence is not as well suited as more advanced 
methods such as random forests to solve the nonlinear network reliability problems, it 
provides a visualization of the estimated failure surface that has not been previously 
explored for networks. 
The next section formally defines the network reliability problem to be solved in 
the context of seismic risk assessment via statistical learning. Then, an introduction to 
random forests is provided which lists some of their most desirable characteristics for 
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network reliability application, and describes the process of model selection. Finally, the 
proposed method is applied to form surrogate models for three synthetic networks, and 
provide the prediction error for different sizes of training sets. One of the example 
synthetic networks also involves FDA application in order to visualize the failure 
surfaces in network reliability. The real application to the case study bridge network in 
the state of South Carolina is presented in Chapter 6. 
4.1. Network Reliability as a Statistical Learning Problem 
In order to formulate the problem of statistical learning for a network with n 
bridges, first assume that the BRAN methodology is applied to evaluate the network 
reliability of the bridge system for ns seismic scenarios. For seismic scenario i, the bridge 
failure probabilities form a row vector ( ) ( ) ( )1 2 ...
T i i i
i nx x x   x where 
( ) , 1,...,ijx j n is 
the failure probability of bridge j given scenario i. The input matrix 
ns nX is subsequently 
set up as follows for ns seismic scenarios: 
1
2
...
T
T
T
ns
 
 
 
 
 
  
x
x
X
x
 
Network failure probabilities for those ns seismic scenarios form the output vector
1nsY . Note that the input and output values are all probabilities, and hence are in [0, 1]. A 
regression model fitted to input X and output Y for ns seismic scenarios can predict the 
outcome (i.e. network failure probability) for future different scenarios and save 
computation time, as the network reliability evaluations only need to be implemented to 
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form the training set output vector Y. A related classification problem could also be 
defined when the output vector Y becomes categorical, taking values in {0, 1} instead of 
continuous values in [0, 1]. Formulating the reliability problem as classification may be 
achieved by adopting a threshold value for network failure probability Pf, so that a Pf 
greater than the threshold value is considered a failure for that seismic scenario (network 
state = 1) and survival otherwise (network state = 0). The threshold value of tolerable 
network failure probability may be set by network managers, and has been selected to be 
0.8 in this paper. 
The appropriate statistical learning method to solve a regression or classification 
problem must be selected based on the nature of the problem and the involved random 
variables. Network reliability has a deterministic underlying physical model in either 
classification or regression cases (i.e. the MCMC algorithm) to compute the outcome y
(i)
 
(the i
th
 component of Y) given the input bridge failure probabilities xi
T
 for scenario i. As a 
result, the regression model produces a clear hyperplane for the limit state function and 
the classification problem brings about perfect separability between classes. By having an 
underlying physical model, network reliability problems are similar to those in structural 
reliability. The functional form of the failure surfaces in network reliability problems 
must also be examined to select a suitable statistical learning method. Figure 4.1 depicts 
two simple networks and presents their computed failure probability. The presented 
formulae for network failure probabilities given the input bridge failure probabilities (xj) 
are straight forward to derive, since the selected network topologies are not complex and 
hence, the example networks can be reduced to sets of series and parallel nodes. The 
computed closed form functions for these two examples confirm that the failure surfaces 
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are strictly nonlinear functions of the input features, even for simple topologies. 
Furthermore, polynomial functions which are commonly used in structural reliability do 
not properly represent the failure surfaces in networks, due to the existing interaction 
terms xixj. Therefore, polynomial response surface methods are not appropriate for 
network reliability problems. In fact, some response surface models consider the 
interaction terms, but they often restrict terms to secondary interactions, which does not 
suffice for larger complex networks. Nonetheless, the form of the failure surfaces imply 
that one must not be concerned about large local errors in the numerical integration of 
Equation 1.1 when those functions are replaced with surrogate models as the derived 
functional forms are relatively smooth. 
  
(a) (b) 
Figure 4.1. Network failure probabilities of schematic network topologies with independent 
component failures: a) 
1 2fP x x , and b) 1 2 3 1 2 3  fP x x x x x x . Hollow nodes 
represent bridges while dark nodes are used to show origin and destination nodes. Links 
show the connecting highways between bridges, and are assumed to be invulnerable. 
Actual bridge networks have complex topologies which prevent explicit 
representation of their limit state function. Predictive models formed by statistical 
learning methods such as random forests can approximate such complicated functions 
using a limited number of training samples, and therefore, should be considered strong 
candidate tools for risk assessment applications where many failure scenarios must be 
analyzed. Random forests, which are extensively used for data mining, are introduced in 
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the next section in the context of network reliability along with their identified 
advantages for network reliability problems. 
4.2. Random Forests in Network Reliability Evaluations 
The fundamentals of statistical learning are presented here prior to describing the 
random forest surrogate model. In any statistical learning problem, classification or 
regression, the ns available data points (i.e. bridge failure probabilities from the seismic 
scenarios and their associated network reliabilities) to establish the predictive model must 
be divided into two disjoint sets for model selection and model assessment (Table 4.1 ). 
The predictive model is fitted to the data points in the model selection set without using 
any data from the other set. Table 4.1 also helps to explain the process of model 
selection. Each statistical learning method, including random forests, has several tuning 
parameters which need to be set in order to establish the best predictive model. The 
values for the tuning parameters are determined by randomly splitting the data points in 
the model selection set into two other sets, training and validation. The predictive model 
is fitted to the training set using some assumed values for tuning parameters, and is then 
applied to the validation set to estimate its prediction error. This prediction error can be 
the root of mean squared error (RMSE) in a regression problem or the percentage of 
misclassified data points in classification, among other possible metrics. The validation 
error is estimated for models established with different values of the tuning parameters, 
and the values resulting in the minimum validation error are selected to form the optimal 
model. The evaluated error consists of two terms, bias and variance, which are defined by 
Equation 4.1 for regression: 
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in which, MSE refers to the mean squared error in a regression model, ( )f   is the true 
function (here, the network failure probability, as exemplified in Figure 4.1) relating the 
input variables in
0x to the output in 0y , and 0y is the predicted output from the predictive 
model. The bias term in a model measures the difference between the expected (mean) 
prediction value for a data point and its given value in the model selection set. The 
variance term refers to the variance of the prediction values around their mean. Since the 
decrease in one term results in an increase in the other term, finding the optimal tuning 
parameters for model selection is equivalent to forcing a balance between those two 
terms (Hastie et al. 2009). Although classification problems measure the prediction error 
with different metrics such as misclassification or exponential loss, those error metrics 
can be described by bias and variance error terms as well. The examples later in this 
chapter use RMSE and misclassification error for regression and classification problems, 
respectively. Other L1 error measures such as the mean absolute error are also applicable 
for regression to enhance the interpretability of the measured errors. 
Table 4.1. Splitting the available data points into separate sets for model selection and 
model assessment 
Model Selection 
Model 
Assessment 
Training Validation Test 
 
The selected model from the model selection process is finally applied to the test 
set for model assessment, which provides the expected prediction error for future data 
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points which are not in the considered data set (also known as out of sample data). To 
obtain an unbiased estimation of the prediction error, the data points in the test set must 
not be used for model selection. However, the majority of the available data must be used 
for model selection in order to reduce the model’s bias from the training data, limiting the 
size of the test set to 20-30% of total data points for practical applications. 
Random forests average the outcomes of a large collection of decision trees for 
their output (Hastie et al. 2009); therefore, trees are briefly explained next. As one of the 
most basic models in statistical learning, trees are mostly popular for their 
interpretability, robustness to irrelevant (insignificant) input variables, and invariance 
under monotonic variable transformations. Figure 4.2 demonstrates sample regression 
and classification trees for classification with five random variables x1 to x5. Such trees 
can be employed to predict the failure probability of a five-bridge network (the state of 
the system for the classification problem). 
  
(a) (b) 
Figure 4.2. Sample regression (a) and classification (b) trees for a problem with five 
predictors (x1, …, x5) and five terminal nodes. Note that x4 was not selected as a dividing 
variable in setting up these trees 
Classification trees divide the feature space into ns-dimensional cuboids, with 
data points in each cuboid categorized as one class in the classification problem. The 
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number of cuboids is equal to the number of terminal nodes in the tree; for example, the 
tree in Figure 4.2(b) divides the feature space into five regions (for example, the first 
region is where x3 < 0.4 and x1 < 0.6). If the number of terminal nodes in a classification 
or regression tree increases (i.e. the tree grows larger), the model fits more closely to the 
data points in the training set, and therefore, the model’s bias from data points (training 
error) decreases. However, overfitting is likely to occur in larger trees, resulting in a large 
variance and large overall prediction error which makes them less suitable for future, out 
of sample predictions. As previously described, each statistical learning method aims at 
balancing the bias and variance error terms in order to present a model that is 
representative of the training set, yet general enough to generate reasonable predictions 
for out of sample data points in the test set. Random forests achieve that balance by 
forming many de-correlated trees, and averaging their outcome as in Equation 4.2: 
1
1ˆ ( ) ( )
B
B
rf b
b
f T
B 
 x x  4.2 
where ˆ ( )Brff x denotes the outcome of random forest prediction from a total of B trees, and
( )bT x is a decision tree formed upon m randomly selected variables (out of n variables) 
from the input vector x. Unlike individual trees, large-sized trees in a random forest 
rarely lead to overfitting, and therefore, one may let the trees grow large to decrease the 
bias without concern for a major increase in variance. The overfitting is avoided by 
selecting m variables at random for each tree, which results in minimal correlations 
among their outcomes even if the trees are large. In order to show how de-correlation 
avoids overfitting by limiting the variance term, assume B random variables each 
corresponding to the outcome of one tree in the random forest for a data point in the 
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model selection set. Those random variables are identically distributed as all of them 
estimate the outcome of one particular data point. Moreover, they are not strongly 
correlated since each tree is established using only m input random variables randomly 
chosen out of total n variables. The selective variable assignment limits the correlation 
coefficient between the B random variables to a small  value. The average of the B 
described random variables, as used in Equation 4.2 to estimate the outcome of the 
random forest, will have the variance presented by Equation 4.3 (Hastie et al. 2009): 
2 21
BVar
B

 

   4.3 
where  is the common standard deviation of the B random variables. A large B value 
eliminates the second term, while the first term is governed by the correlation coefficient. 
The specific algorithm used in random forests minimizes  as described above while 
preventing from growing large in the process. A full explanation of the random forest 
algorithm may be found in Breiman (2001) or Hastie et al. (2009). An efficient 
implementation is presented by the randomForest package in R language (R Core Team 
2012). 
Random forests have strong advantages over most widely used statistical learning 
and data mining methods in application to network reliability evaluations, both as 
classification or regression problems. While support vector machines offer a solid 
performance in classification problems, their prediction power in regression models is 
generally weaker. Another advantage over SVM emerges in the process of model 
selection. Random forests have m as their only tuning parameter compared to two 
parameters for support vector machines, resulting in a shorter model selection process. 
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Other parameters of random forests are not critically important since the size of the tree is 
often not an issue in selecting optimized random forest models, while the average 
personal computers can simulate many trees in minutes, letting the modeler choose a 
large value for parameter B to increase the accuracy of the model. Moreover, the value of 
m most likely to yield the best model is known (Hastie et al. 2009), making optimal 
model selection in random forests relatively fast. Assuming n random variables in the 
model, the search for the optimal value for m is performed around n for classification 
and / 3n for regression problems. 
Other characteristics of random forests also underline their applicability to 
network reliability assessments for risk analysis. Random forests naturally select the 
significant features and understate the irrelevant random variables to form the surrogate 
model. In network reliability application, it is equivalent to identifying the more critical 
bridges in the system and using them to develop the model rather than considering many 
bridges whose failures have negligible effect on the network connectivity among origin 
and destination nodes. The existence of many insignificant features can deteriorate the 
performance of some other statistical learning methods such as SVM and k-nearest-
neighbors (KNN). KNN splits the feature space into hyper spheres rather than cuboids 
and similarly requires only one tuning parameter: the number of nearest neighbors k. In 
fact, random forests may be thought of as KNN with weighted distances which are 
proportionate to the importance of the random variables. Weighting the distances per 
variable importance is the key to make random forests robust to problems with many 
irrelevant variables, where KNN often fails to form a reliable predictive model. As 
another advantage, random forests are well suited for studying the relationship between 
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the input variables and the output. Since random forests are developed based on trees, the 
results are straight forward to interpret. They also provide insights on variable 
importance, and consequently, can be used for data mining. Such characteristics set 
random forests apart from the competing well established methods in statistical learning, 
and makes them uniquely desirable for the network reliability applications. 
To rank input variables based on their relative importance, random forests assign 
criticality to random variables whose inclusion in a tree as dividing variables enhances 
the model accuracy more significantly. In other terms, inclusion of those variables 
reduces the impurity of the trees. This feature of random forests is used in Chapter 5 to 
develop a probabilistic importance measure for bridge retrofit prioritization, and will be 
elaborated in more details later. 
4.3. Examples of Surrogate Models in Network Reliability 
This section presents the application of random forests to form a surrogate model 
and predict the network failure probability in four synthetic bridge networks with 
different topologies (Table 4.2). Both regression and classification problems are 
presented, to estimate the network failure probability and determine the state of the 
system (failure or survival), respectively. 
The data points in the input matrix
ns nX for training, validation, and testing are 
generated by an experimental design scheme using n-dimensional uniformly distributed 
quasi-random numbers in[0,1]n , since the input random variables are bridge failure 
probabilities. Sampling from a uniform distribution replaces the bridge failure 
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probabilities from actual seismic scenarios in this chapter, implying that there is no prior 
knowledge on the joint distribution of input random variables. However, the real case 
study in Chapter 6 describes a risk assessment application where it is possible to draw 
samples from a known joint distribution based on seismic hazard scenarios. The impact 
of that prior knowledge (i.e. the distribution of bridge failure probabilities resulting from 
the seismological study of the faults in the region) on the accuracy of predictions is 
demonstrated in the case study network of Chapter 6 by comparing the results of the two 
training schemes: one with independent uniform sampling similar to Examples 1-3 here, 
and the other by drawing samples from the joint distribution. The examples in this 
section, however, show that sampling with no prior knowledge on the joint distribution 
can still result in a satisfactory surrogate model. Note that the surrogate models 
developed in this chapter as well as Chapter 6 do not consider extra correlations in order 
to maintain focus on statistical learning methods. However, the extra correlations can be 
similarly included as hazard-induced correlations, since they also influence the joint 
probability distribution of the input variables. 
Table 4.2. List of example networks to predict the network failure probability (regression) or 
the state of the system (classification) 
No. Description 
1 
Simple five node synthetic network (three bridges). Network reliability is evaluated 
by closed form solution. 
2 
Complex six node synthetic network (four bridges). Network reliability is evaluated 
by MCMC. 
3 
Two complex synthetic lattice networks, with 16 and 20 nodes (14 and 18 bridges, 
respectively). Network reliability is evaluated by MCMC, and FDA is also performed 
for visualization. 
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Experimental design with independent uniform sampling is performed by using 
quasi-random numbers. Quasi-random numbers cover the feature space more uniformly 
compared to pseudo-random numbers, as demonstrated by Figure 4.3. The figure 
compares the distribution of 100 data points in a two-dimensional feature space (i.e. a 
network with two bridges). The left part of the figure shows the distribution of data 
generated by a Sobol sequence (Niederreiter 1992), a quasi-random number generator, 
while data points on the right figure are simulated by a pseudo-random number generator. 
Quasi-random number simulators are more structured than pseudo-random number 
generators, and leave less uncovered areas in the feature space. 
  
(a) (b) 
Figure 4.3. Experimental design with 100 data points in two dimensions with a Sobol 
sequence (left) and a pseudo-random sequence (right). The two input random variables are 
bridge failure probabilities. 
The network failure probability for model selection and assessment is evaluated 
by either closed-from solutions (where available, as in Example 1) or Monte Carlo 
simulations. For large and complex networks, therefore, the training size ns is limited by 
the available computational capacity since Monte Carlo simulations are computationally 
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expensive for larger networks. The network failure probabilities for the presented 
examples have been evaluated for 0.01 allowed error with 95% confidence. 
Example 3 uses Fisher’s discriminant analysis (FDA) in addition to random 
forests to solve the classification problem in order to visualize the boundary separating 
the two classes. FDA is a linear classifier, and is used in spite of the fact that failure 
surfaces in networks are nonlinear (Figure 4.1). In theory it is possible to use linear 
models to solve network reliability problems by introducing new random variables 
formed by interaction of bridge failure probabilities, such as adding all secondary             
( , , 1,...,i jx x i j n ) and other higher level interactions. However, such techniques are not 
suitable when n is already large, as is the case for real bridge networks. Therefore, FDA 
is mainly presented as a means to visualize the failure surface in networks rather than to 
form a predictive model. Direct visualization in network reliability problems is often 
troublesome because of the dimensionality of such problems (n, the number of bridges). 
FDA makes visualization possible by transforming the n-dimensional feature space into 
two proxy random variables most able to explain the variation in the data using some 
simplifying assumptions, and therefore, enables visualizing the class separation in two 
dimensions (Hastie et al. 2009). 
4.3.1. Example 1 
The simple network in Figure 4.1(b) is selected as the first example. This network 
contains three bridges, so n = 3. A closed-form solution exists in form of 
  1 2 3 1 2 3 f x x x x x x  x  to evaluate the network failure probability as presented in 
Figure 4.1, and therefore, the desired number of training records depends on preference 
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rather than computational power. One hundred data points (corresponding to 100 
combinations of bridge failure probabilities generated at random) are used for this 
example, of which 70 are used to establish the predictive model (model selection) while 
30 data points are reserved for testing to evaluate the prediction error relative to the 
closed-form solution. As the result, input matrix X has 100 rows and three columns. Both 
regression and classification predictive models are developed by a random forest of 500 
trees with maximum allowable size, which means the trees may grow to have up to 70 
terminal nodes (the number of data points in the training set), if desired. The optimal 
model was found using m = 2. Figure 4.4 shows the evolution of model selection and test 
errors in terms of root of mean squared error for the regression problem. The model 
selection error is also called the training error, since it results from the process of 
validation on a model which was fitted to the training data points. Note that the test error 
is even smaller than the training error, but is shown in a different scale to highlight its 
variations as trees are grown. The evaluated test error is an unbiased estimator of the 
expected prediction error for future data, while the training error is mainly used to find 
the optimal m value. The classification model results are also presented in Table 4.3 . 
Similar to the regression problem, a classification model established by the data points in 
the model selection set (with the same number of trees and m value) is tested by 30 data 
points which have not been used to train or validate the model. The resulting test error is 
hence an unbiased estimator of how reliable the surrogate model is to predict the outcome 
for future data points, such as actual seismic scenarios. Similar to the regression problem, 
the test misclassification error is smaller than training error, showing the accuracy of the 
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developed model to predict the network failure probability for future, out of sample 
bridge failure records. 
The prediction error estimates become very small after merely 50 trees are grown 
(Figure 4.4); suggesting the surrogate model properly fits the failure surface. However, 
even the best surrogate models cannot outperform a closed-form solution. Complex 
networks, as in the following examples, better emphasize the benefits of surrogate models 
since closed-form functions are not available or difficult to obtain. 
  
(a) (b) 
Figure 4.4. Root of mean squared error in fitting a random forest predictive model for the 
five-node network depicted in Figure 4.1(b), with 70 data points for training and validation, 
and 30 data points for testing. 
 
Table 4.3. Training (left) and test (right) misclassification errors for the five-node network 
depicted in Figure 4.1(b), with 70 data points for training and validation, and 30 data points 
for testing. 0 = network survival, 1 = network failure. 
Training error estimate = 7.14% Test error estimate = 6.67% 
 0 1 Class error 
0 48 3 0.06 
1 2 17 0.10 
 
 0 1 Class error 
0 19 1 0.05 
1 1 9 0.10 
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4.3.2. Example 2 
Figure 4.5 depicts a small complex network with four bridges. One hundred data 
points are generated according to the independent uniform sampling scheme, of which 80 
are used for model selection and the remaining 20 for testing. Compared to Example 1, 
more data points are assigned to model selection due to the increase in dimensionality 
and complexity of the network topology. In lack of a closed-form solution, Monte Carlo 
simulations are employed to estimate the network failure probability for each of the 100 
data points. This example represents a situation in which a surrogate model developed by 
random forests fits the failure surface of a bridge network with complex topology. The 
classification error estimates are presented in Table 4.4. The obtained predictive model 
with m = 3 perfectly separates the two classes in the test set (testing error is zero). The 
regression model is not presented for brevity, although based on the classification results 
and similar to Example 1, it is expected to produce a surrogate model with minimal 
RMSE error for the network reliability problem at hand. 
 
Figure 4.5. A complex six-node network (four bridges) for Example 2 
4.3.3. Example 3 
Two lattice networks are explored in this example, shown in Figure 4.6, with 16 
and 20 nodes (14 and 18 bridges, respectively). Lattice structures pose a different 
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challenge from the previous examples due to lack of bridge importance hierarchy. To 
clarify the differences, note that Bridge 1 is more critical than the other two in Example 
1, since its failure results in certain network failure, while the failure of either Bridge 2 or 
Bridge 3 still leaves open the path from the origin and destination through the other 
bridges. Also in Example 2, Bridges 1 and 4 are more critical than the other two as their 
failure more adversely affects the network connectivity. However, the bridges in Figure 
4.6 networks seem to have equal criticality other than four bridges directly connected to 
the origin and destination nodes (1, 4, 11, and 14), since there are many paths with equal 
length from the origin to the destination node and the loss of no single bridge has a 
significant impact on the network connectivity. Clearly, the percentage of more critical 
bridges reduces as the size of a lattice network grows. 
Table 4.4. Training (left) and test (right) misclassification errors for the six-node network 
depicted in Figure 4.5, with 80 data points for training and validation, and 20 data points for 
testing. 0 = network survival, 1 = network failure 
Training error estimate = 7.5% Test error estimate = 0% 
 0 1 Class error 
0 69 1 0.01 
1 5 5 0.50 
 
 0 1 Class error 
0 17 0 0.00 
1 0 3 0.00 
 
 
The lack of clear hierarchy in lattice structures makes it more difficult for random 
forests to form a successful predictive model. In hierarchical networks, the more 
important bridges emerge more frequently in trees within a random forest since they can 
explain more of the variance, and hence, become preferred random variables for dividing. 
Given lack of hierarchy, more trees need to grow to explain the same amount of variance 
and establish a dependable predictive model. Nevertheless, an increase in the number of  
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(a) (b) 
Figure 4.6. Lattice networks in Example 3: a) 16-node lattice, and b) 20-node lattice 
trees is a manageable challenge for random forests as the implementation is fast in 
available software packages. 
A more significant challenge compared to the previous two examples is the 
number of training samples, which needs to increase with the rise in dimensionality in 
order to preserve the prediction accuracy. In fact, the number of data points must increase 
exponentially with the number of random variables (bridges) to keep the density of data 
points constant in the feature space. However, the prediction accuracy does not 
deteriorate as fast by a reduction in the density of data points. The required density of 
data points for a desired level of accuracy cannot be predicted before the model is 
established, and the number of data points must be selected based on previous experience 
and judgment. This example uses 1,000 data points by the independent uniform sampling 
scheme for the two lattices in Figure 4.6, of which 800 are assigned to model selection. 
Similar to the previous example, the network failure probability for each of those data 
points is estimated by Monte Carlo simulations. The models are developed by growing 
500 trees, although the error would stabilize with fewer trees as well. Figure 4.7 presents 
the regression test errors for the example networks. The projected test errors verify that 
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model accuracies are comparable to those of Example 1 (Figure 4.4b) which only has 
three bridges, in spite of far less data point density in the lattice networks. The 
classification model is also formed, and confusion matrices are given in Table 4.5 (the 
training errors which are used to find the optimal model are not shown). The 
classification model for the 20-node lattice predicts failures (class = 1) perfectly, but 
misclassifies nearly half of survival cases (class = 0). The low accuracy in predicting 
survivals indicates the classification predictive model has not been sufficiently trained 
with data in that class. In fact, around 70% of 20-node network’s 800 data points belong 
to the failure class. As a result, the established model is conservative, since it is far more 
likely to label network survivals as failures than vice versa. Nevertheless, most of those 
misclassified failures (false failures) lie close to the failure surface (i.e. network failure 
probabilities are close to 0.8) which explains the regression model’s acceptable test error 
relative to the classification model’s relatively low accuracy in predicting survivals. 
  
Figure 4.7. Root of mean squared test errors for Example 3 networks depicted in Figure 4.6. 
800 data points are used for model selection, and the test is performed on 200 additional 
samples. 
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Table 4.5. Test misclassification errors for the Example 3 networks (Figure 4.6). 0 = 
network survival, 1 = network failure. 
16-node network: Test error estimate = 13.5% 20-node network:Test error estimate = 15% 
 0 1 Class error 
0 79 21 0.21 
1 6 94 0.06 
 
 0 1 Class error 
0 34 30 0.46 
1 0 136 0.00 
 
 
Using random forests ranking, the input variables corresponding to bridges 1, 4, 
11, and 14 rank at the top as the most important input variables for the 16 node network. 
Similarly, bridges 1, 5, 14, and 18 come on top in the 18 node network. These rankings 
conform to the intuition from the network topology, as those are the bridges on minimum 
cut-sets. 
In order to visualize the n-dimensional failure surfaces for the example lattice 
networks, Fisher’s discriminant classifier is applied to the training set. FDA assumes the 
data points in each class are normally distributed with full rank covariance matrices, and 
categorizes data points based on the ratio of between and within class variances (Hastie et 
al. 2009). The between (B) and within (W) variance matrices are used to project the data 
points into two new dimensions which explain the most variability in the data, as shown 
by Component 1 and Component 2 in Figure 4.8. As observed, the application of a linear 
classifier which assumes normal data point distribution results in fuzzy separation 
surfaces where different classes are mixed at the boundary. Figure 4.9 replicates the 
visualization of the failure surface for tolerable network failure probability values other 
than 0.8 that is otherwise used throughout this chapter. As expected, the mixture at the 
boundary does not depend on the selected tolerable value. Nevertheless, FDA enables 
such data visualizations which are applicable to high dimensional data as in network 
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reliability problems. Therefore, while random forests may provide superior classifiers of 
network performance for use in reliability and risk assessments, the use of FDA can 
render rapid visual screening of failed and safe domains feasible for bridge network 
reliability problems. 
  
Figure 4.8. Failure surface visualization for the lattice networks in Example 3 
  
Figure 4.9. Failure surface visualization for the lattice networks in Example 3 using diffeent 
tolerable network failure probability values. The 16-node network uses 0.5 while the 20-
node network uses 0.7. 
Hurtado (2011) has also proposed a dimensionality reduction method to visualize 
the failure surface for problems in structural reliability using polar coordinates. However, 
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the dimensionality reduction requires that the limit state function be expressed in explicit 
form and be differentiable around the design point. Since surrogate models of the limit 
state function developed by random forests are expressed by decision trees which are step 
functions (and therefore, not continuous), the requirements of the dimensionality 
reduction method limit their applicability to visualize the failure surface in network 
reliability problems. 
4.4. Summary 
Probabilistic risk assessment of urban infrastructure systems such as highway 
bridge networks enables network managers and stakeholders to make informed decisions 
for risk mitigation and emergency planning. However, assessment of risks owing to 
failures and natural hazards such as earthquakes requires extensive simulations, and can 
be limiting for large networks. This chapter proposed a new framework which uses a 
limited number of network reliability evaluations (for example, by BRAN) to develop 
surrogate models by random forests. Therefore, surrogate models do not replace methods 
to evaluate network reliability, but they rather build upon them for probabilistic risk 
assessment applications. The proposed method can reduce the simulations time to for 
multiple network reliability evaluations by orders of magnitude while incurring 
manageable errors compared to benchmark Monte Carlo simulations. The surrogate 
models in this chapter are developed using data points simulated by uniform independent 
sampling, and therefore, they don’t represent actual bridge failure records resulting from 
hazard scenarios (the actual risk assessment application is presented in Chapter 6). The 
examples presented in Section 4.3 verify that the application of random forests can 
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develop proper surrogate models for networks with different simple and complex 
topologies. When the network topology does not offer a clear hierarchy among bridge 
criticalities, establishing surrogate models becomes more contrived and may required 
more data points for training as shown for two synthetic networks in Example 3. In 
addition to random forests, a linear classifier in Fisher’s discriminant analysis has been 
presented to visualize the implicit high dimensional failure surfaces in networks projected 
into two auxiliary dimensions. The use of the linear classifier, however, is limited to 
visualization as it is not a suitable candidate for nonlinear network failure surfaces. 
The application of surrogate models relaxes the computational demand at the 
network performance evaluation level rather than reducing the number of hazard 
scenarios to be analyzed for probabilistic seismic risk assessment, which is the state-of-
the-art approach. However, network surrogate models formed by random forests may be 
trained by bridge failure scenarios generated by importance sampling after a 
seismological study of the region’s fault systems to further enhance the model accuracy, 
as explained in Chapter 6. The improved accuracy is achieved by making use of the joint 
probability distribution (induced by hazard intensity or extra correlations) among random 
variables for training. Nevertheless, data points for model selection may also be 
generated by an independent experimental design without any knowledge on the joint 
probability distribution if seismic risk assessment is not the primary focus of the analysis. 
The study of South Carolina bridge network in Chapter 6 reveals that components 
of real highway bridge systems often results in a hierarchical bridge importance, which 
makes the application of random forests to form surrogate models more desirable. 
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Moreover, although the surrogate models in this chapter are developed for network 
connectivity reliability, their application is not limited to that reliability objective, and 
can be readily extended to objectives such as the total travel time in the network.  
Besides network reliability evaluations, the use of random forests to establish the 
network surrogate models also provides a prioritization scheme for input variables by 
ranking their potential to predict network failures. Example 3 of this chapter revealed that 
the provided ranking by random forests conforms to the bridge criticalities by studying 
minimum cut-sets. The next chapter uses the ranking feature of random forests to develop 
an importance measure which is not dependent on a hazard scenario, but rather can be 
used in a probabilistic risk framework. 
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Chapter 5 
Prioritizing Network Components for 
Retrofit and Maintenance 
Stakeholders of infrastructure networks face the challenge of optimizing the allocation of 
limited available resources (budget, personnel, etc.) to maximize the benefits to their 
systems and users. From the reliability perspective, resource allocation implies 
prioritizing the components of the network (e.g. bridges in a highway transportation 
system) for maintenance and retrofitting in order to optimize the network’s ability to 
perform its intended function. While the resource allocation problem can be addressed by 
running an optimization scheme (e.g. Stergiou and Kiremidjian 2010), the size of the 
problem often poses practical limitations. Moreover, such optimizations require many 
simplifying assumptions which influence the validity of the produced results. In practice, 
therefore, importance measures are often preferred since they identify the criticality of 
components, either directly or as a by-product of reliability analyses, without solving an 
optimization problem. Thus, this chapter reviews the most widely used importance 
91 
 
measures to rank the seismic criticality of bridges in highway bridge networks, and 
introduces two importance measures developed in this research: the Bridge Rank and 
random forests importance measure. The proposed importance measures are applied to 
the case study bridge network in South Carolina, US (Chapter 6), and the results are 
discussed and compared against the more traditional metrics. Although presented for 
highway bridge networks, the application of the two proposed importance measures is not 
restricted to highway bridge networks, as they can be generally applied to any networked 
infrastructure system. 
5.1. State-of-the-Practice Methods for Ranking Highway Bridges 
Traditionally, two different strategies are prevalent in practice for ranking bridges 
in a highway network, namely, the Indices Method and the Expected Damage Method, 
both of which are presented in the seismic retrofitting manual (Buckle et al. 2006). The 
Indices Method is the simplest of the ranking strategies and assigns a rank between 0 to 
100 to each bridge following a qualitative assessment of bridge structural vulnerability 
against seismic and geotechnical hazards and the seismicity of the region, as well as 
socio-economic factors. Bridges are first assigned a score based on their vulnerability, 
which is later modified by their importance (cost, importance for neighborhood, etc.). 
The Expected Damage Method, on the other hand, ranks bridges by estimating direct 
monetary losses incurred to repair a bridge during the same earthquake. Bridges with the 
largest expected damage are then assigned the highest priority for retrofitting. In contrast 
to the Indices Method, the Expected Damage Method captures to a certain extent the 
uncertainty in ground motions and structural properties by using simple fragility 
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functions to estimate the damage state probabilities. Despite similarities between the two 
ranking schemes, their bridge rankings can differ significantly, and their results often do 
not match those of the other methods (discussed in the following sections) either. 
Although the seismic retrofitting manual does not offer a method to consider the overall 
role of bridges to fulfill the objectives of the transportation network, it acknowledges the 
need to incorporate such aspects. Moreover, the simplified fragility models used to 
evaluate the structural seismic vulnerability do not account for environmental conditions 
(e.g. corrosion) or live load (traffic) effects. 
5.2. Ranking by Time-Dependent Bridge Fragility Analysis 
This method determines the probabilities of failure of each deteriorating bridge in 
the network using time-dependent seismic bridge fragility models (Rokneddin et al. 2012; 
Ghosh et al. 2013). Unlike simple fragility curves, these advanced models estimate the 
probability of a bridge being in a given damage state by accounting for the deteriorating 
effects of the corrosive agents in addition to seismic intensity levels at bridge location (in 
terms of peak ground acceleration or spectral acceleration). Figure 5.1 exemplifies a 
fragility model which accounts for the age of the bridge and provides the probability of 
reaching complete damage state conditioned upon Peak Ground Acceleration (PGA) at 
bridge location. The bridge fragility models are formed by structural reliability analysis 
under various strong ground motion records. Clearly, older bridges become more 
vulnerable against the same level of seismic intensity, as their fragility curve moves 
towards left (Figure 5.1). 
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Figure 5.1. Sample bridge fragility model accounting for the age of the bridge 
Ranking by Time Dependent Fragility Analysis (TDFA) assigns priority to 
bridges with the highest probability of failure (reaching the complete damage state) 
regardless of their significance inside the network. Therefore, TDFA ranking ignores the 
significance of bridges in fulfilling the network reliability, or the layout of the bridge 
network in general. 
5.3. Topological Ranking 
Although the importance of accounting for the topology of the network is 
highlighted in the Seismic Retrofitting Manual for Highway Structures (Buckle et al. 
2006), the manual does not provide an explicit method to consider the impact of network 
layout. Betweenness Centrality (BC) is one of many centrality measures in network 
theory that has been extensively used in the literature to simulate the flow in complex 
networks under hurricane and seismic hazards (e.g. Kinney et al. 2005; Dueñas-Osorio 
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and Vemuru 2009; Winkler et al. 2010). The BC of a given node in the network is 
defined as the number of paths passing through that node, as shown in Equation 5.1 
(Freeman 1977): 
 
, 
,  1, , ist
s t
BC i n i n    5.1 
where s and t are pairs of all origins and destinations in the network and i
stn  is an 
indicator function assuming the value of one if node i is on the geodesic path from s to t 
and zero otherwise. Geodesic paths are the shortest paths between two nodes in terms of 
the number of links. The BC metric is often normalized for the size of the network, as in 
Equation 5.2 for directed networks: 
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 Since flow tends to follow the shortest path between any two nodes, BC can be 
considered as a first order proxy to the flow in networks (traffic in the case of 
transportation networks). Thus, high BC can be a measure of bridge importance since 
removing the nodes with high betweenness results in longer travel times or fast 
degradation of connectivity. For example, consider the network in Figure 5.2, in which 
nodes 1 and 2 each represent a one-node cut-set. Apparently, any flow from the origin to 
destination has to pass through nodes 1 and 2, and accordingly, they have the highest 
betweenness in the network. 
Computing BC values for all bridges in the network is possible with a 
computational complexity of    O( log )ln n l n n   for directed networks; implying that 
BC ranking does not require significant computational resources as it scales polynomially 
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as a function of n. The BC may also be customized for transportation network 
applications by slightly modifying its definition. In the modified form, paths are only 
considered between predefined O-D pairs, to be consistent with the network reliability 
objective, rather than all the nodes in the network. As the result, the modified definition is 
more compatible with the network reliability objective. This thesis uses this modified 
definition on Betweenness Centrality in its application to the case study network in 
Chapter 6. 
 
Figure 5.2. High betweenness nodes 1 and 2 are critical to facilitatating the flow in the 
network 
5.4. Conditional Importance Measure 
Conditional importance measures focus on the probability that a given component 
fails provided that the system has failed; for example: 
P( )
P( )
i sys
i
sys
E E
CIM
E
  5.3 
where CIMi denotes the conditional importance measure of component i, and Ei and Esys 
refer to the events of component i and system failures under a given hazard scenario, 
respectively. Therefore, CIM finds components whose failure triggers a high loss of 
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connectivity between the predefined O-D pairs in the network (Song and Der Kiureghian 
2005). 
Ranking based on network reliability is the most comprehensive of the four 
proposed strategies so far since it relates the importance of a bridge not only to its 
vulnerability in terms of failure probability, but also to its impact on overall network 
reliability based on a network reliability objective, as Equation 5.3 considers the joint 
occurance of component and system failures. In the example network of Figure 5.2, 
bridges 1 and 2 may not appear at the top of the CIM ranking, depending on the 
considered seismic hazard event, if they are not vulnerable to the seismic excitations. 
CIM provides a comprehensive method to evaluate network component 
criticalities; however, it requires solving the whole system reliability problem by one of 
the methods introduced in Chapter 2, which makes it more computationally expensive 
compared to the other reviewed importance measures. If the MCMC algorithm is 
followed for network reliability evaluation, CIM may be computed with computational 
complexity of O(NMC.m
2
.n
2
.log(n)). 
Equation 5.3 presents the most commonly used form of the conditional 
importance measure; although other forms have also appeared in the literature with slight 
differences (Der Kiureghian and Song 2008; Volkanovski et al. 2009). For example, the 
reciprocal form of the CIM formula introduced above is also used in some applications. 
However, this thesis evaluates the conditional importance measure by the form used in 
Equation 5.3. 
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5.5. The Newly Developed Importance Measures 
5.5.1. Bridge Rank 
To overcome the computational complexity of conditional importance measures, a 
novel ranking approach has been proposed by the author based on the original PageRank 
algorithm (Brin and Page 1998). PageRank is the metric used to rank web pages by the 
Google search engine, and combines the relevance of web pages with the importance of 
other pages linking to them to assess topological criticality in the network of the World 
Wide Web. PageRank is formulated to give importance to nodes that are themselves 
connected to important nodes, and is used in Google and many other search engines in 
response to search queries, as described below. 
 Search engines rely on internet bots (web crawlers), which are automated 
programs to browse the web and index web pages along with their incoming links to 
constantly update the network of internet websites. Then, PageRank or similar algorithms 
are applied to the network’s graph to assess the topological criticality of webpage across 
the web. This criticality assessment is performed offline to identify important websites 
(nodes), which are well connected themselves and receive many incoming links from 
other important nodes. When a user enters a search query, the search engine evaluates the 
relevance of the indexed web pages to the query, and again ranks the web pages based on 
a specific combination of the topological criticality (e.g. by PageRank) and keyword 
relevance (Newman 2010). This process can be implemented fast, since the topological 
criticality ranking is already stored on the search engine’s servers after offline evaluation. 
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Bridge Rank is developed by modifying the described process to assess the 
criticality of the components of urban infrastructure systems, specifically highway bridge 
networks. Rather than search queries, Bridge Rank combines the topological importance 
with bridge fragilities, as defined by Equation 5.4: 
1 1( ) 1   BR β I AD  5.4 
where BR is the Bridge Rank vector, I is the identity matrix, A is the adjacency matrix of 
the network, D is the diagonalized matrix of node out-degrees, and  denotes the 
diagonalized matrix of network component vulnerabilities. 
11n  represents a vector of 
ones (n being the number of brides in the network), while D and  are square matrices 
with zero entries except on the main diagonal. Parameter  denotes a scalar that is 
required to be less than the reciprocal of the maximum eigenvalue of AD
-1
. The original 
PageRank formulation assumes the diagonal entries of  to be 1, as it is performed in the 
offline stage of the search process, and is only concerned with the topological ranking. 
However, using bridge vulnerabilities for  in the Bridge Rank formulation eliminates the 
need for two-stage ranking as applied in the search engines, since vulnerabilities are 
available and can be combined with the topological ranking at once. 
The introduction of containing non-topological information enables tailoring the 
PageRank approach to other applications. Accordingly, using information on bridge 
fragilities for this purpose leads to a unique combination of network topology and 
structural vulnerability which is the basis for Bridge Rank. The component vulnerabilities 
in matrix  are derived by time dependent structural reliability analysis on system 
components, as in the BRAN methodology (Ghosh et al. 2013; Rokneddin et al. 2013). 
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The contribution from topology comes from degree centrality and connection to 
important nodes to form critical sectors in the network (Equation 5.4). The set of 
topologically important nodes (which are interconnected among themselves) facilitate 
global connectivity, and their failure impacts the system reliability more severely than the 
failure of less central nodes. 
To have balanced contributions from the topological importance of components in 
the network and their structural vulnerability, the magnitude of component vulnerabilities 
in  must be scaled to the PageRank values (provided by setting the diagonal entries of  
to one in Equation 5.3). Such scaling ensures uniform contributions from topology and 
vulnerability—thus averting unbalanced rankings that can arise from differences in 
magnitudes where modest differences in the topological importance may undermine 
significant contrasts in structural urgencies (and vice versa). Nonetheless, the formulation 
presented in Equation 5.4 also provides the flexibility to give more weights to the 
contribution from either topology or vulnerability to tailor the metric to different 
applications and stakeholder preferences. 
Although BR accounts for the topological structure of the bridge network, it does 
not depend on the choice of network reliability objectives or the origin and destination 
nodes. In this regard, BR provides an all-to-all ranking, where connectivity is evaluated 
between every pair of nodes in the network. In the example network of Figure 5.2, BR 
disregards the specified origin and destination nodes; however, bridges 1 and 2 are still 
topologically important since both are well connected (with a node degree of 4), as well 
as connected to each other. Nevertheless, their BR rank also depends on their 
vulnerability to the seismic hazard. 
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The computational complexity of BR ranking is significantly less than that of the 
conditional importance measures as it averts the need for network reliability assessments. 
However, rankings from both methods are conditioned upon the considered hazard 
scenario to estimate bridge failure probabilities. The next method, informed by random 
forest surrogate models presented in Chapter 4, provides a ranking scheme which is not 
scenario dependent, and can be used in a probabilistic risk assessment framework. The 
application of BR is shown on a case study bridge network in Chapter 6. 
5.5.2. Relative Component Importance by Random Forests 
In fitting a surrogate model to ( )g x , different input variables show different 
predictive capability. For example, consider the bridge network reliability problem of 
Figure 4.1(b). Losing bridge 2 does not affect the network connectivity as much as the 
failure of bridge 1, since bridge 1 is a minimum cut set for the considered origin to the 
destination nodes (note that removing bridge 2 still leaves the path to the destination 
connected through bridge 3). Similarly, bridges 1 and 2 each provide a one-node cut-set 
in the network of Figure 5.2; thus the failure of each disconnects the network. None of 
the remaining six bridges in the depicted network are as significant to the network 
connectivity. Accordingly, the number of variables which have a significant influence on 
the fitted surrogate model for bridge networks is often a fraction of n, the number of 
components in the system. Chapter 4 showed that the hierarchy of variable importance 
influences the accuracy of the developed surrogate model with the same training samples. 
Since each tree in a random forest is established via m random variables out of the 
possible n variables, those variables appearing in more trees can be considered to have 
higher predicting capability. Random forests consider the variable importance as the 
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average gain in accuracy while splitting by the variable over all trees. This gain in 
accuracy may be defined either through the Gini splitting index or out-of-bag 
randomization (Hastie et al., 2009). However, this choice often has little influence on the 
final ranking, as both metrics generally assign importance by counting the number of 
times a variable is used for dividing in the random forest. 
Variable importance measures for random forests are gaining in popularity in 
many scientific fields (e.g. Strobl et al. 2007; Archer and Kimes 2008); however, they are 
shown to be sensitive to differences in the scale of input random variables (Strobl et al. 
2007). However, random forests importance measure rankings (referred to as RFIM 
hereafter) are well suited to the risk assessment of bridge networks since all input 
variables are bridge failure probabilities and therefore, have the same scale. Moreover, 
since the surrogate models are developed over multiple failure scenarios in a probabilistic 
risk assessment framework, the ranking scheme offered by random forests does not 
depend on a single hazard scenario, unlike CIM and BR. The probabilistic nature of RFIM 
ranking has important implications, as a bridge close to the earthquake epicenter is more 
likely to rank high based on event specific CIM and BR methods. RFIM, on the other 
hand, evaluates the bridge criticalities over multiple events, and thus, provides a more 
balanced ranking in which the role of bridges in fulfilling the network reliability 
objective is more emphasized than their single event vulnerability. Accordingly, one 
should expect similarities between RFIM and BC rankings. The application of RFIM 
alongside the other introduced metrics in Chapter 6 highlights the similarities and 
contrasts discussed in this chapter. The most important characteristics of the discussed 
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methods are also summarized in Table 5.1. This table may be used to select an 
importance measure for bridge retrofit prioritization based on user preferences.  
Table 5.1. Characteristics of the importance measures in Chapter 5 
Importance 
Measure 
Considers 
bridge 
vulnerability 
Considers 
role in 
network 
Depends on 
(O, D) pairs 
Provides 
probabilistic 
ranking 
Seismic retrofit 
manual methods 
 No
*
 No No No 
BC No Yes    Yes
**
 No 
TDFA Yes No No No 
CIM Yes Yes Yes No 
BR Yes Yes No No 
RFIM Yes Yes No Yes 
Seismic retrofit manual methods include the Indices method, and the Expected Damage 
method. BC: Betweenness Centrality. TDFA: Time Dependent Fragility Analysis. CIM: 
Component Importance Measure. BR: Bridge Rank. RFIM: Random Forests Importance 
Measure 
*   The Indices method ignores fragility, while the Expected Damage method uses old 
fragility models. 
** The (O, D) dependent definition of BC is considered here.  
5.6. Summary 
Importance measures provide viable alternatives to optimization schemes to 
identify critical system components. Without the need to solve an optimization problem 
which can be costly for large networks, importance measures are either directly computed 
or evaluated as a by-product of network reliability analyses. Traditionally, importance 
measures focused on the repair or replacement cost of bridges, or their individual 
vulnerability against natural hazards, without considering their role inside the network. 
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Conditional importance measures (CIM) combine bridge vulnerabilities with their 
significance in fulfilling the network reliability objective. However, CIM ranking is more 
computationally demanding than most other methods, as it requires solving the network 
reliability problem. Bridge Rank is developed based on the PageRank sorting algorithm 
by Google, and provides a computationally efficient solution while considering both 
bridge vulnerabilities and network aspects. Additionally, Bridge Rank does not depend 
on the choice of (O, D) pairs in network reliability, and offers an implicit all-to-all 
approach. Both CIM and Bridge Rank, however, present rankings which depend on a 
specific hazard scenario. The second novel presented approach uses random forests’ 
relative importance of input variables (i.e. bridges) to predict the network reliability 
outcome. In that regard, random forests ranking is similar to CIM, as both consider the 
network reliability objective and the role of bridges in maintaining connectivity. 
However, using the network reliability formulation by surrogate models in Chapter 4, 
random forests provide a probabilistic framework for ranking which does not depend on a 
particular hazard scenario. 
Chapter 6 compares the ranking outcome of the different importance measures 
discussed in this chapter, and compares the results across different methods. The 
developed metrics give priorities to bridges very different from those by Seismic Retrofit 
Manual for Highway Structures; highlighting the significance of involving the network 
aspect for retrofitting and maintenance planning. 
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Chapter 6 
Applications of Reliability and Risk 
Assessment Methods to Urban  
Infrastructure Systems 
This chapter presents the application of the methods developed in the previous chapters 
to network reliability evaluation, probabilistic risk assessment, and component 
prioritization of highway bridge networks. In addition to bridge networks which have 
been frequently discussed in the precious chapters, this chapter presents case studies for 
two other infrastructure systems: the water distribution network and the power 
transmission grid. The same reliability and risk methods are applicable to study all 
networked infrastructure systems; however, water and power network applications are 
exemplified by focusing on less discussed aspects of interdependence and performance 
bounds to emphasize their significance in reliability and risk evaluations. 
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6.1. Highway Bridge Network 
The case studies shown in this section exemplify the application of the BRAN 
methodology, risk assessment using surrogate models, and ranking by importance 
measures for part of the highway bridge system in South Carolina, US (Figure 6.1). An 
earthquake scenario is considered, for which the peak ground acceleration (PGA) 
contours are shown. The depicted seismic scenario results from a strong ground motion 
of Mw = 7.3, based on the largest contributing event to the 10% exceedance probability in 
50 years seismic de-aggregation map of the region (USGS 2010). The event’s epicenter 
coincides with the epicenter of the historic 1886 Charleston earthquake, which is 20 km 
away from the center of Charleston. The PGA contours are computed using HAZUS-MH 
MR4 (FEMA 2009) by an attenuation model for Central and Eastern US seismic zone 
(CEUS). This CEUS attenuation models is itself the weighted average of four attenuation 
relationships, namely Atkinson and Boore (1995), Toro et al. (1997), Frankel et al. 
(2002), and Campbell (2003), which present different models for that region. The case 
study network lies in the greater Charleston area and includes bridges and roads along 
freeways, highways, and main roads encompassing the counties of Charleston, Berkeley, 
Orangeburg, Dorchester, and Colleton between Interstate-95 and the Atlantic Ocean. 
The network consists of 509 aging bridges from different bridge classes 
categorized according to structure, material properties, and construction type (Table 6.1). 
The bridge inventory is obtained from the National Bridge Inventory (Federal Highway 
Administration 2013) and integrated with the GIS map of the region’s roadways from 
(TELEATLAS 2010). The majority (over 83%) of the bridges in the network belong to 
the category of non-seismically designed bridges (pre-1990 construction), and have been 
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characterized by previous researchers as seismically vulnerable (Nielson and DesRoches 
2007). Moreover, they are prone to the adverse effects of aging and deterioration given 
their age and proximity to the sea. 
Previous studies on the seismic vulnerability of highway bridges in the region 
highlight potential bridge susceptibility to seismic loads (Wong et al. 2005; Padgett et al. 
2010); however, they do not consider the effects of aging and network-level performance. 
Rokneddin et al. (2012) studied the seismic network reliability in the region considering 
the effects of aging bridge fragilities. Also, a later study highlighted the need for updating 
historical estimates of deterioration parameters from field-monitored data to develop 
bridge fragility models that reflect in situ conditions (Rokneddin et al. 2013).  
For this case study, the destination node is selected to be in highly populated 
urban areas, which would be in need or urgent care in the event of the depicted seismic 
scenario. The origin node is on the perimeter of the network, which can be considered as 
a point of access from the outside through the Interstate-95 highway. 
The bridge network of South Carolina is a large and complex network which 
provides an opportunity to showcase the capabilities of the developed methods in 
previous chapters. The BRAN methodology is first employed to evaluate the seismic 
reliability of the network under the depicted scenario (Section 6.1.1) taking into account 
the extra correlations among bridge failures, which do not stem from PGA correlations 
due to geographical proximity, but rather originate from the bridge structural conditions, 
topological characteristics of the network, and the effect of live traffic, among other 
factors. For probabilistic risk assessment, surrogate models are developed in Section 
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6.1.2 which are consistent with the network reliability objective and the identified origin 
and destination nodes. Finally, different importance measures are applied to the case 
study network, and the ranking outcomes are compared in Section 6.1.3. 
 
Figure 6.1 - The case study aging bridge network in South Carolina, US, along with 
intensity contours (PGA) of the seismic scenario (Mw = 7.3) and the choice of origin and 
destination nodes 
6.1.1.  Network Reliability Evaluation by BRAN methodology 
6.1.1.1. Correlation Matrix and Monte Carlo Sampling 
This section reviews the process of BRAN methodology with data from the case 
study network. The network failure probability is evaluated in the next section. BRAN 
offers the necessary algorithms to simulate samples from the d-dimensional binary 
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random variable with mean 
1 2[ , ,..., ]
T
dP P Pμ and correlation matrix R, where d is the 
number of correlated bridges in the network out of the total n bridges. Correlated bridges 
must have a failure probability between 0.05 and 0.95, since bridges with lower and 
higher failure probabilities can be treated independently, as detailed in Chapter 3 and 
Appendix A. 
Table 6.1. Inventory of bridges in the case study transportation network showing the 
different classes 
Bridge Classes Number 
MSSS Slab 159 
MSSS Steel Girder 123 
MSSS Concrete Girder 117 
MSC Steel Girder 38 
MSC Slab 17 
SS Concrete 19 
SS Steel 19 
MSC Concrete Box Girder 15 
MSC = Multi-span continuous, MSSS = Multi-span simply 
supported, SS = Simply supported 
 
The case study network has 117 bridges (out of 509) with correlated failure 
probabilities, constituting 23% of the total. The remaining 392 bridges (77%) either have 
extremely high (110 bridges) or extremely low (282 bridges) failure probabilities which 
make them independent. The bridge failure probabilities (Pi’s) are evaluated using a 
parameterized bridge fragility model, developed by Ghosh et al. (2013). The correlation 
matrix (R) is established by the three auxiliary data sources, i.e. bridge condition ratings, 
functional road classes, and the topological similarity measure, as per explanations in 
Section 3.2. Given lack of any information on the relative importance of the three 
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sources, the entries of the correlation matrix are assumed to be the average value from the 
three data sources. 
Next, the correlation matrix (R) is transformed to
0
R  whose correlation values are 
compatible with the evaluated bridge failure probabilities. In conjunction with the bridge 
failure probabilities,
0
R is used to simulate samples of the d-dimensional binary random 
variable. For the case study network, the contributions from bridge condition ratings and 
the functional road class mostly produce positive correlations. However, network 
topology results in some negative correlations across bridge pairs since nodes can be 
connected to very different neighboring bridges which produces negative correlation 
ratios according to Equation 3.5. Accordingly, the resulting
0
R includes both positive and 
negative entries. 
Since the correlation values in R and consequently, in 0R  are derived from 
auxiliary data sources, they may not necessarily provide accurate estimates of actual 
correlation values. Therefore, the correlation values are varied within their respective 
admissible range for a sensitivity analysis which is used to examine the range of 
variations in the evaluated network failure probability. Section 3.3 presents the 
formulation of the varied correlation matrices R , where positive and negative λ values 
represent the shift of correlation ratios towards minimum and maximum admissible 
values, respectively. For this case study, λ values vary from -0.5 to 0.5 in 0.1 intervals, 
producing a total of eleven correlation matrices for network reliability analysis. 
The normalized error metric (E) introduced in Section 3.3 measures the level of 
changes from original correlation estimates in R when modified for compatibility by 
110 
 
computing their normalized difference in matrix 2-norm. The value of E computed for the 
eleven formed correlation matrices is shown in Figure 6.2. For the mapped original 
estimates in
0
R , E is computed to be 5%, which is small enough to support the choice of 
the three information sources to establish the correlation matrix. Although the correlation 
ratios from the three auxiliary sources are not estimated based on real post-earthquake 
data analysis, they at least show reasonable compatibility with bridge failure 
probabilities. Nevertheless, it must be noted that compatibility does not necessarily imply 
accuracy of estimates. Therefore, the impact of varying correlation levels on network 
reliability is investigated in the sensitivity analysis. 
With correlation matrices R ready, the Dichotomized Gaussian Method (DGM) is 
used to simulate realizations of bridge failures from their correlated failure probabilities 
and the modified correlation matrix. The dimensionality reduction as the result of 
independent treatment of extreme bridge failure probabilities has significant 
computational consequences. In this case, forming the covariance matrix (S) of the 
associated d-dimensional (here, d = 117) normal distribution requires far less 
computations compared to forming it for an n-dimensional (n = 509) variable. The 
remaining 392 bridges with independent failures do not depend on the DGM method to 
simulate correlated failure samples, as their failure can be simulated independently. To 
increase the efficiency of computations, independent failures are generated using quasi 
random numbers rather than common pseudo-random number generators. 
Finally, realizations of correlated bridge failures are combined with independent 
failure realizations to form a dataframe consisting of NMC realizations of the n-
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dimensional binary random variable for each  value. These eleven dataframes are used 
to evaluate the network reliability by the modified MCMC method, the results of which 
are presented in the next section. 
 
Figure 6.2. the error term associated with R  for compatibility modifications 
6.1.1.2. Results of BRAN’s Application to the South Carolina Bridge Network 
Figure 6.3(a) shows the frequency distribution of the conditional failure 
probabilities corresponding to the 509 bridges in the network under the scenario seismic 
hazard. Evidently, the majority of the bridges have extreme failure probabilities. A 
significant percentage of the bridges with very low failure probabilities are comprised of 
MSSS Slab, MSC Slab, SS Concrete, and SS Steel bridges which are found to be 
relatively non-vulnerable to the scenario seismic event owing to minimal bearing 
deformations and low column demands (for multi- span bridges). The low seismic 
vulnerability of these bridge types is in agreement with similar findings reported by a 
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previous study (Rokneddin et al. 2012). Bridges with high failure probabilities tend to 
belong to the aging MSC Steel, MSSS Steel, and MSSS Concrete girder bridge classes 
characterized by high demands on column, bearing and abutment deformations and are 
primarily concentrated near the epicenter characterized by high PGA intensity and 
corrosive environment due to proximity to the sea splash zone. 
Figure 6.3(b) compares the network reliability estimates as a function of the 
number of Monte Carlo simulations. Both independent and correlated (based on original 
estimates
0
R ) bridge failures are examined, and the simulations continue until the 
standard deviation of estimates falls below 0.005. Monte Carlo analysis for the 
independent failures shows superior efficiency as they have been sampled using quasi-
random numbers. As the result, evaluating the network failure probability by independent 
failures only requires up to 20,000 simulations. The correlated scenario, on the other 
hand, needs 100,000 simulations to stabilize since it uses pseudo-random sampling, 
according to Equation 3.14. As for network reliability estimates, Figure 6.3(b) suggests 
that accounting for the original estimates of extra correlations among bridge failures 
improves the reliability of the case study network by reducing its failure probability from 
around 0.55 to 0.51. 
Due to the size of the network, the arguments on the impact of extra correlations 
on network reliability estimates (Section 3.1) cannot be directly tested, as the network is 
too large to identify all paths and cut-sets. However, Figure 6.2 suggests that the 
correlation values in 0R are closer to Rmax than Rmin, since moving further towards Rmax , 
by increasing , which means more positive correlations, has negligible influence on the 
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error term. On the other hand, accounting for extra correlations has improved the network 
reliability (Figure 6.3b), suggesting more bridges on the shortest paths between the origin 
and destination nodes must be positively correlated. An examination of the shortest path 
reveals that six out of seven bridges on that path are in fact positively correlated.  
 
 
 
 
(a) (b) 
Figure 6.3. The results of network reliability evaluations corresponding the the network and 
seismic scenario depicted in Figure 6.1: a) Frequency distribution of the bridge failure 
probabilities, and b) Network connectivity reliability between origin and destination nodes 
versus the number of samples in Monte Carlo simulations. 
Figure 6.4 presents the results of the sensitivity analysis, along with the associated 
error E for each R . This figure confirms that overall, more positive correlations improve 
the reliability of the case study network. On the other hand, the failure probability 
generally increases as λ moves towards negative values before dropping at λ = -0.5 (this 
irregularity needs further investigation in future research). In spite of this increase, the 
failure probability does not reach that of the independent scenario. The range of failure 
probability variations is around 20% of the failure probability associated with the original 
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estimates (0.51), which emphasizes the impact of extra correlations and underlines the 
need to develop post-earthquake-data-driven models to better estimate the extra 
correlations. 
Several past studies on the seismic reliability of bridge networks have suggested 
that neglecting correlations results in underestimation of losses at the network level (e.g. 
Bommer and Crowley 2006; Lee and Kiremidjian 2007). It is important to note that those 
studies have considered different types of correlations (hazard intensities in terms of 
inter- and intra-event errors, and seismic response of structures) and present the results 
for a different limit state (loss in monetary terms rather than network connectivity). 
Neglecting the spatial correlations resulting from of inter- and intra-event error terms is 
commonly assumed to underestimate the assessed loss in a portfolio of structures. 
However, neglecting extra correlations may over or underestimate the network reliability 
depending on the correlation signs and the topology of the network. Therefore, the impact 
of extra correlations and may vary among different networks. Nevertheless, neglecting 
extra correlations may cause large deviations from the real network reliability value, as 
confirmed in this section. 
To further investigate the impact of extra correlations on network reliability 
assessments, two different scenarios are studied in which the origin and destination nodes 
have changed to produce tail failure probabilities in the case study network. Figure 6.5 
presents the results of the sensitivity analysis on the failure probability of these scenarios 
with the same range of λ values as before. To be consistent with the original case study, 
the simulations continue until the standard deviation of reliability estimates reaches 
0.005. As expected, varying extra correlations has far less influence on extreme failure 
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probabilities. Note that the trend observed in Figure 6.4 (i.e., reduction of network failure 
probability with overall more positive correlations) is not echoed in Figure 6.5, as the (O, 
D) pair and the resulting paths and cut-sets have changed. Nevertheless, changing 
correlation ratios has negligible effect when the network failure probability is either very 
large or very small, as confirmed by Figure 6.5. 
 
Figure 6.4. The impact of varying λ on the network failure probability of the South Carolina 
bridge network 
In summary, the BRAN methodology is shown to be applicable for reliability 
assessment of large highway bridge networks. BRAN employs advanced bridge fragility 
models, which are used to evaluate the bridge failure probabilities. Several bridge classes, 
especially slab type and simply supported bridges, are relatively non-vulnerable to 
seismic events due to low seismic demands on bearings and columns. On the contrary, 
proximity to the epicenter of the earthquake makes many bridges highly vulnerable. 
Therefore, the majority of bridges (77%) in the network have either extremely high or 
low probabilities which make their failures independent. 
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(a) (b) 
Figure 6.5. The impact of varying λ on the network failure probability with: a) an origin-
destination pair resulting in extremely high failure probability, and b) an origin-destination 
pair resulting in a very low probability of failure. 
Network reliability evaluation of the South Carolina bridge network revealed that 
the three auxiliary data sources can produce a viable the correlation matrix, a claim 
supported by around 5% change in matrix 2-norm after modification for compatibility. 
Furthermore, the sensitivity analysis examined the impact of accounting for different 
levels of extra correlations on network estimates. The evaluated network reliabilities 
showed up to 20% variation, which is significant enough to justify their inclusion in 
network reliability studies. The results also emphasize the need to derive post-earthquake 
data driven correlation estimates. Next, network reliability evaluations by BRAN are 
used in a probabilistic risk assessment. 
6.1.2. Probabilistic Risk Assessment by Surrogate Models 
Table 6.2 lists the required steps to evaluate the risk of exceeding given network 
reliability levels by the application of surrogate models. Step 1 involves creating nmaps 
hazard intensity maps, which are the input for risk assessment, and account for inter- and 
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intra-event correlations (Crowley and Bommer 2006; Jayaram and Baker 2009). Bridge 
fragility models by Ghosh et al. (2013) are then employed to evaluate the bridge failure 
probabilities, which is the probability of exceeding the extensive damage state in this case 
study. The BRAN is subsequently employed to evaluate the network failure probability 
for ns (which is less than nmaps) hazard maps (Step 3), which along the bridge failure 
records corresponding to those ns maps are used to develop a surrogate model for 
network reliability evaluations (Step 4). The surrogate model is then applied to evaluate 
the network failure probability for the rest of hazard maps (
mapsn ns ).Once the nmaps 
network failure probabilities are evaluated using Steps 1-4, Equation 6.1 can be used to 
evaluate the probability of exceeding network reliability levels (Jayaram and Baker 
2010): 
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 6.1 
where Pf is the network failure probability, 0p specifies values for which the probability 
of exceedance is evaluated, and terms w and I stand for scenario weight and the indicator 
function, respectively. The weights are used for importance sampling, so that more 
hazard maps are generated corresponding to larger earthquake magnitudes. Moreover, 
and since the generated seismic intensity maps are associated with a return period, 
Equation 6.1 may be expressed in terms of the annual probability of exceeding network 
reliability levels. 
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Table 6.2. The risk assessment methodology using network surrogate models 
Steps Description 
1 Generate nmaps hazard intensity maps 
2 
Evaluate the bridge failure probabilities for the generated 
hazard maps using bridge fragility models 
3 
Evaluate the network failure probability for ns (ns < nmaps) 
hazard maps by BRAN methodology 
4 
Form a network surrogate model by training with the ns 
scenarios of Step 3 using statistical learning methods. 
Evaluate the network failure probability using the developed 
surrogate model for the rest of the hazard maps 
5 
Evaluate the risk of exceeding network reliability levels using 
Equation 6.26.1 
 
The presented methodology for risk assessment provides efficient methods which 
can save simulation time, as listed below: 
1. The advanced bridge fragility models used in Step 2 are developed by surrogate 
demand models (Ghosh et al. 2013). Accordingly, they provide the fragility 
function without the need for extensive finite element analyses. 
2. BRAN (Step 3) incorporates several methods to enhance the computational 
efficiency of network reliability simulations, as detailed in Chapter 3. The possible 
errors from independent treatment of extreme bridge failure probabilities are shown 
to be negligible. Moreover, MCMC allows for large number of Monte Carlo 
simulations to achieve the desired convergence level. 
3. The use of surrogate models in Step 4 reduces the number of network reliability 
evaluations from nmaps to ns. The value of ns is determined by the desired level of 
119 
 
accuracy in the predictive model. Therefore, in cases where nmaps is large, the use of 
surrogate models can significantly reduce the simulation time of risk assessments. 
4. Finally, the inclusion of weights for importance sampling in Equation 6.1 reduces 
the variance in evaluating the probability of exceedance, as elaborated on in 
Jayaram and Baker (2010). Accordingly, importance sampling results in narrower 
bounds around the estimated mean probability of exceedance from nmaps hazard 
maps. 
This section describes the development of surrogate models for the South 
Carolina bridge network with the same choice of origin and destination nodes as in 
Figure 6.1. The risk assessment is then performed using nmaps = 1,000; however, the value 
for ns is to be determined. Comparing the dimensionality of this case study (i.e., 509) 
with the example networks presented in Section 4.3 may suggest the need for a large 
number of data points to train the random forest model, as 1,000 failure records were 
used for the model of the 20-node network. However, the bridge importance hierarchy in 
the South Carolina network differs from that of the lattice networks, and is governed by 
the shortest paths between the origin and destination sets, as is the case for most actual 
bridge networks. Since the failure of bridges lying on shortest paths affects the network 
connectivity more than the failure of the rest which results in unequal bridge criticalities, 
there is a clear hierarchy among nodes within the network and the predictive models are 
expected to train faster than lattice topologies. This clear hierarchy helps to avoid keeping 
up with the density of data points in actual bridge systems, which otherwise would make 
the simulations intractable. 
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The experimental design implemented for the synthetic networks assumes no 
knowledge on the distribution of random variables. However, for risk assessment 
applications, it is possible to find and make use of the joint distribution of bridge failure 
probabilities among random variables in order to generate the data points in the region of 
most interest for more accurate predictions. The joint distribution involves the intra- and 
inter-event correlations resulting from the hazard scenarios (Step 1 of Table 6.2), and is 
estimated by studying the fault systems in the area in order to simulate network consistent 
seismic scenarios for the network. Since this case study focuses on surrogate model 
development, extra correlations are excluded for simplicity. For each seismic scenario, 
the bridge failure probabilities are evaluated by bridge fragility models (Step 2). The 
resulting bridge failure probabilities follow a joint distribution which differs from 
independent uniform sampling in [0, 1]
n
 which is used for the experimental design set up 
of example networks in Section 4.3. Researchers in structural reliability (e.g. Hurtado 
2004) have reported improvement in prediction accuracy when samples are drawn from 
joint distributions which is often known for structures. Nevertheless, surrogate models by 
independent experimental design are also developed and their results are compared 
against those of the surrogate models developed according to the methodology in Table 
6.1 (i.e. scenario-based sample generation). 
The independent experimental design makes use of 1,000 data points (i.e. bridge 
failure records and their corresponding network failure probabilities), 800 of which are 
used for model selection. The scenario-based approach, on the other hand, employs ns = 
350 seismic intensity scenarios. Although the methodology in Table 6.1 adopts hazard 
maps generation by importance sampling (Jayaram and Baker 2010), other importance 
121 
 
sampling methods in the literature (e.g. Kiremidjian et al. 2007) are also applicable for 
this purpose, and can be used to derive the coveted joint probability distribution. Those ns 
seismic scenarios produce 350 bridge failure records resulting from bridge fragility 
models, of which 280 (i.e. 20%) are used for model selection. In order to evaluate the 
performance of the surrogate model on the depicted seismic scenario in Figure 6.1, the 
corresponding record of bridge failure probabilities resulting from that specific scenario 
is not included in the model selection dataset and reserved for the final prediction tests. 
This record corresponds to the network reliability study presented in Section 6.1.1. 
Figure 6.6 compares the test error in the regression model for the two training 
approaches. Only the regression model is established, since this case study primarily 
intends to estimate the network failure probability for the scenario earthquake depicted in 
Figure 6.5, and therefore, a classification model is not necessary. Both training 
approaches have resulted in smaller test errors compared to the lattice networks (Figure 
4.6) in spite of application to a problem with far higher dimensionality. Recall that 
surrogate models for lattice networks produced an RMSE error close to 0.09. The 
observed improved accuracy highlights the benefit of random forests to de-emphasize the 
contribution of irrelevant random variables (here, most bridges close to the perimeter of 
the depicted network). In comparing the two training approaches, the one trained by true 
hazard scenarios produces lower errors, while trained with only one third as many data 
points as the independent sampling approach. Approach 2 also requires more trees grown 
to stabilize the error, which has negligible impact on the computation time. 
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Figure 6.6. Root of mean squared test errors for the South Carolina network.The 
independent sampling approach uses 800 data points for training, while the network 
consistent scenario based approach uses 280. 
The network reliability study for the demonstrated scenario in Figure 6.1 
evaluates the network failure probability to be 0.55 for the case without extra correlations 
(Section 6.1.1). In comparison, Approach 1 (independent sampling) estimates that 
probability to be 0.58, which incurs a 5.4% deviation, while Approach 2 (sampling by 
hazard scenarios) evaluates it to be 0.57, resulting in an even smaller 3.6% relative error. 
The magnitude of those errors is in the admissible tolerance range of risk assessment 
studies, suggesting that random forests can significantly contribute to the computational 
efficiency of such applications. 
Finally, the surrogate models developed by Approach 2 are employed to evaluate 
the seismic risk for the South Carolina network for the remaining 650 hazard maps. 
Figure 6.7 depicts the evaluated risk curve, which shows the annual probability of 
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exceeding network failure probabilities. Although test error for network reliability 
evaluation confirms that the difference between computed network failure probabilities 
by surrogate models and BRAN is negligible, future work will confirm whether the two 
resulting risk curves match closely. 
 
Figure 6.7. The risk evaluation curve for the South Carolina bridge network, showing annual 
probability of exceeding network failure probabilities. Network reliability evaluations are 
performed by the developed surrogate models. 
The application of statistical learning surrogate models to risk assessment is 
especially emphasized as once a predictive model is established, the future network 
reliability predictions can be made almost instantaneously for many representative hazard 
scenarios. Since the computational complexity of forming the surrogate models by 
random forests is insignificant compared to the reliability evaluations, the computation 
time required for risk assessments is nearly proportional to the number of performed 
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reliability evaluations. Accordingly, using surrogate models may cut the computation 
time proportional to the size of the model assessment set divided by the necessary 
number of reliability evaluations for risk assessment. In this case study, for instance, 350 
seismic scenarios are used to set up the surrogate model, which is then used to form the 
risk curve of Figure 6.7 by 1,000 network reliability evaluations. The computational time, 
accordingly, is reduced by almost two thirds. Network stakeholders, as a result, can opt to 
simulate many more hazard scenarios after forming the model with a tractable number of 
them in order to develop more detailed risk curves. 
6.1.3. Importance Measures 
This section compares the ranking outcome from the importance measures 
discussed in Chapter 5 to rank bridge priorities for retrofitting or maintenance. The 
review of importance measures reveals that ranking of bridges within the network based 
on state-of-the-practice methodologies are cursory in nature and do not account for either 
the deteriorated bridge fragilities or the topological aspects of the network. The time-
dependent fragility analysis (TDFA) improves the bridge ranking by accounting for the 
deteriorated bridge fragilities developed through rigorous nonlinear dynamic and 
probabilistic analyses. However, TDFA still ignores the role of bridges within the 
network. On the other hand, ranking by Betweenness Centrality (BC) is based solely on 
the topology of the network, without acknowledging the heterogeneity in their 
vulnerabilities. Conditional importance measures (CIM) consider both of these aspects; 
however, they require solving the network reliability problem, which makes them the 
most computationally intensive metric among the discussed methods. Chapter 5 also 
introduces two new importance measures, the Bridge Rank (BR) and the Random Forest 
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Importance Measure (RFIM), which account for bridge vulnerabilities and significance 
within the network. In comparison, BR is not limited to the choice of any specific 
reliability objective or the location of origin and destination nodes, as it implicitly 
accounts for all possible paths from every node to every other node in the network. 
However, BR ranking does depend on a specific hazard scenario to evaluate the bridge 
vulnerabilities. RFIM, on the other hand, evaluates the significance of bridge failures to 
predict the network failure probability based on its reliability objective. Moreover, it 
provides a probabilistic ranking which considers multiple hazard scenarios as required for 
probabilistic risk assessment. 
Figure 6.8 identifies the location of ten top ranked bridges inside the South 
Carolina network according to the discussed metrics. The seismic scenario of Figure 6.1 
is considered for TDFA, CIM, and BR importance measures. Accordingly, the rankings 
by these metrics tend to rank higher the bridges closer to the epicenter of the earthquake. 
In addition, for CIM and RFIM which account for the network reliability objective and 
(O, D) pairs, the origin and destination nodes also rank high. RFIM has both of the end 
nodes in the top ten, while CIM has the origin node in the top ten, and the destination 
node in the top 20 (not depicted). Moreover, three out of ten top ranked bridges based on 
RFIM lie on the shortest path from the origin to the destination, highlighting the 
importance of those bridges in maintaining the network connectivity. 
As less complicated methods, BC and TDFA provide contrasting rankings. TDFA 
highlights the most vulnerable bridges, which unsurprisingly lie close to the seismic 
scenario’s epicenter. Highly ranked bridges by BC, on the other hand, do not account for 
bridge vulnerabilities and are more scattered throughout the network, as it is a proxy for 
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traffic flow. Two out of ten top ranked bridges by BC also lie on the shortest path from 
the origin to the destination. 
BC and RFIM both rely on the choice of origin and destination nodes in the 
network. However, while the BC metric ignores the seismic hazard altogether, RFIM 
provides a probabilistic ranking, which does not depend on the depicted seismic scenario. 
This is a key difference, which becomes obvious by comparing the highly ranked bridges 
by the two methods. BC is concerned with key bridges facilitating connectivity, as those 
on the shortest path. However, RFIM accounts for their vulnerability as well, and does 
not include structurally safe bridges among those with priority for retrofitting. 
Nevertheless, their rankings may have a few bridges in common depending on the 
network topology and choice of origin and destination nodes. 
Finally, the simple metrics of the Expected Damage method and the Indices 
method provide rankings which do not match any of the patterns by other importance 
measures. These metrics have been designed with replacement cost of bridges in mind 
(although the Expected Damage method considers old bridge fragility curves as well), 
and give priority to bridges with long spans. The highly ranked bridges by the state-of-
the-practice methods have an important role to distribute traffic under normal operational 
conditions, but their impact on fulfilling the network reliability objectives in extreme 
events is not significant, particularly when compared to highly ranked bridges by more 
advanced methods. 
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Figure 6.8. Bridge criticality rankings by importance measures: RFIM: Random Forest 
Importance Measure, BR: ridge Rank, CIM: Comditional Importance Measure, TDFA: 
Time Dependent Fragility Analysis, and BC: Betweenness Centrality. The Expected 
Damage and Indecis Methods are state-of-the-practice methods in the Seismic Retrofit 
Manual (Buckle et al. 2006). 
In summary, the ranking outcomes by presented methods differ from one another 
based on their characteristics (Table 5.1). Nevertheless, there are clear similarities 
between them as well. Specifically, the three advanced metrics of CIM, BR, and RFIM 
identify the location of important bridges in the network, although by different criteria. 
Out of those methods, BR has the least analytical complexity, and provides the ranking 
scheme by far fewer computations. Therefore, it may be an appropriate metric for a 
probabilistic ranking framework similar to RFIM, since evaluating the BR rankings for 
multiple hazard scenarios can be done relatively fast. However, BR rankings from those 
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multiple scenario analysis need to be combined in a systematic way, which is pursued in 
future research. 
Before moving to the case study of other infrastructure networks, the following 
lists highlights from the case study on the South Carolina bridge network: 
1. BRAN methodology is applied to evaluate the reliability of a large 
highway bridge network in South Carolina, US, with 509 deteriorating 
bridges from different bridge classes. The methodology presented to 
estimate and modify the correlation matrix for extra correlations 
efficiently produced samples of correlated bridge failures for Monte Carlo 
simulations. The efficiency is specially achieved by independent treatment 
of bridges with very high or very low failure probability (greater than 0.95 
and less than 0.05, respectively). 
2. Extra correlations have potentially significant impact on network 
reliability estimates, and therefore, they may not be ignored in reliability 
studies. Varying the correlation levels resulted in up to 20% change in the 
estimated network reliability of the case study network. 
3. Probabilistic risk assessment in bridge network can greatly benefit from 
surrogate models for network reliability evaluations. Such surrogate 
models are developed by random forests after training with a manageable 
number of network reliability evaluations, and produce predictive models 
to replace Monte Carlo simulations for further reliability evaluations with 
negligible error. 
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4. Network surrogate models can combine with hazard scenario reduction 
methods prevalent in risk analysis, such as importance sampling, to further 
enhance the efficiency and accuracy of the risk assessment. 
5. The newly introduced importance measures, Bridge Rank and Random 
Forests Importance Measure, enhance upon the state-of-the-art methods 
for bridge retrofit prioritization by accounting for bridge vulnerabilities 
and their role in the network at the same time. Bridge Rank focuses on 
computational efficiency, while Random Forests Importance Measure can 
provide a probabilistic ranking which does not depend on a specific hazard 
scenario. 
 While the developed frameworks for highway bridge network reliability and risk 
evaluation are transferable to other networked systems, the case studies for water 
distribution systems and power networks focus on reliability aspects which are more 
relevant to those networks. Those aspects, including interdependencies across different 
infrastructure systems and vulnerability analysis, are the subject of increased interest in 
recent years due to their significance in system reliability studies. The next two sections 
exemplify new approaches to implement interdependence and vulnerability analysis in 
water and power systems, respectively, for large and complex systems. 
6.2. Water Distribution Network 
Communities located along the U.S. Gulf of Mexico are uniquely vulnerable to 
disruptive events associated with hurricane activity in the Gulf. In 2005, landfall of 
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita on the Louisiana and Texas coasts brought public attention 
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to the overwhelming destructive power of hurricane events and to the impacts they can 
have on local and regional infrastructure networks, such as the water distribution system. 
Similarly in 2008, Hurricane Ike hit the Texas coast resulting in heavy damage to major 
infrastructure systems. Analogous to the highway bridge networks, studying the 
vulnerabilities of water network components, and evaluating the systemic reliability 
enables the system stakeholders to make informed decisions for risk mitigation and 
network management. 
While the majority of water system components, such as water pipes and fittings, 
enjoy protection from hurricanes because they are located underground, the dependence 
of water distribution network on the electrical grid to power its pumps make it vulnerable 
to hurricane demands. Equipping pumping sites with back-up power generators to 
provide emergency power may not fully address this vulnerability issue because of the 
limited amount of fuel that can be stored on-site, the likelihood of power outages lasting 
on the order of weeks, potential problems with securing dependable fuel sources in times 
of emergency and shortages, and the likelihood of transportation disruptions. Moreover, 
having a separate power generator at each pumping site requires a considerable 
investment, which is not always possible. 
6.2.1. The Case Study Network 
The case study network belongs to a small community (approximately 70,000 
residents) located on the upper Texas, US, within the Greater Houston metropolitan area. 
Figure 6.9 shows the city’s actual water distribution network containing 5 to 107 cm (2 to 
42 inch) diameter pipes with a total length of 502 km (312 miles), 9 ground 
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storage/booster pump sites, and 3 elevated storage tanks. The depicted water distribution 
system, even though it serves a relatively small community, is a complex network with 
approximately 17,200 individual pipes. To facilitate the analysis, the actual water 
distribution network is simplified to only include the most important components, as 
represented by the network shown in Figure 6.10. This simplified version of the city’s 
distribution system contains 316 links representing approximately 209 km (130 miles) of 
pipes connecting 221 vertices including the 12 supply nodes. 
The network reliability is evaluated under the impact of five hurricane scenarios, 
each representative of a hurricane category in the Saffir-Simpson hurricane scale 
(National Hurricane Center). The State of Texas requires that each water system operator 
in the state develop an emergency preparedness plan that details steps the operator will 
take to provide a minimum operating pressure of 240 kPa (35 psi) under foreseeable 
emergency conditions, including natural disasters (Texas Administrative Code). The 
reliability analysis, therefore, require hydraulic pressure modeling in the network for each 
simulated state of the system by EPANET, which exemplifies a different reliability 
objective compared to the connectivity reliability for highway bridge networks. EPANET 
is a software cable of estimating water flux and pressure across pipes in the network by 
defining the geometry of the water network, pipe specifications, and source water 
pressures. 
For the power grid in the study area, only the power system asset inventory of 
generators and transmission level facilities are identifiable from available data sources 
(Federal Emergency Management Agency 2008). The corresponding electric distribution 
network is typically not documented due to security concerns, but its layout is estimated 
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by inspection through several site visits. A topological representation of the power grid 
serving the area is shown in Figure 6.11, where power load substations are modeled as 
nodes and power lines are shown as connecting links. Nine power distribution lines from 
the power substations to water pump stations (i.e., the interdependency lines) are also 
included in the system model. 
 
Figure 6.9 - Case study water distribution network in a small city in Texas, US. PS denotes 
pump station, and WT stands for water tank. 
Studying the performance of two networks at the same time, as well as the flow 
based reliability objective of the water distribution system highlights the need for 
efficient models which are applicable to large systems. The next section presents a model 
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developed for this study, which accounts for the interdependent response of water and 
power systems in a decoupled, two-stage framework. 
6.2.2. The Decoupled Reliability Approach 
A novel two-stage reliability assessment methodology is proposed for water 
distribution networks in coastal communities under hurricane hazard. A decoupled 
method is used to simulate the state of the components in the electrical and water 
distribution systems under hurricane scenarios, and hydraulic analysis by EPANET 
follows to estimate water pressures throughout the network. Figure 6.12 presents the flow 
chart of the decoupled method to simulate realizations of the state of the systems. The 
decoupled method assumes a unidirectional relationship between the power grid and the 
water network in which the latter is dependent upon the former for operating power, but 
no significant dependence exists in the other direction. Accordingly, failures in the 
electrical network can be simulated prior to failures in the water network. For the case 
study presented, cooling water for the electrical substations is acquired from surface 
water sources and not the potable water distribution system, so the unidirectional 
dependence assumption is reasonable. The decoupled strategy is justified because the 
response of power grid components to failures is significantly faster than water network 
components, and therefore, the spread of damage in the water network can be assumed to 
start after the power grid has reached a steady state. Decoupling the response of the two 
systems reduces the complexity of jointly simulating the state of the system, which in 
turn makes the reliability analysis more applicable and computationally feasible for real 
infrastructure systems, such as the water distribution system of this study. Evaluating the 
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performance of utility systems by physics-based models is computationally intensive; 
however, the decoupled framework presented here provides a practical alternative. 
6.2.2.1. Stage 1: Power Network Failure 
Node Betweenness Centrality is employed in this case study to approximate the power 
flow (which in future research is replaced by DC flow models). As also explained in 
Section 5.3, betweenness is a proxy for the amount of current passing through network 
elements. The initial load of a substation equals its betweenness in the initial power 
network. A disruptive event can cause the failure of some power substations and alter the 
network topology, which further changes all substation betweenness values. If a 
substation betweenness exceeds its maximum capacity defined as the product of its initial 
betweenness and a tolerance parameter, the substation fails operationally due to overload. 
Stage 1 runs the betweenness model for each hurricane category to simulate the direct 
and operational failure of the power network components. Similar outage models have 
been used to analyze the cascading failure process of many real power transmission grids, 
such as the North American power grid (Kinney et al. 2005) and the Italian electric grid 
(Crucitti et al. 2004). The generated failure scenarios are used in Stage 2 to evaluate the 
hydraulic reliability of the water system by Monte Carlo simulations. 
6.2.2.2. Stage 2: Water Network Failure 
The components of the water network are assumed to be invulnerable to direct 
hurricane impact, especially in lack of trees which can uproot the underground pipes in 
the region. However, a sensitivity analysis is conducted that assumes reliabilities of 0.95, 
0.98, and 0.99 for the water system components under wind load, in order to investigate 
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the variations in network reliability estimates. Moreover, the state of water pump stations 
also depends on the state of their corresponding power load substation and the 
interdependency lines as simulated at Stage 1. Accordingly, water pumps fail if either of 
the corresponding load substation, the interdependency line, or the water pumping 
 
Figure 6.10. The simplified version of the water distribution network in Figure 6.9 
structure fails. For each of the five hurricane categories, one hundred realizations of the 
state of water system components are generated by Monte Carlo simulations. The use of 
one hundred samples for Monte Carlo ensures that the coefficient of variation of the 
estimated network failure probabilities is limited to 5% with 95% confidence. For each 
realization, the layout of the water distribution network is updated to reflect the new state 
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of the system considering both direct structural and interdependence-induced pump 
failures. 
 
Figure 6.11. The approximate layout of the elecrical network in the case study region 
Finally, to evaluate the system reliability, the water system’s ability to satisfy the 
State’s pressure requirement (i.e., 240 kPa throughout the system) is evaluated for each 
Monte Carlo simulation by hydraulic analysis (via EPANET). The results of the 
described two-stage reliability analysis are discussed in the next section. 
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6.2.3. Network Reliability Results by the Two-Stage Method 
This two-stage, multi-system system reliability analysis estimates the water 
pressure throughout the network under five hurricane category events, each with one 
hundred failure realizations. For each hydraulic realization, the pressure at each node is 
calculated and compared against the minimum regulatory requirement. If all nodal 
pressures within the system are greater than 240 kPa (35 psi), the system is in compliance 
with the regulatory requirement for that realization and is classified as reliable. If some, 
or all, of the distribution nodes do not provide a pressure of 240 kPa (35 psi), the system 
is considered unreliable for that category of hurricane in that realization. Note that being 
classified as unreliable means that some portion of the network does not meet the 
minimum pressure requirements, and does not necessarily imply that the system suffers 
catastrophic failure. Upon completion of all realizations for each category of hurricane, a 
failure probability is estimated as the number of failed scenarios divided by the total 
number of model realizations (the failure probability is the probability that at least one 
node in the system does not meet the minimum pressure requirement). If the probability 
of failure is unacceptably high, the water system owner would then develop and 
implement system improvements to rectify the short-comings as required by regulation. 
Figure 6.13 shows the pressure distribution contours across the case study water 
distribution network for Category 1 through 5 hurricanes. The reliability results suggest 
that the system fails to meet the reliability objective (the regulatory requirement of 240 
kPa) for Categories 4 and 5, mainly due to loss of power at the water pumping sites. 
Figure 6.13 shows the results of the sensitivity analysis, implemented for Category 3 
hurricane, where the reliability of water pipes is assumed to be 0.99, 0.98, and 0.95 to 
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replace the invulnerability assumption. The system reliability is adversely affected as the 
result, and almost completely fails under all three reliability scenarios (Figure 6.14). 
 
Figure 6.12. The flowchart of the decoupled method to evaluate the water network reliability 
by accounting for its interdependence with the power grid. 
Access to such quantitative information can assist engineers, city planners and 
emergency managers in maintenance and retrofit plans against hurricane disasters by 
identifying the weaknesses not only in the water network itself, but also in the supplying 
power load nodes. The two-stage decoupled reliability approach presented in this section 
enables reliability and sensitivity analysis of large water distribution networks under 
hurricane hazard. It can also help developing and implementing a responsive and 
appropriate disaster management plan based upon the size of the approaching storm and 
the probability of the city’s ability to provide basic services in the immediate aftermath. 
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Figure 6.13. The results of the reliability analysis on the case study water distribution 
network. The contours of water pressure throughout the network are shown for five 
hurricane categories. Pipes are assumed to be invulnerable to hurricane. 
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Figure 6.14. The sensitivity of network reliabilty estimates against Category 3 to varying 
pipe vulnerabilities 
The same methodology used in BRAN for highway bridge networks can be 
applied to simulate correlated failures of the components in water and power systems 
once the sources of correlations are identified. Moreover, surrogate models can apply to 
predict the state of the system for risk assessment. Rather than predicting the connectivity 
reliability of the network, surrogate models fit to the outcome of hydraulic results, which 
are more computationally intensive for large systems than connectivity reliability 
simulations. Accordingly, the gained efficiency in risk analysis is even more substantial. 
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6.3. Power Transmission System 
At the transmission level, the power grid consists of power plants (generators), 
substations, and high voltage transmission lines (over 37.5 kV). Network models of 
power transmission systems regard generator and electrical substations as nodes and the 
power lines as links. As an example, Figure 6.15 shows the layout of the power 
transmission grid in the state of Texas, US. This section investigates the performance of 
twenty five power transmission systems corresponding to major cities in Texas, 
California, and Southeastern states of Florida, Georgia, Tennessee, South Carolina, and 
North Carolina against various hazards. The selected systems represent a variety of 
characteristics in design and reliability since they were designed during different times 
and expanded with different growth rates. 
The power transmission grid across some states or the country level is sparsely 
interconnected, and nodes are often distributed in clusters. This interface separation roots 
in the design of the grid to populate centers and also to mitigate the risk of cascading 
failures (Holmgren 2006). Both nodes and links in power transmission networks are 
vulnerable against a wide range of natural (seismic, hurricane) and man-made (terrorism, 
vandalism) hazards, which makes a comprehensive reliability and risk study challenging 
for real systems. To address this challenge, this section adopts a different approach to 
investigate the response of the case study power transmission networks, and a 
vulnerability study replaces scenario based or probabilistic reliability evaluation which 
was pursued for the other infrastructure systems. The vulnerability analysis 
systematically evaluates system weaknesses against all possible failure contingencies, 
from known or unknown hazards. In comparison, reliability studies assess the systemic 
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performance under known hazards using specific or randomly generated hazard 
scenarios. The difficulty of collecting all significant hazard scenarios and the possibility 
of missing out on scenarios potentially capable of leading to disastrous outcomes make 
the vulnerability study well suited for power transmission systems, as it does not require 
prior knowledge on the nature of hazards. Instead, it investigates the negative 
consequences associated with all possible damaged states the system can suffer from. 
 
Figure 6.15. The layout of the power transmission grid in the state of Texas, US 
Most power transmission planning and expansions follow the contingency 
enumeration approach, which studies the effects of all possible combinations of one 
component failure, i.e. the N – 1 criterion (Billinton and Allan 1992). According to this 
criterion, power transmission networks must remain fully functional in case any one of its 
N system components fails. This criterion ensures a level of redundancy in the system to 
stay operational under small or frequent disruptions. However, this procedure does not 
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fully capture the failure events and associated system performance of networks under 
severe natural hazards such as earthquakes and hurricanes, or targeted attacks such as 
vandalism and terrorism. The vulnerability analysis extends the N – 1 criterion to all 
possible contingency sets, i.e. N - k, with k = 1, 2, …, N. However, this thesis only 
considers the failure of nodes (power plants and substations), since their removal will 
also put the power lines connected to them out of service. Load node failures are 
especially important in studying interdependent systems, as observed in the case study of 
the water distribution network. The adopted vulnerability approach which investigates the 
performance of networks under all node failure contingencies is also the subject of 
percolation studies in network theory literature (Newman 2010), where removing k nodes 
from the system is also interpreted as assigning a uniform probability of failure of 
/f k N  to all nodes in the network and determining system level properties as a 
function of f . 
Although vulnerability studies provide a viable solution to investigate the 
performance of power transmission systems, such studies may involve intractable number 
of simulations for large networks, due to the fact that they require permutations of all 
possible component failures. Therefore, this section also introduces performance bounds 
on the systemic performance. The performance bounds are developed using the results of 
the vulnerability analysis on synthetic networks with extreme topological formations. The 
application of the performance bounds provides reasonable estimates of systemic 
performance with manageable number of simulations for initial assessment and decision 
making. The adopted synthetic networks are referred to as ideal topological formations 
hereafter. 
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 The methodology to implement the vulnerability analysis and the choice of 
system performance metrics are discussed in the next section. This thesis examines 
twenty five case study power transmission networks across the United States along with 
their ideal topological formations. The results of vulnerability analyses on the case study 
networks enable developing the performance bounds, which in turn enable fast systemic 
assessments with reasonable accuracy.  
6.3.1. Vulnerability Analysis Methodology 
The network performance metric may be defined by either topology, such as 
connectivity, or by current flow (Pagani and Aiello 2011). Pagani and Aiello (2011) have 
surveyed many studies on the performance of power networks under attack scenarios, and 
report that the majority of researches focusing on actual networks use topological metrics 
such as efficiency, size of the largest cluster, and the connectivity loss. This research 
adopts Connectivity Loss (CL), proposed by Albert et al. (2004), as the metric for 
vulnerability analysis in order to investigate the performance of power transmission 
networks by topology. Connectivity Loss does not take into account the current 
redistribution process in the system after component failures that often results in the 
failure of additional power lines due to overload. Nevertheless, maintaining connectivity 
is an essential precondition for the network to function under severe conditions (Pagani 
and Aiello 2011). Equation 6.2 presents for formulation of CL upon removing k 
components: 
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where CL(k) is the connectivity loss index for k removed nodes, nG and nD are the number 
of power plants (generators) and substations (distribution nodes), respectively, and n
i
G is 
the number of generator nodes still able to supply power to the i
th
 distribution node after 
removing k nodes. CL(k) varies in [0, 1], assuming the value of zero when the network is 
fully functional and one in case there are no generators connected to any substations. 
In computing CL(k), the k nodes to be removed may be selected from n possible 
nodes where n is the total number of generators and substations. Therefore, computing 
the connectivity loss for k failure contingencies requires C(n, k) simulations, where C(n, 
k) is the combination of k out of n. Consequently, exploring the performance of the 
network under all possible failure contingencies involves a total of 2
n
 failure realizations 
which results in a Non-Polynomial (NP) problem with intractable number of simulations 
for large transmission networks with hundreds to thousands of nodes. For this research, 
the vulnerability requires an estimate of the mean value of CL(k) with 95% confidence 
and an error of 0.005. To comply with the stated error and confidence bound, only 300 
out of C(n, k) scenarios need to be simulated per k value. Nonetheless, the vulnerability 
study on the twenty five case study networks still requires exploiting parallel computing 
on computer clusters due to the size of those systems. The twenty five networks are 
selected from the states of Texas, California, and southeast states of Florida, Tennessee, 
South Carolina, and North Carolina to represent different geographical regions, network 
designs, and growth rates. For each city, the largest connected cluster of the grid within 
the city boundaries is considered. In addition to the case study networks, the vulnerability 
analysis is also performed for ideal topological formations, which are described next. 
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6.3.2. Ideal Topological Formations 
Ideal topological formations have extreme topological characteristics that can 
bound those of the real networks, and are formed by reorganizing, adding or subtracting 
the links connecting the same nodes in the real network. Many past studies compare the 
properties of real networks to those of the random graphs (Watts and Strogatz 1998) or 
the scale-free networks (Albert and Barabasi 2002); however, Minimum Spanning Trees 
(MST) and Greedy Triangulations (GT) are better suited for planar infrastructure 
networks (Buhl et al. 2006; Cardillo et al. 2006). A planar network can be represented in 
the two dimensional space with no link intersections. Planar networks are closest ideal 
representation to capture geographically distributed systems. This research also 
introduces Pseudo-Greedy Triangulation (PGT) for planar networks, as explained below. 
Figure 6.16 depicts schematic representations of MST and PGT formations on a 
16-node lattice network. A spanning tree barely includes the minimum number of links to 
connect all nodes in the network. The Minimum Spanning Tree is a spanning tree that has 
the minimum total edge weight (cost) among all possible spanning trees. If all links are 
assumed to be the same, any spanning tree is a MST. A spanning tree requires only 1n   
links to connect a network of order n. Many real networks tend to be close to a spanning 
tree in structure because it is the most cost efficient topological formation. However, this 
formation compromises the reliability of the network for lack of redundancy as any 
component failure results in a disconnected residual network. A Greedy Triangulation, on 
the other hand, is the maximally connected network formation to comply with the 
planarity constraint, i.e., no edge can be added to a Greedy Triangulation without 
violating the graph planarity. A GT is shown to have 3 6n   edges (Buhl et al. 2006), far 
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less than ( 1) / 2n n  for complete graphs which are not planar, but are used as ideal 
networks as well. A GT formation has many redundant edges in addition to what is 
required for minimum network connectivity (i.e., 1n  ) and, therefore, is far more 
resilient to component failures than spanning trees. On the other hand, GT topologies 
may contain very long edges, for example, an edge connecting two nodes on the extreme 
ends of a network. Such long edges are unlikely to exist in real infrastructure networks 
due to their construction costs. Therefore, PGT, a topological formation close to GT, is 
introduced here which excludes long edges from GT and is more computationally 
efficient to generate as well. If power transmission networks can be morphed into a 
lattice, PGT drops connections between nodes that are farther away than the third 
neighbors. For large networks, the difference in the number of edges between PGT and 
GT is in the order of O( n ). 
  
(a) (b) 
Figure 6.16. . a) Minimum Spanning Tree, and b) Pseudo-Greedy Triagulation formations 
on a 16-node network. The dark nodes represent generators. 
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6.3.3. Vulnerability Analysis by Node Removals 
The vulnerability analysis results are presented in the form of mean connectivity 
loss estimates against the fraction of node removal ( /f k n ). Figure 6.17 shows the 
performance of the 25 case study networks along with the performance of their ideal 
formations. Interestingly, the performance of ideal topological formations in terms of the 
connectivity loss bounds that of the real networks. The figure also reveals that the slope 
of the performance curves roughly remains the same until reaching a critical node 
removal ratio. For real networks, this critical point occurs at around 0.4f   for all the 
networks under study. This value is in good compliance with a theoretical value that 
computes the fraction of component removals until a network is divided into smaller, 
separate networks. The theoretical value for the critical node removal ratio, which 
neglects node degree correlations, is given by (Rosas-Casals et al. 2007): 
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where E[ ]  denotes the expected value, and k is the node degree. Therefore, E[ ]k  is 
equivalent to the average node degree. The value of 
c  is computed to be in [0.35, 0.43] 
for the twenty five case study networks. The conformity of the analytical estimate from 
Equation 6.3 to the observed values in Figure 6.17 in spite of neglecting degree 
correlations is due to the fact that high degree nodes tend to connect to low degree nodes 
in technological networks such as infrastructure systems (Boccaletti et al. 2006). 
Figure 6.17 also reveals that the variability in the performance across the case 
study systems increases from MST to PGT networks. This observation can be explained 
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by the density of the networks and the number of generator nodes selected to be removed 
for a given value of f . Since the curves show the mean CL values, the differences in the 
number of removed generator nodes across different networks results in more variability 
in the sparser MST networks. In far denser PGT networks, the difference in generator 
node removals is minimal, since there will be redundant links to connect the remaining 
substations to the remaining generators. 
 
Figure 6.17. Performance assessment of case study power transmission networks against 
possible failure scenarios in a vulnerability analysis 
The shape of the vulnerability curves may be represented by a bilinear form, both 
for the real networks and their ideal formations. Such bilinear functional forms can be 
exploited to reduce the computational complexity of the problem by implementing the 
vulnerability analysis for enough values of k in order to fit two lines. A sample bilinear 
model fitting is displayed for the transmission network of Los Angeles, CA in Figure 
6.18. As the figure suggests, the actual transmission networks are a better fit to the 
bilinear model compared to their ideal formations. In fact, the error is minimal for the 
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network of Los Angeles, except around the critical node removal fraction. Therefore, the 
application of the bilinear model can save computation time for the vulnerability analysis 
of power transmission networks, especially if the failure scenarios do not involve close to 
40% node removals. The application of the bilinear form is especially useful since most 
practical N – k assessments focus on only a few node removals (k = 1, 2, or 3). Based on 
the bilinear forms, the same assessments can be expanded for higher node removal ratios. 
 
Figure 6.18. Vulnerability curves for the network of Los Angeles, CA. The gap between the 
curves and the tangent dashed lines show the error induced by bilinear model estimation 
In summary, as the dynamics of power grid management gradually change in an 
energy market influenced by deregulation laws, traditional assumptions on contingencies 
such as N – 1 threatening power systems may not be accurate enough for reliability 
analysis. Moreover, the lack of dependable component reliability estimates, in contrast to 
bridge networks where advanced bridge fragility models have emerged, suggests that 
vulnerability analysis may provide adequate understanding of the systemic performance 
over reliability analysis for power transmission networks. As explained in the previous 
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sections, vulnerability analysis does not require the nature of hazards be known; instead, 
it identifies system weaknesses against systematic component failures, and therefore, can 
complement the reliability analysis which studies the performance of the system against 
hazards. 
The performance curves resulting from the vulnerability analysis on the twenty 
five case study networks can be represented by bilinear forms, which can be exploited to 
enhance the computational efficiency of vulnerability analyses for power transmission 
networks. The bilinear functions, which can be considered surrogate models for 
vulnerability analysis, closely match the performance of power transmission systems 
except close to the critical node removal value, which is close to 0.4. 
Despite the limitations of reliability analysis for power transmission networks 
(mainly resulting from the lack of knowledge on all potential hazards), reliability 
evaluations are required for probabilistic risk assessments. The same methods for 
network reliability and risk assessment as well as the interdependency models are 
applicable to power transmission systems. Vulnerability analysis, meanwhile, contributes 
to the design of more resilient power transmission systems by realizing the systemic 
performance against contingencies which may not be included in reliability analysis. 
6.4. Summary 
This chapter illustrated network reliability assessments in three infrastructure 
systems with different performance metrics, reliability objectives, and hazard scenarios. 
For highway bridge networks, the BRAN methodology incorporates different sources of 
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correlations among bridge failures, and evaluates the reliability of large and complex 
networks by a modified MCMC reliability approach. Sources of correlations such as the 
structural conditions of bridges, type of the roads they carry, traffic, and topological 
implications of the bridge network impose extra correlations among the failure 
probabilities that are often impractical to include in the analytical bridge modeling, 
particularly on a structure-by-structure basis. BRAN proposes the use of auxiliary data 
sources to quantify the extra correlations, and uses a practical approach based on the 
general Dichotomized Gaussian Method (DGM) to simulate correlated bridge failures. 
Furthermore, BRAN makes use of data available from field instrumentation of 
bridges, and provides enhanced bridge fragility models to account for aging and 
deterioration. Application of BRAN to seismic reliability assessment of the case study 
bridge network in South Carolina reveals that neglecting the extra correlations among 
bridge failures may lead to over or underestimation of network reliability estimates, 
depending on the sign of correlations and network topology. 
The BRAN methodology is also used to assess the probabilistic seismic risk of the 
South Carolina bridge network, by providing the annual probability of exceeding network 
reliability levels. For risk assessment, a data set of network reliability evaluations by 
BRAN is used to form a surrogate model by statistical learning methods, which then 
replaces network reliability algorithms such as MCMC for reliability assessments. The 
application to the South Carolina bridge network shows surrogate models formed by 
random forests are well suited for reliability and risk assessment in networks. Two 
approaches are used to generate the input data for model selection: 1) independent 
uniform sampling of bridge failure probabilities, and 2) simulating bridge failure 
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probabilities according to network consistent seismic scenarios. Both approaches are 
shown to provide surrogate models which estimate the outcome of the case study seismic 
scenario with high accuracy. Nevertheless, the second approach provides further 
improvements as it builds upon hazard scenario reduction methods such as importance 
sampling. 
The case study of South Carolina bridge network also applies the importance 
measures developed in Chapter 5 to assess the criticality of bridges for seismic 
retrofitting. Both developed methods, the Bridge Rank (BR) and Random Forest 
Importance Measure (RFIM) account for the role of bridges within the network in 
addition to bridge vulnerabilities. BR is shown to be a fast, all-to-all implementation 
providing a balance between those two criteria for a given hazard scenario. RFIM, on the 
other hand, provides a probabilistic ranking which is not dependent on a single hazard 
scenario, but customized towards network reliability objectives. Nonetheless, both 
methods offer bridge rankings that are significantly different from the practical 
approaches in the seismic retrofit manual of highway bridges or other approaches not 
considering both ranking criteria (bridge vulnerabilities and their role in the network). 
Moreover, since the developed methods rely on dependable estimates of bridge 
vulnerabilities, they benefit from the BRAN methodology, in which enhanced fragility 
models account for bridge deterioration mechanisms to provide present day bridge failure 
probabilities. 
While the same methodologies are transferrable across different infrastructure 
systems, the case studies on water distribution networks and the power transmission grid 
emphasize different aspects of reliability and risk analysis. For the case study water 
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distribution network under the hurricane hazard, the adopted network reliability objective 
is to provide a minimum water pressure at the consumption nodes, presenting a reliability 
objective different from connectivity reliability. As the result, hydraulic simulations by 
EPANET replace the connectivity reliability analysis used for the highway bridge 
networks. The components of the water distribution network are assumed to be 
invulnerable to direct hit from the hurricane; although small vulnerability levels are 
assumed for sensitivity analyses. Nevertheless, the interdependency with the power grid 
causes failures in power load nodes to propagate to pump stations in the water system. A 
two stage reliability analysis is adopted for the performed reliability evaluations, which 
decouples the failure propagation in the power and water systems. The results show that 
interdependency-induced failures account for most of the water pressure shortage in the 
reliability analysis against simulated hurricanes of Category 1 to 5. The methodology 
presented to study the interdependence between power and water networks is transferable 
to other infrastructure systems as well, especially since most infrastructure systems show 
interdependent response against natural hazards. 
The reliability of power transmission networks may be analyzed using similar 
reliability methods as BRAN; however, because the hazard scenarios influencing the 
performance of the power grid are very diverse, and all significant scenarios may not be 
accounted for in a reliability study. Therefore, the performance of twenty five case study 
power distribution networks is evaluated using vulnerability analysis, which investigates 
the performance of the system against a wide range of failure contingencies without 
associating them with specific hazard scenarios. Vulnerability analysis provides insights 
to identify systemic weaknesses of the systems under study, and can complement the 
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reliability analysis. The performance metric for vulnerability analysis is selected to be the 
Connectivity Loss, which is widely used in the study of electric power systems and is 
different from the metrics used in this thesis for water and bridge networks. The 
vulnerability study is performed on the ideal topological formations (networks set up 
based on the case study networks with extreme topological characteristics) in addition to 
the twenty five case study networks. Ideal formations Minimum Spanning Tree (MST) 
and Pseudo-Greedy Triangulation (PGT) are shown to provide bounds on the 
performance of their corresponding case study networks in the vulnerability analysis. 
Moreover, the functional form of the resulting vulnerability curves allows for a surrogate 
bilinear function to be fitted to those curves. The use of bilinear models can significantly 
reduce the computational complexity of vulnerability analysis, especially for large power 
transmission networks, and provide approximations with minimal error except for node 
removal ratios close to the critical value, which is around 0.4 for the case study networks. 
The vulnerability study is not a direct replacement for the reliability evaluations, 
especially since the latter are needed for risk assessments. However, urban infrastructure 
systems can benefit from joint reliability and vulnerability analysis to study their 
systemic behavior which can result in the emergence of more resilient systems. 
The next chapter provides a summary of the contributions that the developed 
methods in this thesis have made to the reliability and risk evaluations of critical urban 
infrastructure systems. Additionally, it identifies areas for improvement and lists 
opportunities for future research, which concludes this thesis. 
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Chapter 7 
Conclusions and Future Research 
With the urban population around the globe on a sharp and steady rise, maintaining and 
expanding urban infrastructure systems has become critically important at both the local 
and the national levels, where lifeline systems are the subject of a wide range of studies 
from engineering to public safety and homeland security. Reliability and risk evaluations 
of infrastructure systems under natural hazards are part of this awareness movement that 
supports the development of informed operation, management and renewal plans by 
system stakeholders; however the size and complexity of infrastructure systems are often 
limiting for realistic modeling and analysis. Hence, this thesis develops new frameworks 
which enable practical modeling of networked infrastructure systems by providing more 
efficient computational methods for reliability and risk assessment using a variety of 
contemporary metrics and objectives. A literature review of the existing studies on 
reliability and risk assessment of infrastructure systems has revealed three areas for 
improvement, which became the three major research questions of this thesis, including: 
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1. The need for an enhanced network reliability assessment framework which is 
applicable to large, complex infrastructure systems and can account for multiple 
sources of correlations among component failures as well as their deteriorating 
condition over time, 
2. The need for highly efficient risk assessment frameworks which enable 
incorporating a large number of hazard scenarios without requiring an otherwise 
intractable number of simulations for large systems, 
3. The need for improved component prioritization methods that account for the 
components’ role inside the network in addition to the component vulnerabilities. 
The contributions of the developed methods in this thesis with regard to the above 
research questions are summarized in Section 7.1, while Section 7.2 identifies areas for 
further improvement, and elaborates on opportunities for future research. 
7.1. Summary and Concluding Remarks 
The Bridge Reliability Assessment in Networks (BRAN) methodology for bridge 
reliability assessments in networks quantifies and incorporates the effects of extra 
correlations for the first time. While bridge failure correlations induced by seismic 
intensity at bridge locations have been the subject of extensive reliability and risk studies, 
the extra correlation have not received the same amount of attention despite being a 
known need (Lee and Kiremidjian 2007). BRAN uses auxiliary data sources in bridge 
condition ratings, functional road classes, and network topological similarities in order to 
quantify these extra correlations. In addition, it provides a methodology to simulate 
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samples from multi-dimensional Bernoulli random variables with a correlation matrix by 
the tractable Dichotomized Gaussian Method (DGM). DGM simulates correlated bridge 
failures to be used in a Markov Chain Monte Carlo simulations reliability method 
(MCMC), which is modified for incorporating correlated component failures. The 
seismic reliability assessment of the bridge network in South Carolina, US (509 bridges) 
against a defined seismic scenario shows the potential impact of extra correlations on 
reliability estimates. A sensitivity analysis with varying correlation levels also confirms 
that ignoring the extra correlations can lead to over or underestimation of network 
probability of failure. The estimates of the network failure probability are varying by 
20% when different correlation levels are considered. 
BRAN has focused on highway bridge networks, as one of the most critical 
infrastructure systems in urban societies along with power and telecommunication. The 
BRAN framework takes advantage of the availability of advances bridge fragility models 
which account for deteriorating bridge conditions. However, the same methodology can 
apply to evaluate the reliability of other infrastructure systems, such as water distribution 
systems and the power transmission grid, once component failure probabilities are 
identified using a physics-based model similar to bridge fragility models. 
The BRAN methodology is also applied to probabilistic risk assessment, where 
network connectivity reliability is adopted as the network performance metric. Although 
BRAN is efficient for single scenario reliability evaluation, the number of required 
hazard scenarios which need to be analyzed in a probabilistic risk study (i.e. 1,000 in the 
presented case study) can be prohibitive. Accordingly, this thesis develops surrogate 
models which are trained based on a limited number of hazard scenario evaluations by 
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BRAN. The development of the surrogate models applies emerging methods from 
statistical learning such as random forests, which efficiently establish a predictive 
network reliability model with minimal errors. The use of surrogate models in network 
reliability and risk assessment studies has not been explored before, and is introduced in 
this thesis for the first time. Random forests are found to be well suited for network 
reliability applications due to their ability to de-emphasize the contributions of 
insignificant bridges in the network. The abundance of irrelevant features introduced in 
the statistical learning model by such bridges can deteriorate the performance of other 
methods, for example the Support Vector Machines. 
In addition to developing frameworks to assess the reliability and risk in 
networked systems, this research has developed novel methods to prioritize the criticality 
of network components for retrofit actions. The application has been shown for highway 
bridge networks and seismic hazard, but the methods are transferrable to other systems 
(water, power, telecommunication, etc.) under different types of hazards as well. Two 
new importance measures are developed in this thesis. They enhance upon the current 
practical or state-of-the-art methods on the bridge seismic retrofit prioritization in terms 
of scope, computational complexity, and applicability. Bridge Rank (BR) builds upon the 
PageRank algorithm, and provides a method to balance the contributions from network 
topology and bridge vulnerabilities due to a hazard scenario to its rankings. The 
advantage of BR to other importance measures is in its fast implementation, and the 
flexibility to give more importance to the contribution of either aspects (bridge 
vulnerability or role in network). The Random Forests Importance Measure (RFIM), on 
the other hand, does not depend on a particular hazard scenario, which makes it 
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especially desirable for probabilistic risk assessment studies, where the network 
stakeholders want to evaluate the overall significance of bridges within a highway 
transportation system with no regard to a certain hazard scenario. 
Contributions to study the performance of water distribution and power 
transmission networks build upon the methods presented for highway bridge networks, 
but focus on different and also important aspects of interdependency and vulnerability 
analysis. The two-stage interdependency method to evaluate the reliability of water 
distribution networks under hurricane hazard is introduced for the first time, which 
enables hydraulic system reliability evaluations of large water networks. Although the 
literature offers an established record of interdependence studies between the power and 
water networks, such interdependencies have not been the subject of reliability studies 
with hydraulic analysis in the past. The computational intensity of Monte Carlo 
simulations with the adopted flow based metric requires efficient treatment of the 
interdependence links between power and water systems, which is incorporated in the 
presented two-stage framework. The developed methodology may help the system 
stakeholders with planning, particularly against hurricanes in the coastal communities, 
and be better prepared in devising restoration plans by identifying the troubled areas in 
the network. For power transmission networks, a vulnerability study, which explores 
failure contingencies N – k, is proposed to complement reliability studies, since the major 
threatening hazards and component fragilities are not as easily identifiable for such 
systems as for other networks. However, comprehensive vulnerability analyses are 
computationally intensive, and require cloud computing to implement. Therefore, this 
thesis proposes topological bounds on systemic performances in vulnerability analysis for 
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rapid assessments. Moreover, a new ideal topological formation, Pseudo-Greedy 
Triangulation (PGT) is proposed for planar infrastructure networks. Together with the 
Minimum Spanning Tree (MST), the ideal formations provide bounds on the 
performance of power transmission networks in vulnerability studies. The evaluated 
performance curves are also found to follow a bilinear form, which can replace the curves 
with minimal error except around the node removal ratio of 0.4. Using the bilinear 
functions as surrogates to the performance curves enables expedited vulnerability 
evaluations with reduced simulations. 
7.2. Future Research Opportunities 
The presented BRAN methodology is generally applicable to reliability and risk 
evaluation of infrastructure networks with a range of reliability objectives. In bridge 
network studies, specifically, travel time and network traffic capacity have been 
extensively used in the literature as performance metrics for reliability and risk 
evaluations. To incorporate those performance metrics in the seismic reliability studies of 
transportation systems, specific models are available to relate the structural damage to the 
bridge structures to the traffic flow capacity reductions, e.g. in HAZUS (FEMA 2008) 
among others. Moreover, a range of traffic assignment models with varying complexity 
are available to predict the traffic demand in the aftermath of natural disasters. Integrating 
either of those approaches enhances the presented BRAN methodology. Furthermore, 
network surrogate models can be formed for the new reliability objectives as well in 
order to perform risk assessments that require a multiplicity of scenarios for convolving 
hazard with fragility. 
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While the application of BRAN is shown to seismic reliability and risk 
assessment of bridge networks, the hurricane hazard can readily be incorporated within 
the same procedure. Similar to bridge seismic fragility models, fragility models for 
hurricane hazard are also emerging in the literature. Those models evaluate the bridge 
failure probabilities in a hurricane scenario, after which BRAN can be applied to perform 
reliability and risk assessments. The same network surrogate models are still applicable 
to any other hazard as well, since they only depend on learning the functional form of the 
limit state function, not the input bridge failure probabilities. 
With regard to the importance measures, a framework may be devised for Bridge 
Rank to provide a probabilistic ranking similar to the one offered by random forests 
importance measure. Since the hazard event contribution only appears in the matrix of 
bridge vulnerabilities in the formulation of the Bridge Rank, providing a probabilistic 
ranking simply requires a modified definition for the bridge vulnerability matrix. A 
probabilistic Bridge Rank can be employed where specific origin and destination nodes 
are not considered for bridge prioritization, and can complement the (O, D) dependent 
rankings by random forests. 
In addition to the proposed expansion opportunities, there are prospective areas to 
further improve this research. The extra correlations have been estimated using auxiliary 
data sources in this thesis. However, those estimates may be improved in future when the 
data from detailed post-hazard reconnaissance reports is mined to associate extra 
correlations with specific structural details, material, deterioration, and live load. The 
framework to account for extra correlations in BRAN can accommodate such enhanced 
correlation estimates for an added accuracy in network reliability and risk assessments. 
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Finally, reliability and risk evaluations can be part of a resilience study, where 
they are considered along with system recovery and restoration process after a natural 
disaster. Resilience studies are receiving increasing attention in recent years, as they 
discuss the intervention actions in addition to probabilistic prediction of hazard outcomes. 
Accordingly, intervention scenarios may be devised using component prioritization 
schemes in order to evaluate their influence on system restoration to pre-hazard 
conditions. 
The computational frameworks developed in this research, such as BRAN, 
surrogate models by statistical learning methods, and importance measures, provide 
unprecedented opportunities to explore various what-if questions. Consequently, system 
stakeholders can make more informed decisions on reliable maintenance and expansion 
of infrastructure networks against natural hazards. 
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Appendix A 
This section provides a proof to support the independence assumption among 
bridges with very large or very small failure probabilities. The level of dependencies is 
evaluated by the difference between the joint failure probability Pij and the product of 
marginal probabilities PiPj. The three possible combinations with extreme failure 
probabilities among bridges are examined: 
Case 1) Pi → 0 and Pj → 0 
Assume Pi = Pjas  → 0. From Equation 3.9: 
   1  1ij i j ij i i j jP PP R P P P P      
2
1ijR     1 0     0ijR as        
Case 2) Pi → 1 and Pj → 0 
Assume Pi = 1 –  and Pjwhere  → 0. Similar to Case 1: 
        
2
1  1 1 1 0     0ij i j ij i i j j ij ijP PP R P P P P R R as               
Case 3) Pi → 1 and Pj → 1 
Assume Pi = Pj = 1 –  where  → 0. Similarly: 
        
2
1  1 1 1 0     0ij i j ij i i j j ij ijP PP R P P P P R R as               
Q.E.D. 
In application of the Dichotomized Gaussian Method (DGM) to simulate 
realizations of the n-dimensional Bernoulli random variable (Section 3.4),  is selected to 
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be 0.05. Smaller values have found to induce numerical instabilities in the DGM process, 
and should be avoided. 
